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Abstract 
 
When the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched in 2004 expectations of 
its potential were low because it lacks the ability to offer EU membership as an 
incentive, which was found to be pivotal for the EU to have influence in the Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEECs). Nevertheless, progress reports have 
demonstrated that some convergence toward the EU standards has taken place in the 
neighbouring countries. This research seeks to understand under which conditions 
compliance takes place, what explains the variation in (non)compliance with the EU 
standards in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and what influence does the 
EU have.  It examines formal and behavioural compliance with the EU action plan 
recommendations in the area of border guard reform, readmission agreement, asylum 
and refugee protection, and criminalisation of human trafficking in Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine. The three states have all expressed interest in EU membership, but they 
vary in their potential to be considered as candidates and in their identification with the 
EU. Rather than assuming that the EU’s influence is low in the neighbourhood because 
it cannot offer a certain membership incentive, this research studies the problem by 
focusing on a combination of explanatory factors drawn from rational choice and 
sociological/constructivist institutionalism both at the macro level (strength of 
membership prospect and  identification with the EU) and at the issue-specific levels. 
The research demonstrates that the EU’s influence is differential and dependent on 
domestic, external and issue-specific conditions. The results indicate that the EU is 
capable of eliciting influence in the JHA area without a certain EU membership 
prospect. However, when the country perceives that there is a possibility to accede to 
the EU, compliance with the EU standards has been more even across the four issue 
areas and at the formal and behavioural levels.  
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The goal of accession is certainly the most 
powerful stimulus for reform we can think 
of. But why should a less ambitious goal 
not have some effect?  
(Prodi 2002) 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Setting the Context: the EU and its Neighbourhood  
After the collapse of communism, whilst many Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) had already taken a path to transition, Georgia and Moldova were struggling 
with secessionist conflicts and Ukraine was coming to terms with being a state with its 
own rights as territorial questions remained unsolved with Russia until 1998 and as 
economic collapse aggravated reluctance to pursue reform (Magocsi 1996; Bremmer 
2006). Despite the struggle for stability, since the mid-1990s, the three countries have 
expressed their interest in being considered as potential candidates for EU membership 
and declared the wish of returning to Europe which they considered to be their 
ideological and cultural home. Nevertheless, little attention was given for their bids by 
the EU and throughout the 1990s the relationship remained limited within the 
framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA). Indeed, it was only 
in 2000 when the EU finally started to pay increasing attention to the three states. This 
was related to the realisation of the potential consequences of the enlargement that was 
set to take place in 2004. It increased concern over the soft security threats that the EU 
recognised in the neighbourhood and which it expected would become more relevant for 
the EU due to the enlargement. Following this realisation, the EU launched the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to address ‘dividing lines’ between the 
neighbourhood and the new member states and promised to share ‘everything but 
institutions’ with the neighbourhood (Prodi 2002). The three states, which expected to 
be considered as potential candidates, however, saw the ENP as a sign that membership 
was less likely for them and felt that they were considered as the new buffer zone for 
the EU instead. 
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In this setting, where the EU was aiming to increase its own security while addressing 
the neighbourhood’s soft security threats, the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) issues 
became one of the priorities of the ENP (Occipinti 2007; Wichmann 2007).  
This research aims to understand what influence the EU has in its Eastern 
neighbourhood in the area of JHA in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. More specifically 
it seeks to answer: under what conditions does compliance with the EU demands take 
place? What explains variance in (non)compliance with the EU action plan 
recommendations? 
The empirical goal is to establish the EU’s potential influence in the neighbourhood 
when EU enlargement is coming closer to its limits and when the ENP may be the only 
policy framework for cooperation through which the EU can have influence in the 
neighbourhood. 
This research theoretically builds on the research understanding the EU’s domestic 
influence on non-member states and thus engages in debates of Europeanisation and 
external governance. It draws on new institutionalist approaches to explain what 
influence the EU has in the eastern neighbourhood.  
It aims to provide answers on the sources of EU leverage and limitations to influence 
the EU neighbourhood.  After the launch of the ENP the EU’s potential influence 
remained scarcely researched due to its recent nature and also as it was approached from 
the point of view that without the EU’s membership incentive it would not be likely to 
have influence. Even if the external governance literature in the last few years has 
started producing empirical findings, it has focused mainly on understanding the EU 
influence focusing on the sectoral level and has not considered the potential influence of 
the macro-level factors across target states. This research argues that understanding the 
EU’s potential influence through its neighbourhood policy frameworks could however 
benefit from drawing on both macro and issue-specific level factors as some countries 
still may be eligible for EU membership. This, albeit vague, possibility to join the EU, 
may impact their calculation of whether or not to comply. Moreover, some countries 
which identify with the EU may be more prone to comply with the EU standards in 
absence of strong material incentives. 
Sufficient time has now elapsed from the initiation of the action plans, upgrading the 
EU policy toward the Eastern neighbourhood through the introduction of the Eastern 
13 
 
Partnership (EaP) and moving onto discussions about Association Agreements in order 
to draw conclusions on the EU’s influence not only at a formal level but also for seeing 
whether the adopted laws have been acted out.  
The rest of this chapter will briefly introduce the ENP and its origins and tools, and the 
JHA area which the research focuses on before stating the main arguments and findings 
of the research and the structure for the rest of the thesis.  
1.1 The European Neighbourhood Policy  
The European Neighbourhood Policy was initiated to create a ‘ring of friends’ between 
the EU members and the new EU neighbours and thus to reduce the potential 
consequences of the 2004 enlargement. It builds on the previous cooperation structures 
of the countries in the east and the south on the basis of mutual commitment to common 
values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy 
principles and sustainable development) (European Commission 2004). In the 
Mediterranean it builds on the cooperation structure of Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
which has been in force since 1995 but has largely failed in delivering expected changes 
(Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005). In the eastern neighbourhood it strengthens the 
relations that had previously been covered by the PCA.  
Within its communication and strategic papers, three values are the main objectives of 
the partnership: security, prosperity and stability. The action plans, which are negotiated 
between the partner states and the EU, became responsible for furthering these 
objectives within the ENP. The eastern members of Ukraine and Moldova have been 
implementing them since 2005 and Georgia since 2006. Each of the action plans 
contains priorities based on the assessment of the country’s key concerns and has both 
long and short-term objectives. The target countries pursue these priorities during a 3-5 
year timeline. The priorities of the ENP in the action plans have a common structure 
including issues relating to political dialogue and reform, economic and social 
cooperation and development, trade-related issues, and market and regulatory reform, 
and in cooperation with the JHA issues. In addition, it outlines cooperation in sectors 
such as transport, energy, research and development and emphasises also a focus on a 
human dimension (such as people-to-people contacts, civil society, public health) 
(European Commission 2004).  
14 
 
While the ENP does not deny the potential for membership it does not offer it. The EU 
is aiming to promote its standards through a variety of other tools. These tools can be 
divided into those associated with conditionality, with normative pressure and capacity 
building tools and thus they resemble the tools that were in use also during the Eastern 
enlargement. The EU uses in its neighbourhood a variety of incentives related to 
economic, security and societal levels to elicit compliance with its conditional demands. 
At the economic level it offers an extension of the internal market, preferential trading 
relations and market opening. It also supports integration into the global trading system. 
As the most sizeable incentive the ENP has declared ‘a stake in the EU internal market’ 
(Ferrero-Waldner 2006a), while EaP has offered the opportunity for a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). At the security level incentives are 
possibilities for lawful migration and movement of persons, intensified cooperation to 
prevent and combat common security threats, greater EU involvement in conflict 
prevention and crisis management and greater efforts to promote human rights 
(Canciani 2007).  Since the EaP, the EU also introduced an incentive with a long term 
perspective for visa liberalisation for the EaP countries. For overall societal 
development the EU offers further cooperation opportunities in the area of cultural 
cooperation, integration into transport, energy and telecommunications networks and 
the European research area.
1
 
Besides conditional incentives the EU can use normative pressure, capacity building 
and financial aid. Tools associated with normative pressure are official statements and 
declarations describing the desired direction of policy, missions in the field/ad hoc 
visits, legal expert teams (Canciani 2007). The EU aims to build capacity and 
knowledge through allowing participation in its own programmes and institutions such 
as TAIEX, Twinning and FRONTEX, and Europol since the initiation of the ENP. 
Within the economic tools, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI) has been focusing on the financial support within the ENP since 2007. It has 
taken over the previous funding of Meda and Tacis and has a budget of €11.2 billion 
from 2007-2013 (Canciani 2007). 
                                                          
1
 See Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbour, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
11.03.2003, pp. 9-15. 
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1.2 Externalisation of the Justice and Home Affairs sector into the Neighbourhood 
When JHA was formalised as a part of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, it was 
primarily concerned with the EU’s internal security and keeping the threatening factors 
away from its borders. Since the late 1990s there has been an increasing interest by the 
EU and the member states to cooperate with non-EU countries on security related issues 
and the JHA issues started to become externalised already in 1998 when in the Vienna 
action programme EU governments outlined a goal to increase the EU's influence in 
international cooperation in regard to internal security matters (Zhyznomirska 2011). 
When the Tampere Programme officially introduced for the first time the external 
dimension of Freedom Security and Justice (FSJ) it aimed to incorporate the FSJ issues 
into the Union’s external policy (European Council 2000:5; Zhyznomirska 2011). The 
aim of the ENP was simultaneously to ‘soften’ but secure the borders between the EU 
and the new neighbours and not surprisingly, the JHA issues became one of the priority 
areas under the ENP. 
 
Already prior to the ENP the JHA issues featured for the first time in regard to the 
neighbourhood in the JHA action plan which was created for Ukraine in 2001. In regard 
to Moldova and Georgia the JHA priorities were formed as a part the of their ENP 
action plans. In all of the action plans however the same priorities exist covering 
sections of migration (legal, illegal, readmission, asylum, visa), border management, the 
fight against organised crime (including human trafficking), drugs, money laundering 
and economic crime and police and  judicial cooperation.  
 
While most of the ENP action plan priorities related to the JHA section include 
provisions for enhancing the EU’s security by enhancing border control and controlling 
illegal immigration, the action plans also address the human aspect of organised crime 
and irregular migration. For instance, the readmission agreement section aims for a 
facilitation of readmission but also calls for enhancement of the reintegration of own 
nationals or improving detention centres and while human trafficking is primarily 
treated as an organised crime at the border, the action plan also encourages the 
governments to address  victims and establish programmes to prevent trafficking.  
1.3 Research Scope and Argument  
Having defined the origins and purpose of the ENP and JHA, which form the core of 
this research, this section defines the scope of the research and the main thesis 
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argument. This research seeks to understand the EU’s influence in the Eastern 
neighbourhood and focuses on the three most likely cases: Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine in four areas of the JHA standards from 2000 until the end of 2011.  It employs 
a framework for study which provides for variation in the explanatory factors. In this 
way it aims not to overestimate the EU’s influence in the cases and to understand the 
true potential of the EU to promote influence.  The focus is on four JHA issues which 
vary in regard to their level of clarity of incentives and legitimacy as chapter three 
explains: border guard reform, readmission agreement, asylum and refugee protection, 
and criminalisation and punishment of human trafficking.  
The research results indicate in sum that the EU’s influence was differential depending 
on the country conditions, external setting and issue-specific factors. Whereas the lack 
of membership did not halt compliance, in cases where it was believed to be a 
possibility, compliance was more uniform across issues as exemplified in the case of 
Moldova. Where there were no membership expectations but high levels of 
identification what mattered was how legitimate the issues were for the country. 
Georgia was complying with the issues which it perceived as ‘the right thing to do’ but 
such compliance did not indicate the EU’s direct influence as Georgia was rather 
following the standards of  international organisations which had been present even 
before the EU and which the EU was also referring to in its action plans. Issues which 
did not use issue-specific incentives were also indicating that compliance was induced 
due to international standards rather than to the EU ones.  
1.4 Structure of the Thesis  
These arguments are developed in the rest of the thesis which is structured in the 
following way: chapter two discusses previous research and theoretical approaches in 
studying the EU’s influence and through pinpointing the gaps forms hypotheses for the 
EU’s influence in the ENP countries. The third chapter explains the methodology and 
data sources for the research. Chapters from four to seven form the empirical part of the 
thesis. Chapter four establishes the level of membership potential by examining the 
main strengths and weaknesses of the countries in regard to the Copenhagen Criteria 
and countries’ own perceptions on the potential likelihood of EU accession. It then 
establishes the levels of identification with the EU in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 
The chapter demonstrates that whereas Georgia identifies most with the EU, its 
likelihood of eventual membership is least favourable. Moldova since 2009 represents a 
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country which has the highest likelihood of EU membership potential and which also 
has had high expectations of it to take place one day. However, it identifies less with the 
EU and throughout history it has both identified with the EU and Russia. Ukraine saw 
membership as a potential until 2007 but since then considered it to be lost and 
therefore has been motivated by the prospect of still having a membership potential only 
from 2002 until 2007. Ukraine’s identification with the EU has varied between the East 
and the West and while the elite in general has chosen the EU as a ‘family’ to belong to 
there is  not a shared consensus on it. Having clarified these country specific factors, 
chapter five focuses on issue-specific questions in four different issue areas within the 
JHA sector in Georgia, traces back the reasons for (non)compliance and draws back 
both to macro and issue specific reasons in establishing the EU’s role in each case. 
Chapter six follows the same structure discussing issues related to Moldova and chapter 
seven discusses the issues related to Ukraine. The final chapter draws conclusions on 
the conditions under which compliance takes place and establishes the necessary 
conditions for compliance and for the EU’s influence in the neighbourhood. It then 
discusses the importance of the research in the light of previous research and the 
findings’ implications for future research. 
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2. From Theoretical Framework towards Analytical Framework: New 
Institutionalism, Europeanisation and External Governance  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The EU’s influence in the member states, candidate states and lately in the 
neighbourhood countries has been captured by the Europeanisation and external 
governance literature. The Europeanisation literature was mostly developed in the 
context of the CEECs and has increased significantly since early 2000. More recently 
literature on ‘Europeanisation beyond the EU’ and external governance, focusing on the 
ENP states, has contributed with empirical results and theoretical insights about the 
EU’s potential outside the candidate states. These strands of literature have most often 
drawn on the rationalist and constructivist approaches of new institutionalism to assess 
the EU’s influence. 
This chapter introduces the findings of the Europeanisation literature in the CEECs, its 
application beyond the EU in evaluating the EU’s influence and the findings of the 
external governance literature. In doing so it identifies factors that were important for 
the EU to elicit influence and gaps that have not previously been addressed. Drawing on 
these lessons and gaps this chapter introduces a framework for studying the ENP’s 
influence in the neighbourhood.  
The main argument of the chapter is that while Europeanisation research in the CEECs 
produced important findings about the EU’s potential and established that the prospect 
of the EU membership was necessary in order to have influence in the CEECs, it should 
not be a starting point for assuming the EU’s lack of influence in the ENP states. This 
was the approach in the early literature interested in the ENP states and consequently 
little empirical research was then conducted. A further argument that this chapter makes 
is that while this gap of empirical research on the EU’s influence in the ENP states has 
been increasingly filled in the last few years by focusing more on the sector level issues, 
the need remains to bridge country related (macro) and issue-specific (micro) variables 
drawing from both rationalist and constructivist backgrounds in order to understand 
why there is variance in the levels of compliance with the EU demands in the ENP 
states and ultimately the EU’s potential  influence in the neighbourhood.  
This chapter introduces first the theoretical framework for studying the EU’s influence 
before drawing hypotheses and introducing the framework for analysis. It starts by 
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introducing the new institutionalist approaches: rational choice and sociological 
institutionalism. The second part discusses explanations of the EU’s influence in the 
CEECs and the lessons from applying these to the ENP countries. Then it moves onto 
the more recent literature which has been engaging in explaining modes of EU external 
governance and which has started also to analyse the EU’s influence in the 
neighbourhood. Based on these contributions and gaps the last section creates 
hypotheses for the research that will be operationalised in the following chapter.  
2.2 New Institutionalist Rational Choice and Sociological Institutionalism 
Research on the EU’s influence in the member states and beyond most often contrasts 
rational choice and constructivist/sociological approaches. These new institutionalist 
approaches have their origin in the logic of March and Olsen’s (1989) modes of social 
action: ‘logic of consequentialism’ and ‘logic of appropriateness’. The former, which is 
in the realm of rational choice, assumes that actors follow the ‘logic of 
consequentialism’, which means that the countries choose the most advantageous option 
from those available (Schimmelfennig 2005). Thus, the main tool for the EU is 
conditionality according to the rational choice logic (i.e. Grabbe 2003; Schimmelfennig 
et al. 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudová 2005).  The EU can use 
either positive or negative incentives to influence the target country. The EU’s influence 
by conditionality is based on setting out demands, which the country might adopt if they 
are gaining more benefits from complying with a demand than they lose out in costs. 
The EU can also threaten to hold back rewards in cases of non-compliance. The latter, 
the logic of appropriateness, based on constructivist/sociological institutionalist 
thinking, assumes that the most appropriate course of action within the circumstances is 
chosen. Its instruments are the politics of socialisation, which implies arguing and 
persuading which may result in the internalisation of new norms and values 
(Schimmelfennig 2005).  The approach views that actors conform to prescribed 
behaviour out of a normative commitment or habit (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2005:10). Therefore, whether the countries find the EU or its rules legitimate or 
acceptable carries importance according to this view (Checkel 2000; Kelley 2004; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). 
2.3 Europeanisation in the CEECs 
The concept of Europeanisation has been at the heart of research describing the EU’s 
influence toward the CEECs since 2000. It has been employed when discussing the 
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EU’s impact in the candidate or member states especially in adherence to the acquis 
communautaire (Radaelli 2000; Börzel and Risse 2000; Kelley 2006; Grabbe 2006; 
Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Vachudová 2005). Radaelli defines Europeanisation as 
consisting of a process of:  
‘construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs 
and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and 
then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, 
identities, political structures and public policies’ (2003: 30).  
The term ‘Europeanisation’ has no analytical power, being rather a process than an 
explanatory framework to describe the process of downloading ‘European Union 
regulations and institutional structures to a domestic level’ (Howell 2005: 1).  
Europeanisation research has identified a large amount of mechanisms to explain EU 
influence. The frameworks and mechanisms explaining the EU’s influence have had 
different starting points. They emphasise either rationalist or constructivist factors and 
they focus on variables paying either more attention to the EU conditions, the domestic 
conditions or a mix of both (Timuş 2007; Sedelmeier 2006, 2011).  
The EU based variables for explaining influence have highlighted the EU’s strength of 
conditionality and other control mechanisms in the analysis (Grabbe 2001; Smith, 
2003:3; 2005; Tulmets 2005). Some others have also stressed the importance of 
domestic factors (Schimmelfennig 2005; Vachudová 2005). Lately, a mix of these two 
sources of variables including domestic and EU related factors drawn both from 
constructivist and rationalist sources have formed the basis of explanatory frameworks 
that try to capture the pathways through which Europeanisation takes place. Examples 
of such frameworks are Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s external incentives model, 
social learning and lesson drawing models (2005), Bauer et al. (2007) explaining 
influence through compliance, competition and communication models or Kubiček 
explaining democratisation through control, contagion, convergence and conditionality 
(2003). 
The EU related factors in the research, which have especially been emphasised as being 
important for influence, have been size and credibility of incentives while at the 
domestic level  veto players, resonance,  adjustment costs, type of government and party 
constellations (Vachudová 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005), identification, 
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past legacies and domestic capacity (Barbé et al. 2009:835) have been explanatory 
factors.  
While the CEECs research has brought a multitude of frameworks and explanatory 
factors for explaining the EU’s influence in the CEECs, a consensus seems to remain 
that the EU’s most successful strategy was to offer a membership incentive as a 
condition for meeting its demands.  
Other findings in regard to the CEECs were also determining that the rationalist logic 
best explained influence. Without it, compliance that took place was patchy and 
selective (Schimmelfennig 2004:220). Moreover, it was also found that political and 
social incentives were not enough on their own but they also needed to be material and 
economical (Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008). Overall, conditionality was especially 
effective when the costs were low and did not threaten the elite’s hold on power 
(Lavenex 2004; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2006; Lang, 2007; Lavenex et al. 2008). 
In comparison, socialisation techniques were only influential in very limited cases, 
giving a direction for the process or support if it was already ongoing (Kelley 2004; 
Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Vachudová 2005). This was, however, only in the 
countries that were considered more liberal (Schimmelfennig 2010). In later stages 
socialisation was beneficial together with membership incentive as it helped 
convergence even when costs were high (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). In 
cases where costs were low socialising power or persuasion were marginally successful 
in the CEECs (Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig 2005).   
2.4 The EU’s Leverage in the Neighbourhood 
The EU’s leverage in the neighbourhood has recently been discussed both in literature 
on Europeanisation beyond the EU and external governance (Börzel and Risse 2004; 
Lavenex 2004; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2006; Bretherton and Vogler 2006). 
Whereas research under these concepts have been focusing on the ENP firstly as a tool 
for the EU’s aim to externalise its governance and to understand how it does so 
(Tulmets 2006; Meloni 2006), recently there has been an increasing interest in 
understanding through empirical research its effectiveness and thus the EU’s leverage to 
influence the ENP states.  
Soon after the ENP launch in 2004, literature on the ENP started emerging firstly 
focusing on the ENP as a phenomenon and discussing the role the EU has in governance 
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and where does it fit in terms of the EU's civilian normative role (Meloni 2006). 
Moreover, it was focusing on its purpose as a policy offering an enlargement substitute, 
the EU’s way to reinforce Euro-Mediterranean cooperation or pre-enlargement strategy 
and expand those foreign policy competencies that it had gained during enlargement 
(Weber and Smith 2007:42). It was also seen as a way to allow the EU to maintain 
credibility and appeal without continuing enlargement or at least to buy more time for 
the EU in deciding where to draw its new borders (Missiroli 2004). In addition, the 
early literature was also discussing the ENP in terms of its tools and made reference to 
similarities with enlargement (Tulmets 2006; Meloni 2007; Kelley 2006; Delcour 
2007). Similarities were found in terms of commitment to shared values, use of 
conditionality, participation through TAIEX and Twinning tools and monitoring tools.  
While similarities were noticed to the enlargement strategy, the lack of the offer of 
membership as a reward for compliance, its vagueness and one-fits-all nature are 
perceived as the main restrictions to the ENP’s potential. Even with the main incentive 
that the ENP is offering, the ‘stake at a market’, there is no descriptive information 
about it or any timeline for it (Wolczuk and Wolczuk 2004). Iwona Piorko criticised the 
ENP for failing to differentiate between partners in terms of their diverging ambitions 
towards the Union (Piorko 2005). For instance, Ukraine has felt that it does not have 
any better chance of EU membership than Morocco under the current framework 
(Piorko 2005).   
Consequently, while interest in the EU’s influence was emerging, the logical step for 
assuming its influence started the analysis from the point of view that the missing 
membership incentive in the ENP approach meant that there is little influence expected 
in the states under the ENP policy. Thus, in the immediate years after 2004, only a little 
empirical research was aimed at understanding the EU’s potential as a consequence of 
this approach (see Kelley 2006; Lavenex 2008: 938; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008; 
Smith 2005; Wolczuk 2007: 36).  
More recently empirical research on the EU’s neighbourhood has started emerging. 
Europeanisation beyond the EU and external governance started appearing as the main 
approaches for assessing the EU's influence beyond the EU.  
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2.4.1 Europeanisation beyond the EU 
The concept of Europeanisation beyond the EU was originally challenged on whether it 
is even possible to talk about Europeanisation if it is not related to EU member or 
candidate states (Schimmelfennig 2009). Despite the uncertainty of the concept’s 
adaptability beyond the EU, it has been utilised when countries’ convergence towards 
EU standards have been in focus in Eastern Europe (i.e. Popescu 2005; Wolczuk 2006), 
in the Mediterranean (i.e. Escribano 2006; Bicchi 2006) or in the Caucasus (i.e. 
Coppieters 2004; Emerson and Noucheva 2004) and in Switzerland, Norway and 
Iceland (i.e. Fischer, Nicolet and Sciarini 2002, Lavenex and Uçarer 2004).   
 
These pieces of research drew on the analytical frameworks of rationalist/constructivist 
approaches like the previous Europeanisation literature in the CEECs. In the case of the 
EaP states the research that related to Europeanisation covered a variety of policy areas 
in mostly single case studies. For instance, in regard to Georgia, Europeanisation 
research has focused on energy (Börzel 2010), in Moldova on conflict resolution 
(Popescu 2005) and democratisation (Timuş 2007); in Ukraine on issues of energy 
(Börzel 2010), and on democratisation (Wolczuk 2007; Yaroshenko 2007).  
Europeanisation studies in Eastern Europe have covered quite many policy areas, 
however, the most covered has without doubt been democratisation (Emerson 2006; 
Meloni 2006;Timuş 2007;Vachudová 2006; Wolczuk 2009). A limited number of 
comparative cross-issue and country studies have also emerged.  Melnykovska and 
Schweickert comparing Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia in the area of energy and JHA 
issues; Wunderlich (2010) focusing on migration policy in Morocco and Ukraine; EU 
external energy policy and Hofer (2008) comparing EU rule export in Bulgaria, Serbia 
and Ukraine (Schimmelfennig 2009).  
 
Despite the increasing number of studies being conducted within the Europeanisation 
beyond the EU framework, the results so far have still been rather preliminary. 
However, they have been pointing out the importance of the fact that in the ENP states 
the EU has to rely on socialisation techniques (Emerson and Jones 2005; Sasse 2008) as 
well as networks (Lavenex 2004, 2008) to exercise influence due to missing 
membership potential in the EU. In addition, it was expected that compliance levels are 
dependent on issue and country specific cost-benefit calculations in areas where the EU 
applies issue-specific conditionality (Epstein and Sedelmeier 2009).  
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2.4.2 EU External Governance  
Whereas Europeanisation is understood as the domestic impact of European governance 
(Schimmelfennig 2010), EU external governance is then describing ‘dynamics which 
spur the extension of parts of the Union’s acquis communautaire beyond the circle of 
member states’ (Lavenex 2004: 681). Even if in the last few years EU external 
governance has explained what modes the EU has to elicit influence outside its borders, 
just recently literature under external governance has also started to examine the impact 
and success of the EU’s external governance in the neighbourhood.  
The external governance approach, analysing reasons for compliance, gained exposure 
in a special issue of the Journal of Public Policy in 2009 (16:6) where it introduced the 
main modes of governance. The framework that was suggested by Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig (2009) introduced a model of governance which includes institutional 
forms: hierarchy, network and market.  
Hierarchical governance refers to a formalised relationship where it is established 
through legislation. The relationship between the two parties is one of the rulers and the 
ruled. In the ENP context, which is based on informal relations, hierarchical governance 
is also in existence as in the ENP there are also rules, formal procedures and monitoring 
and the EU uses conditionality and therefore has hierarchal elements (Lavenex et al. 
2009). Lavenex and Schimmelfennig pointed out that other actors refer to these 
formalised rules as ‘compulsory impact’ (Diez et al. 2006: 572–3) or ‘compliance’ 
(Bauer et al., 2007). It is also possible to point out the similarity to the external 
incentives model in a way that is based on conditionality and the top-down role in the 
study by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005). 
Network governance is based on mutual relationships between the two parties through 
voluntary cooperation. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig identify network elements also in 
the ENP’s macro institutional structure, referring to the fact that action plans were 
jointly drafted and there are also ENP subcommittees created which make sectoral 
expert participation available in EU agencies and programmes (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig 2009; Lavenex 2009). At the sectoral level Lavenex identifies network 
governance as being most fruitful for exporting EU governance. For instance, sectoral 
network governance covers cooperation networks and programmes such as Twinning 
and TAIEX. Network governance tools are recognised as working in a context which 
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Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005 defined as social learning or as communication in 
Bauer et al (2007).  
The last mode of governance is the market which means an outcome is the result of 
competition. It takes place between formally autonomous actors rather than as the result 
of hierarchical harmonisation or networked co-ordination. In the third countries this 
mode is comparable to the EU’s influence in the lesson learning situation described by 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier where the states’ interdependence as well as the EU’s 
presence drives them toward policy transposition (2005).  
This framework was applied to various studies and the conclusions concerning the EU’s 
influence outside its borders points to the EU’s influence being differential according to 
policy areas and not related to the macro institutional structures (ENP, EEA, bilateral 
treaties) (Lavenex et al. 2009). A recent empirical study in the external governance 
literature additionally has suggested that sector conditions such as codification and 
adoption costs matter more than country’s domestic EU aspirations, geographic region 
or degree of country’s liberalisation in the democratic governance promotion (Freyburg 
et al. 2011).  
2.5 Summary of the Main Findings and Gaps in the Previous Research 
While the previous Europeanisation literature was dominated by expectations that 
variance is dependent on the EU’s capability to offer a credible EU membership 
incentive due to the previous success of the membership incentive in the CEECs, the 
external governance aspect suggested the importance of focusing on the sector level for 
explaining influence.  
Acknowledging the importance of the findings of both strands of literature, this research 
incorporates them into the framework to study the EU’s influence in the ENP countries 
and addresses particularities that arise from the ENP’s nature, which it suggests should 
be addressed in the evaluation rather than abandoning the analytical potential of the 
macro level conditions and entirely focusing on the sector specific conditions.  
This argument is put forward as it should be noted that while the EU’s influence has 
been suggested to be sectoral as argued in the external governance, there are also 
countries in the ENP that still aim for EU membership or at least identify with the EU 
which still may offer analytical importance and therefore these aspects should also be 
considered as potential variables.  In addition, as it has also been suggested that  the 
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EU’s influence was overestimated when studying the CEECs,  this research aims to pay 
attention to the external explanatory factors that could offer cross-conditionality and 
socialisation (Kobaladze and Tangiashvili 2006; Sedelmeier and Schimmelfennig 2005) 
and may have been induced by Russia, the US or international organisations.  
Moreover, even if previous Europeanisation research has strictly been drawing from the 
rationalist and constructivist debate, this research along the external governance aspect 
is also interested in the EU lead agencies and the programmes that are available in the 
ENP countries and also hypothesizes them to have importance where capacity and lack 
of knowledge rather than only political will can be a determinant factor for influence 
due to poor starting conditions. Finally, legitimacy may also have importance in regard 
to ENP countries’ willingness to comply. The ENP was not necessarily perceived in a 
welcoming way in all of the ENP states. Therefore, the ENP recommendations may also 
appear as a foreign imposition (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005:18), especially 
taking into consideration that in comparison to what it requests the EU has little to offer. 
Consequently, the question of legitimacy of the issue may increase a country’s 
willingness to comply. 
2.6 Analytical Framework and Hypotheses for Studying the EU’s Influence in the 
Neighbourhood    
Drawing on the lessons and gaps in the previous literature, this section will introduce 
the independent variables that are linked by hypotheses to the dependent variable of 
compliance. The independent variables cross between macro and micro levels, 
rationalist and constructivist variables and domestic, external and EU related variables.  
Table 2.1 Operationalisation of Variables  
 Macro Variables Micro Variables 
EU related Strength of membership  acting 
as a potential incentive (RC: 
Incentive) 
Issue specific benefits and costs 
(RC: Incentive) 
Direct financial assistance  
(RC: Capacity) 
Technical framework for 
capacity building  
(RC: Capacity) 
Domestic related Identification with the EU (SI) Legitimacy (SI) 
27 
 
External explanations Cross - Conditionality/Cross-
Socialisation (RC/(SI)); 
Russia/NATO/the US 
Conditionality/Pressure;  IOs 
longer established role as a value 
base  
Task based OSCE, USAID, 
Council of Europe assistance and 
capacity building 
 (RC: Capacity) 
*RC = rational choice, SI = Sociological/Constructivist institutionalism 
2.6.1 Macro Level  
2.6.1.1 The Strength of EU Membership Potential 
This variable refers to the EU’s likelihood to grant a potential for EU membership. 
Europeanisation literature which emphasised membership incentive as a starting point 
for influence was able to explain convergence in the CEEC states. While the external 
governance literature was taking a step away from this aspect, the empirical research 
has not focused on the fact that some eastern partners may still be eligible for EU 
membership and that the strength of likelihood of the EU membership may work as an 
incentive for them to comply. This research acknowledges that there are still countries 
that believe they have a potential for membership and therefore this may work as an 
incentive for compliance. The immediate neighbours can be divided into two groups: 
those who are still eligible for membership and those who are not. Eligibility is based 
on the country falling within the European borders and fitting under the Maastricht 
Treaty article 49’s criteria: any European country that respects the principles of the 
European Union is entitled to apply to join and therefore could involve other countries 
except for the Maghreb and Mashreq states (Cremona 2008:261). 
While on the one hand the EU has not denied the option to the ENP states: ‘It does not 
prejudge prospects for European countries that may at some future point wish to apply 
for membership, but it does not provide for a specific accession prospect either’ 
(Ferrero-Waldner 2007), on the other hand Ferrero-Waldner told Reuters in Brussels on 
3 May 2005 that near-neighbours like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia would be well 
advised not to apply for European Union membership now, because they would be 
rebuffed  (RFE/RL Newsline 04/05/2005). 
This relationship toward the question of EU membership potential may act as an 
incentive or as a disincentive. It therefore puts the EU in a position of needing to 
balance how little or much it promises so as not to lose its potential leverage and have 
the states turning their back on the EU but also on the other hand to consider how much 
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it can deepen relations without transforming them into countries that would satisfy the 
Copenhagen Criteria because the EU would find it very hard to deny membership on 
substantive grounds (Sasse 2008:3).  The level of how the strength of the membership 
prospect varies is discussed in chapter four. 
2.6.1.2 Identification with the EU 
Apart from the variable of strength of the EU membership prospect, identification with 
the EU may be relevant in explaining differences in compliance. Constructivist and 
sociological institutionalism expect that enlargement politics are shaped by ideational 
and cultural factors (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005:14) and therefore most 
relevant factors are a community or cultural match (see Checkel 1999; Cortell and 
Davies 2000). This ‘match’ or belongingness at the macro level is best described by 
identification with the EU as it refers to a situation when ‘the target states regard the EU 
as a valid aspiration group whose collective identity, values and norms they share and 
whose recognition they seek and to which they want to belong’ (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005:19). Identification with the EU is important as it can encourage 
compliance because under these conditions the target states are more easily persuaded 
by the EU (2005:19). Those who like to be recognised as part of the European family of 
democratic nations: ‘find it painful to be shamed and shunned’ (Schimmelfennig et al. 
2003: 493).  
Whereas in the context of candidate states, researchers have only found identification 
with the EU to be partly influential, it is hypothesised here still to have importance as an 
explanatory factor in the ENP states. The EU may be more attractive as a reference 
point due to its values and norms in these countries which are weak democracies and 
still in the process of reform and which have complex relations with Russia. Moreover, 
it is relevant to be considered because the previous research, which was dominated by 
the governance by conditionality aspect, may have overestimated the rationalist factors 
in explaining compliance. The degree to which identification with the EU varies is 
discussed in chapter four. 
2.6.2 Micro Level 
2.6.2.1 Issue-Specific Benefits 
While membership conditionality is not available for the ENP countries, the EU is able 
to use countries issue-specific incentives in the neighbourhood. Issue-specific benefit is 
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a rationalist variable.  It is a strategy of reinforcement where the EU is offering a reward 
for the satisfaction of its demand to bring about change at the domestic level 
(Kratochvil and Lippert 2008; Schimmelfennig 2004). The issue-specific asymmetry of 
power which relates to the fact that the EU has much to offer through the ENP but the 
countries have very little, may enable it to work as an encouragement for promoting 
compliance.  As Grabbe maintained in regard to CEECs, while the EU has all the 
benefits to offer (principally accession, trade and aid), the CEECs in comparison, have 
little to offer to the EU (Grabbe 2006). Thus, the EU is in a position of altering cost-
benefit assessment of the countries through incentives and disincentives (Barbé et al. 
2009). In the ENP context, it is positive conditionality that is mostly applied and 
referred to in respective documents. It concerns political (value-based) as well as policy 
(acquis-based) conditionality (Kratocvil and Lippert 2007). Whereas political 
conditionality is rather vaguely formulated in ENP documents, as it combines them with 
uncertain rewards, policy conditionality shows a clearer relationship between request 
and reward (Kratocvil and Lippert 2007:38). No negative conditionality so far has been 
used in the case of the three ENP states.
 2
 In general issue-specific incentives may be 
important in the countries which are part of the ENP as they need to consider the 
benefits case by case due to the fact they do not have the membership possibility as the 
ultimate reward (Wolczuk 2004). 
2.6.2.2 Issue-Specific Costs 
Costs have demonstrated to be able to prevent compliance without the membership 
incentive being availalbe according to the previous literature. Rationalist institutionalist 
theories differ in regard to the cost-benefit calculations that states typically make 
(Sedelmeier and Schimmelfennig 2005:13). Neo-liberal institutionalism assumes that 
states care mainly about their own absolute gains and losses whereas realists expect that 
state actors take into account external autonomy and power (Sedelmeier and 
Schimmelfennig 2005). The costs assessed in this research are to do with issue-specific 
costs which are evaluated both at the rule adoption and rule implementation level. The 
costs at the formal compliance level emerge if the decision to be taken will split the 
political elite and thus can cause instability or opposition. While the implementation 
level does not face this kind of question having had the decision already taken, its 
implementation may be facing economic costs which are expected to be high if the 
                                                          
2
 Author’s interview with an interviewee no.10, Brussels, June 2011. 
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action is continuous rather than once off and thus can affect decision-making both at 
adoption and implementation levels.  
2.6.2.3 Direct Financial Assistance 
This variable especially is related to the behavioural level of compliance. Apart from 
cost-benefit calculations compliance may also be impacted by factors related to 
economic costs of the policy change. The ENP states have lower development levels 
than the CEECs in general which may also limit their compliance even if they had the 
political will to implement or adopt rules. Therefore, financial assistance that is given 
by the EU to compensate the costs, may facilitate compliance. The levels of financial 
assistance in regard to specific sectors are discussed in regard to each country and sector 
in the case study chapters. 
2.6.2.4 Capacity and Technical Expert Groups  
Besides issue-specific benefits and financial assistance to compensate for the costs, the 
EU facilitates information exchange and capacity building through enabling 
involvement with its agencies and programmes (e.g. TAIEX, Twinning, FRONTEX, 
and Europol). They have been available for the ENP countries since 2006. The external 
governance literature calls this type of participation ‘networks’ or ‘negotiation systems’, 
(Börzel 2007:65) where partners have an equal position in the process and are based 
rather on expertise rather than political affiliation (Lavenex 2004; Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig 2009). Besides EU conditionality and assistance these forms of 
activities can be assumed to be especially important in the ENP countries which lack 
expertise and capacity to the extent where some interviews confirmed that sometimes 
even if there is enough money for being able to reform the system, there is no one to do 
it.
 3
  
2.6.2.5 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy of the rule may be important in encouraging compliance with the EU 
standards as ENP states are not part of the EU rule making process and any rule is likely 
‘to have the stigma of foreign imposition’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005:18). 
Therefore, legitimacy can be considered as an important factor in the decision making 
on whether or not to comply as it is argued that international norms are influential when 
they are seen as legitimate (Hurd 2007) and because legitimacy enables a ‘compliance 
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 Author’s interviews with an interviewee no. 32, Chisinau, June 2010 and interviewee no.73, Kiev, 
December 2009.  
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pull’ according to Franck (1988). Furthermore, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) 
found in the research that the more internationally codified the rules were the more they 
were complied with.  
2.6.2.6 Micro and Macro Level External Pressures 
The EU is not the only factor influencing the JHA issues in the ENP countries, however, 
the research which has studied the EU’s role has made little reference to other potential 
external factors as it is expected that if the organisation is not in a position of offering 
membership the EU rules will then be followed. Apart from two main macro level 
independent variables, prospect of membership potential and identification, the 
countries may also be prone to other potential external conditionality or socialisation 
factors (Dimitrova and Dragneva 2009; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). External 
pressures can be conceptualised as cross-conditionality and cross-socialisation 
(Kobaladze and Tangiashvili 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). These 
pressures can come from Russia, NATO or CIS which are the only actors beyond the 
EU in a position to offer incentives or socialisation points. International organisations 
such as the UN, Council of Europe and OSCE do not use conditionality, however, these 
organisations may also have an important role in terms of persuasion or socialisation in 
creating or restricting decision making or capacity which should not be overlooked 
when analysing the EU’s influence. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the literature in the study of the EU’s influence and the 
framework and approaches that it had involved. In regard to EU influence in the ENP it 
focused on the external governance and Europeanisation beyond the EU literature. From 
previous literature and through investigation of the methods and findings, it identified 
variables which were formed as hypotheses for this research and thus the analytical 
framework including macro variables: strength of EU membership prospect and 
identification with the EU, and micro variables: cost and benefits, legitimacy, financial 
assistance and technical capacity groups. 
This framework forms the basis for the study of the three most likely cases of ENP 
countries which allows generalisation on at least the necessary combination of 
conditions that were in place in each country even if it acknowledges the issue sector 
and country characteristics. It hopes to create conclusions on the potential influence of 
the EU and simultaneously to advance literature on the comparative aspect in Georgia, 
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Moldova and Ukraine and specifically in the JHA sector. The following chapter 
introduces the research design including operationalisation of the dependent and 
independent variables, case selection and methods. 
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3. Research Design: Cases, Methods and Data 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted that there is a consensus in the literature that the EU 
has been influential in the CEECs because it was able to offer them a credible 
conditional membership perspective. As a consequence the motivation to study the 
EU’s influence in the ENP in the beginning was scarce since the ENP did not offer a 
membership incentive. To clarify the potential of the EU to elicit influence in the 
neighbourhood the previous chapter introduced a framework for analysis and 
hypotheses for influence drawing from previous literature both on Europeanisation and 
external governance. Having clarified the hypotheses for the research this chapter 
presents the research design including case selection, operationalisation and 
measurement of the variables and data sources for the research. The first part of the 
chapter starts with case selection discussing both the country and issue selection. The 
second part introduces the dependent and independent variables. The last part discusses 
data and sources before concluding with a summary of the chapter.  
3.2 Case Selection 
3.2.1 Country Selection 
The countries chosen are the most likely cases for the EU to be able to elicit influence in 
the neighbourhood because Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are willing for cooperation, 
and they are interested in the prospect of membership (Franke et al 2010; Wolczuk 
2008).  In all three countries cooperation with the EU first took place under the PCA 
and then the ENP and EaP frameworks but with all expressing their preference for 
bilateral relations. Other countries in the EaP have no interest in the membership 
potential (Armenia, Azerbaijan) and Belarus has even been denied the cooperation 
within the ENP in the past due to its authoritarian nature. Furthermore, among the 
eastern neighbours the three states of the research are the most democratic and therefore 
the most influence can be expected according to the Europeanisation literature (Flikke 
2008; Freedom House 2008).  
They have a common background of being post-Soviet states, they all had to start 
developing their state institutions from nothing due to lack of institutional structures and 
their progress has been challenged by corruption. They also have differences between 
them in regard to the likelihood of eventual membership and identification with the EU.  
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Whereas Georgia’s strength of membership prospect is unlikely to be efficient in 
encouraging change due to the lack of a prospect, in Ukraine strength of membership 
prospect can be considered as a motivator for changes from 2002 to 2007 and in 
Moldova to some extent since 2005 and more so since 2009. In regard to identification 
with the EU Georgia has demonstrated most clearly the EU as an aspiration group on 
the basis of values and norms, whereas in Moldova and Ukraine the identification is not 
as clear. The categorisation of these three countries with regard to country level 
domestic variables is established in detail in chapter four.  
Table 3.1 Country Selection 
Country Selection EU Membership Prospect 
Stronger 
EU Membership Prospect 
Weaker 
Identification  
with the EU higher 
Ukraine 2002-2007 
  
Georgia 2000-2011 
Identification  
with the EU lower 
Moldova after 2005  Ukraine 2007-2011 
Moldova before 2005 
 
3.2.2 Issue Selection 
The issues that were chosen to be examined are priority areas in the JHA section of each 
of the three action plans. The research focuses on the issues of border management, 
migration management (readmission agreement), asylum, and human trafficking. The 
reasons for the selection of these particular issues are the following: overall, these four 
issues have not been a focus in the previous literature extensively as the research has 
mostly been dealing with democratisation questions and environmental and energy issue 
convergence. Furthermore, with the arrival of the ENP, JHA issues became the policy’s 
priority (Knelangen 2007: 88) as the EU also wanted, through the ENP, to address many 
soft security threats of the region including human trafficking, illegal immigration and, 
thus, the interrelated issue of border management (Weber 2009). JHA issues are also 
chosen as they are more traceable than issues such as democracy as there are not so 
many specific organisations in the area and, therefore, separating the contribution of the 
organisations is easier.  
Most importantly, the case selection is done with a view to ensure variation and focus 
on JHA issues offers a good starting point. Firstly, they show variation with regard to 
the key factors emphasised in the rationalist and constructivist debate focusing on 
incentives vs. questions of legitimacy.  Issues in the JHA section include some issue-
specific incentives for increased mobility and offer variation in the EU’s approaches to 
35 
 
study issue-specific incentives. The level of legitimacy also varies between the less 
legitimate border management and readmission in comparison to asylum protection and 
the fight against human trafficking. Border management and readmission issues are not 
internationally codified, (although border reform is also promoted by other 
organisations), are self-interested requests by the EU and therefore, have lower values 
of legitimacy. 
Secondly, they are selected in regard to their legal nature. As Lavenex (2009:37) 
maintained, JHA issues are marked by coexistence of ‘weak hierarchical legal 
interaction through community method (in the first pillar) and intergovernmental 
procedures (in the third pillar) and dominance of network governance in both pillars 
through transgovernmentalism. Whereas readmission is expected from the countries if 
they want to join the EU, border guard reform in terms of demilitarisation is part of the 
Schengen acquis. Asylum protection and the fight against human trafficking are 
enshrined in international law and mentioned for instance in the UN Convention and 
Protocol, and the three P’s (protection, prevention and prosecution) have become 
cornerstones in all international organisations such as Council of Europe, the UN and 
OSCE protocols or regulations for the fight against human trafficking. Whereas asylum 
protection has been part of the EU acquis as well, and even providing for its own 
requirements that go beyond the international regulations especially in terms of offering 
subsidiary protection, the fight against human trafficking was not part of the acquis in 
April 2011.  
The issues traced among the four JHA areas were selected if they were clearly 
communicated in the action plans through wording such as: ‘ratifying or signing a 
protocol’; ‘approximating’ towards the EU standards; ‘setting up’ facilities; or 
‘establishing’ an agency or strategy and hence have more clarity on the expected 
demands which helps to establish the requests’ threshold point for compliance. Issues 
were not included if they are just described in general terms such as to ‘continue 
cooperation’ or ‘enhance support’ etc. as they would be difficult to  measure without 
having a clear end goal against which compliance can be assessed. Furthermore, these 
issues were chosen as the same four issues were present in the action plans of the three 
countries, thus, allowing comparison.  
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Table 3.2 Issue Selection 
Issue Selection Lower Legitimacy Higher legitimacy 
Clear issue-specific incentive Readmission after 2005 Asylum  protection after 2010 
Less precise/no incentives Border management before 2005 Fight against  human trafficking  
  
3.3 Methods and Measurement 
My unit of analysis is the EU demands that were put forward under the ENP policy in 
the area of JHA and the formal and behavioural compliance in Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine. This research aims to understand when compliance takes place, what explains 
variation in compliance and what is the EU’s influence in the neighbourhood through a 
research design that allows variation at a macro and micro level, and rationalist and 
constructivist variables. The extent of EU influence will be assessed by focusing on 
compliance with the demands formulated in the EU’s action plans. The thesis identifies 
formal and behavioural compliance with the EU recommendations. The reason for 
variation in outcomes of the dependent variable (DV) is established through a 
comparative case study design covering three countries and four issues areas. The 
research design resembles a ‘diverse-case method’, which covers a full range of 
variation (Gerring 2007:1010; Seawright and Gerring 2008).  
The time period of investigation starts from 2000, when the JHA issues were first 
mentioned in the neighbourhood in the EU country strategy papers, until the end of 
2011. By the end of 2011, the ENP relationship had already deepened in these three 
countries either to the level of negotiations on Association Agreement in Moldova and 
Ukraine or discussions about its possibility in Georgia. This timeline allows enough 
time to see changes at the formal level and also how the country prepared for the 
implementation of the demands.  
Results are drawn using process tracing, before-after comparisons and congruence 
methods which have been found to be useful in the previous research on the EU’s 
influence in the CEEC countries. They aim to address limitations in studying EU 
influence especially in regard to understanding what is the EU’s influence when 
different combinations of independent variables lead to the same result and to separate 
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EU influence from other influences (Keohane and Millner 1996) and from other 
domestic influences (Hurrell and Menon  2003).  
Because many different conditions lead to the same outcome (i.e. compliance or non-
compliance in this case) process tracing helps to identify the causal chain and causal 
mechanisms between the dependent variable and independent variables (Bennett and 
George 2005: 206).  Before-after comparison helps to observe whether the value of the 
dependent variable changes as a result of the independent variables. It is more complex 
when it is likely that there are changes in more than one condition at the same time. The 
congruence method tests the consistency between expected outcome and conditions by 
testing whether an outcome holds according to theory (Bennett and George 2005: 181). 
3.3.1 Operationalisation of the Dependent Variable - Compliance 
Compliance with the EU action plan recommendations is treated as the dependent 
variable in this research. Compliance can be defined as a state of conformity between an 
actor’s behaviour and a specified rule (Raustiala and Slaughter 2002:539) and ‘non-
compliance or violation occurs when actual behaviour departs significantly from 
prescribed behaviour’ (Young 1979: 104).  As the term compliance is usually referring, 
in the context of the EU to the acquis and thus to legally binding rules, some researchers 
prefer to use the term ‘convergence’ when referring to the recommendations that the EU 
suggests in the context of the ENP states. Nevertheless, my research starts the 
evaluation of the action plan recommendations, which are not rules in a legal sense, but 
as they often refer to similar standards in the acquis or which are the general practices 
of the EU, I will use the term ‘compliance’. Compliance, which can be divided into 
three different types, is useful for understanding the different levels of states’ behaviour 
toward the EU standards which are important in this study (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005).  
Previous literature has distinguished between three different forms of compliance: 
discursive, formal and behavioural.  In this research the latter two will be in focus. 
Formal compliance means the adoption of a rule
4
 into national legislation according to 
the EU standards of the particular issue in question (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2005). Behavioural compliance refers to application/enforcement of this rule on the 
ground (Sedelmeier 2009). In general, formal compliance is considered to have taken 
place when the national law is adopted and fulfils the recommendations and is 
                                                          
4
 Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) call it transposition to national legislation. 
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considered to be non-compliant if there are no pertinent legal changes or there is a law 
that undermines the provision for a change. At the behavioural level compliance is 
considered to have taken place when the actions are carried out according to EU 
recommendations or demands and is considered non-compliant when actions are going 
against the law or if there are no changes at all toward the implementation of the 
regulation.  
The ENP action plans are process orientated (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009) 
which means that they do not describe a specified end but request approximation. Smith 
maintains ‘even when it is clear that the neighbour should be taking the action, it is not 
always equally clear how progress will be judged’ (2005:764). ‘Scattered throughout 
many action plans is much about how neighbours must “enhance institutional or 
administrative capacity” in particular areas. What that entails is not specified’ 
(2005:764). In order to be able to build the criteria for the measurement of compliance, 
the following sections describe the indicators in more detail for each issue. They are 
established by drawing on the secondary literature and on interviews. Table 3.3 
summarises the indicators for different levels (full, partial, and non-compliance) of 
formal and behavioural compliance across the four issue areas that the following 
sections establish.  
Table 3.3 Operationalisation of the Levels of Compliance  
Border Guard Reform Formal Compliance Behavioural Compliance 
Compliant Demilitarisation of the border 
guard set into national law  
Conscripts not in use and are 
replaced by professionally 
trained border guards who 
perform activities according to 
the EU standards  
 
Partially compliant Demilitarisation of the border 
guard set partially into national 
law  
Conscripts are partially replaced 
and change toward full 
replacement is in progress  
Not compliant No demilitarisation legislation 
set 
Conscripts are in place and  
there are no plans for 
replacement  
Readmission Agreement Formal Compliance Behavioural Compliance 
Compliant The readmission agreement is 
signed   
Readmission agreement 
implementation is prepared for 
by signing implementation 
protocols, bilateral readmission 
agreements, preparing for 
detention of third country 
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citizens and by facilitation of 
reintegration  
Partially compliant NA Some preparation  as above 
taken   
Not compliant Readmission agreement is not 
signed  
No preparation as above taken  
Asylum Protection: principle 
of non-refoulement, 
subsidiary protection, 
minimum standards 
Formal Compliance Behavioural Compliance 
Compliant The principle of non-
refoulement  is adopted into 
national legislation  and 
subsidiary protection is set into 
law as well as provisions for 
protection of refugees and 
asylum seekers  
The country fully implements 
the principle, offers subsidiary 
protection and has provided 
conditions respecting minimum 
standards for refugees on the 
ground by providing 
accommodation, schooling etc.  
Partially compliant Country adopts  legislation 
which indirectly covers the issue 
but not directly addressing 
asylum seekers or refugees   
The country has taken steps by 
either training or allocating 
resources for its implementation 
Not compliant Country takes no action for 
providing legal base for refugee 
protection 
No action has been taken 
 
  
Human trafficking: 
punishment and prosecution 
Formal Compliance Behavioural Compliance 
Compliant EU  and international standards 
are adopted by introducing 
legislation that provides 
punishment for traffickers  
Punishment is put into place 
through prosecution and by  
imprisonment in  all cases 
Partially compliant Human trafficking is set as  a 
punishable act but not directly 
according to the international 
and EU standards but through 
existing criminal codes  
Punishment is put into action 
but does not cover all the 
investigated cases 
Not compliant There is no legislation regarding  
the punishment of  human 
trafficking  
No punishment is put into action 
even if there are convicted cases  
 
3.3.1.1 Definition and Measurement of Compliance with Border Management 
Requirements  
Within the border management sector, border guard reform was expressed in all of the 
three countries’ action plans. Even if it was not exactly defined in the action plan, 
interviews clarified that it consists of the same expectations as in the Balkan states 
40 
 
which have a road map outlining the specific tasks.
5
 Within border guard reform the 
priority areas are reforming the militarised border guards to a functioning law 
enforcement agency.
6
 The clear expectations have been set in the integrated border 
management programme (European Commission 2008d) which is one of the flagship 
programmes for the EaP countries. To become a law enforcement agency requires 
demilitarisation of the staff and the cessation of the use of conscripts in order to have a 
professional trained staff.
7
 Therefore, border guard reform is understood to have taken 
place and be compliant at the legislative level when the domestic law defines the 
transformation of the border guards from a military agency to a rule enforcement 
agency and uses professional staff for border management duties. At the behavioural 
level compliance is understood to have taken place when conscripts are being replaced 
by official border guards which carry out a police and law-enforcement function with 
investigatory powers instead of duties under militarised status and the training of 
processional border guards is taking place under consideration of the Schengen rules 
(Boda and Kakachia 2005).   
3.3.1.2 Definition and Measurement of Compliance with Readmission Agreement 
Requirements  
Readmission is defined as the commitment of a country to take back its own nationals 
and also transited persons through their territory with which the EU does not have a 
readmission agreement (Johanssen-Nogues 2008; Lavenex 1999). The readmission 
agreement is considered to be compliant at the legislative level when it is signed with 
the EU. At the implementation level readmission agreement is regarded being compliant 
when the procedures of readmission are carried out with respect to EU and international 
human rights standards.  
3.3.1.3 Definition and Measurement of Compliance with Asylum Seeker and Refugee 
Protection Requirements 
Asylum seeker and refugee protection is an issue that is requested from the candidate 
states before accession and it is also included in the Acquis (see: European Commission 
2003b). To be able to assess whether the ENP countries comply with the EU demands it 
is important to acknowledge what EU law includes in the area of asylum and to 
understand its differences to international law as the EU is both advocating compliance 
with its own and international standards in its action plans.  
                                                          
5
 Author’s interview with interviewee no. 46, Chisinau,  June 2010.  
6
 Author’s interview with interviewee no.29, August 2011. 
7
 Author’s interview with interviewee no. 26, Kiev, December, 2009. 
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Whereas the EU rules respect the international standards and draw from them, the EU 
standards in protection go beyond the 1951 Convention definition of refugee status and 
protection standards. The 1951 Convention defines who is a refugee, the respect for the 
principle of non-refoulement and lays down ‘minimum standards for the treatment of 
refugees’.8 The Convention also outlines a refugee’s rights including freedom of 
religion and movement, the right to work and access to education and travel.  
Besides enabling opportunities for a refugee status, the EU standards also recognise 
those who do not qualify under refugee status and facilitate protection under subsidiary 
or complementary forms of protection.
9
 The reason for the EU’s additional forms of 
protection is to create a common standard applicable within the EU as previously there 
have been cases of a variety of interpretations of the refugee definition and also because 
the 1951 Convention does ‘not cover all aspects and situations faced by asylum-seekers’ 
(IOM Migration Review 2008). 
The measurement of asylum seeker protection, therefore, has a dual aspect as the EU 
refers both to its own standards and to international standards in the action plan. 
Compliance, therefore, is measured by assessing the convergence of the country’s 
legislative level to the EU and international standards referring to the legal provisions at 
the national level on offering refugee status or alternative forms of protection introduced 
by the EU. It also assesses compliance with the principle of non-refoulement and 
minimum standards. The demands are considered compliant when the country has set 
the status of refugees into legislation and clarified the forms of subsidiary and 
complementary protection into national legislation. At the international level 
compliance has taken place even without subsidiary protection if it complies with the 
potential for granting refugee status.  
At the behavioural level tasks are considered compliant when the country has set 
protection through basic conditions such as accommodation and access to travel 
documents on the ground and implements the principle of non-refoulement. Examining 
a country’s ‘rule selection’ (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig  2009) and whether it 
                                                          
8
 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3be01b964.html.  
9
 The European Commission proposal for ‘a directive laying down minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third-country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who 
otherwise need international protection’, Directive 2004/83/EC, Adopted by the Council in April 2004. 
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chooses to comply with the EU or international standards
10
 gives an additional and 
interesting outlook on the country’s preferences and the potential for the EU’s influence 
in the country. 
3.3.1.4 Definition and Measurement of Compliance with Punishment and 
Prosecution of Crimes of Human Trafficking Requirements 
Within the sector of human trafficking, the focus of this research is on the 
criminalisation of human trafficking. In the international regulations three main issues 
are mentioned in the UNHCR, OSCE and Council of Europe regulations which are 
known as the three P’s. They refer to prevention from becoming a victim, protection of 
victims and punishment for traffickers.  The EU principles for the fight again human 
trafficking were not part of the acquis until April 2011 but were voluntary. However,  
the April 2011 Directive 2011/36/EU on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in 
Human Beings and Protecting its Victims replaced the Council Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA and it is now applicable to all member states (Council of the European 
Union 2011). The directive, in regard to punishment of criminals, includes a provision 
that the offence is punishable by a maximum penalty of at least five years of 
imprisonment and in cases of the victim being specifically vulnerable a maximum 
penalty of at least 10 years of imprisonment.  
For the purpose of this research, the focus is on the punishment and prosecution in 
section III
11
, which gives a potential point for comparison between whether the 
countries select the EU or the international regulation, as the EU has its own 
recommendations for the length of sentences. Compliance with the human trafficking 
action plan recommendations are considered to have taken place when punishment of 
trafficking has been set into the national legislation of a country and also prosecutions 
are carried out.  
3.4 Operationalisation and Measurement of Macro-Level Variables  
In the previous chapter the six independent variables were introduced together with the 
hypotheses linking them to the dependent variable. This section will operationalise them 
                                                          
10
 EU also offers complementary protection; EU non-refoulement principle also includes reference to 
torture. 
11
 Chapter III - Investigation, law enforcement and prosecution; IV- Prevention of trafficking in human 
beings IV and V. -to Protection and assistance. See: Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, 24 July 2003, Decision No. 557; 
PC.DEC/557, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a54bc2dd.html. 
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in order to make measurement possible. These variables are measured and discussed in 
detail in chapter four.   
3.4.1 The Strength of Membership Prospect 
EU membership potential has previously been demonstrated to depend on whether the 
country is European, as seen when Morocco was rejected outright, and on the fulfilment 
of the Copenhagen Criteria against which the CEEC were assessed when applying to the 
EU or overall whether it poses risks or benefits the EU. The Copenhagen Criteria states 
that: 
‘Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well 
as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of 
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union’. 
Because in the CEECs membership conditionality was considered as the main reason 
for the EU to be able to influence countries, it is also hypothesised here that if the 
country is European, reaches the level of Copenhagen Criteria at least in some aspects,  
the goal has gained support from the EU, and if there are no threatening or 
insurmountable issues which cannot be overcome, they can be assumed to still  have a 
potential to accede to the EU at least in principle. This may encourage compliance with 
the EU standards as in regard to the ENP countries the EU has left the membership 
question ambiguous.  
Even though it has been stated in the research that if a country still has that prospect it 
may encourage a country’s willingness to comply (Freyburg et al. 2011),  the research 
has not actually looked at the EU’s position where the countries stand in relation to each 
other and to what extent they actually could be eligible for the membership and how this 
is impacting the domestic attitude and their perception on whether to see this ambiguity 
as a substitute or as a stepping stone for EU membership (Tulmets 2006; Meloni 2006).  
Therefore, the strength of the EU membership prospect is considered as a variable in 
explaining a country’s motivation for compliance. 
In order to measure the potential for EU membership prospect three indicators are used 
drawing to EU integration theories.   Firstly, sociological institutionalism assumes that 
EU integration is possible depending on the extent to which the country fulfils the set 
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criteria of the EU (Schimmelfennig 2003). This was demonstrated when the 
Copenhagen Criteria were utilised to assess the suitability of the enlargement rounds of 
2004 and 2007 as well as in granting candidacy status to Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey and 
Croatia.
12
  Therefore, development of the ENP countries’ reforms are assessed from 
2000 to 2011 utilising four different sets of data and in order to establish membership 
potential: democracy, rule of law, human rights and functioning market economy and 
countries are rated according to whether they reach the EU average, new membership 
average, candidate average and in relation to each other.  
Secondly, liberal intergovermentalism (Moravcsik 1998; Moravcsik and Vachudová 
2003) assumes that the integration is dependent on whether the EU benefits from the 
country’s accession, thus the benefits the EU would gain from the country’s accession 
and the threats it poses if the EU was to accept it, are also analysed.  
Thirdly, acceptance of a new candidate country requires a unanimous decision between 
the EU institutions and therefore in order to understand the likelihood of a certain 
country being considered as a candidate, it is more likely if there is consensus in the EU 
on supporting the country’s potential integration to the EU. Therefore EU support also 
needs to be analysed.  
Fourthly, the country’s own perception is also taken into consideration. Despite the 
likelihood of the membership prospect in the EU, the country’s own perception on 
whether it considers the ambiguity of the EU membership prospect as a potential or not, 
dictates whether this uncertainty of EU membership can work as an incentive. 
Membership prospect is considered high if the country reaches the candidate or member 
state values in most aspects and if inclusion of the country could be beneficial for the 
EU and there are no clear threats posed by the county’s accession and the EU 
institutions have a consensus on supporting the country’s closer integration.  
Membership prospect is considered medium if a country reaches some of the candidate 
states levels, is a neutral choice for the EU in regard to what it could offer to the EU and 
in terms of posing threats and has some support from the EU officials. Membership 
potential is coded low if there are low levels of fulfilling the EU criteria for 
membership, it poses threats to the EU and has little support from the EU officials for 
future integration towards EU.  
                                                          
12
 Croatia is expected to join the EU in July 2013. 
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3.4.2 Identification with the EU 
Identification with the EU is the other macro level variable that is hypothesised to 
promote compliance. It is expected to be important to promote compliance especially in 
the ENP countries where the credible membership perspective does not exist. 
Identification with the EU may make a difference in willingness to comply, because 
according to constructivist understanding, if a country identifies with an aspiration 
group it will try to adhere to the standards of the group because if it deviates from the 
practices it would feel shamed or shunned (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003). 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005)  argue that ‘non-members states are more likely 
to be persuaded by the EU to adopt its rules if they regard the community of states 
represented by the EU as a valid aspiration group ‘whose collective identity, values, 
norms they share, whose recognition they seek and to which they want to belong’ 
(2005:19). In order to understand the conditions under which compliance takes place 
and to determine the levels of the EU’s potential in the ENP states, identification with 
the EU is also evaluated in the three states.  
To operationalise identification with the EU, as it is a complex task to separate in 
practice identification with the EU from a desire to join the EU for material benefits, 
measurement is enabled by drawing from the definition by Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier (2005) which considers identification with the EU as belonging to a group 
which they share identity, values and norms.  
While feelings of belonging to the EU is possibly best reflected in the expressions of 
wanting to become an EU member, as it has been argued that internal identity and 
identification is best reflected in foreign policy choices (Gülseven 2010; Telhami 2002), 
it also can be a reflection of hoping to gain benefits even without considering the EU as 
an aspiration group and therefore ‘belonging’ needs to be further refined. This is done 
by evaluating whether there are also other orientations the country wants to belong to 
and the reasons for that orientation.   
 
Consequently, the primary orientation is established through examination of countries’ 
perception on the basis of presidential annual addresses on the EU, Russia, CIS, NATO 
and the US and establishing a preferred direction, and the reason for it. Presidential 
annual addresses are used as they are expected to reflect the  best indication on the view 
on the political orientation of the country, as they are directed both to national and 
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international audiences (Timuş 2009). Manifesto Group (MFG) datasets also offer 
information on the political party’s perception of the preferred foreign policy direction 
in order to establish the general view on the leading elite since independence to date.  
Political party datasets reveal more of the full political outlook of the country and not 
only the leading elite.  
 
In addition to the ‘belonging’ indicator, the common values and identity are also 
established. Especially the MFG datasets are used to establish the country’s perception 
on promotion of democracy, human rights, rule of law and market economy.  They offer 
a good source of data when it would be impossible to have comparative data on the 
political elite view without interviewing all the representatives.  
The identity of the state is established by references of the country being European and 
to a common identity with the EU in contrast to nationalist tendencies or focus on other 
identities. The data from the MFG datasets section on nationalist tendencies were used. 
All the data were further enriched by literature and interviews.  
In regard to establishing population identification levels, data were drawn from a variety 
of population polls conducted by the Euro Barometer, International Republican Institute 
(IRI), and the domestic think tanks. In regard to Georgia, Caucasus Research Resource 
Centre (CRRC), in regard to Moldova, Idis Viitorul and Adept and in regard to Ukraine, 
Razumkov centre offered the popular polls that were comparable including similar 
contents. Four questions that have featured in the population polls and available for all 
the three states are used to establish the level of identification with the EU. To establish 
‘belonging’, the data on primary partner and wishes to join the EU were utilised. In 
regard to ‘shared values’ data on what the EU integration meant to the population were 
utilised and finally ‘shared identity’ of the population relies on the data on answering 
the primary identity that the population identifies themselves with.  
The overall data are strengthened by the survey data which includes opinions of the 
major parties on what the EU represents to them thus providing an opportunity to 
understand whether they see the EU in terms of benefits or values. However, 
membership willingness cannot solely be regarded as a reflection of these countries’  
identification with European values due to the fact that even if society’s elite is very 
pro-European and willing for EU membership, the citizens at the national level do not 
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necessarily identify with the EU at all (Bruter 2003). Thus, also public opinion was 
considered as part of the analysis. 
Identification with the EU is considered high if orientation toward the EU is motivated 
by considering the EU and its values in positive terms, and considering itself as 
European or being part of the European family. Identification is considered medium if 
the presidents and the parties views differ but demonstrate some identification with the 
EU. Identification with the EU is considered low if the country orientates to the EU but 
does not have an interest in common shared values and does not consider itself as 
having a European identity. 
3.5 Operationalisation and Measurement of Micro-Level Variables  
3.5.1 Issue-Specific Benefits 
The rewards that the EU is offering under the ENP are related to market access, visa 
facilitation or to further participation in EU agencies. Firstly, the action plans mention 
that further cooperation and assistance is always related to respect of the EU 
standards.
13
 Secondly, the more specific incentives such as market access, visa 
facilitation and visa free travel have been mentioned in the context of particular tasks. In 
the area of JHA issues, the ENP’s main incentives are visa facilitation and assistance. 
When the EaP was launched, the EU also announced as a long term goal visa 
liberalisation for the EaP countries when borders are more secure. The issue-specific 
benefits are considered high when it is directly linked to a reward either by the EU 
explicitly promising it or if the reward is a common procedure as a part of a deal. It is 
considered medium if the country can expect a reward but it is not directly linked to any 
tasks but rather referred to a group of tasks that the issue can be a part of. Incentives are 
considered to be low if there are no incentives offered in regard to the demand.  
3.5.2 Issue-Specific Costs 
The issue-specific costs variable takes into consideration the costs that occur at the 
legislative and behavioural compliance level. At the formal compliance level the costs 
can emerge if a law is passed and if the new regulation undermines government 
practices of power preservation or changing power relations between governmental 
                                                          
13
 Even if the action plans mention that financial assistance is conditional on continuing progress 
according to the plan, interviews with the DG Home Affairs and  EuropeAid representatives (June 2011) 
clarified that there have been no cases where assistance would be taken away if progress would not be 
satisfactory as it would be contradictory for the wider principle of supporting progress. Only in extreme 
cases such as Syria has withholding assistance been considered.  
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actors (Schimmelfennig 2005) or if it is to do with controversial issues in the country 
(Grabbe 2004) which can cause instability within the leadership or between the public 
and the leadership.  Political costs are considered high if the law undermines power 
preservation or causes instability or controversy within the elite. They are considered 
low if it does not change the power structures and if there is a consensus between the 
political actors on the adoption of the law. At the behavioural compliance level issue-
specific economic costs can occur if the implementation of the issue involves complex 
bureaucratic or institutional procedures (Dimitrova 2005) or if it is expensive to 
implement in economic terms.  The costs are considered high if the procedures are 
continuous and require maintenance and a permanent expense from the domestic 
budget. The costs are considered to be low if they are one-off tasks and do not require 
more than one contribution from the domestic budget.   
3.5.3 Financial Assistance 
Financial assistance that the EU provides may be beneficial to overcome the issues that 
could be complied with due to political will but are held back due to lack of capacity, 
especially in technical issue areas at the practical application level.  Financial assistance 
by the EU has been organised in the JHA area through Tacis and thematic funding BB7-
67 and Aeneas until 2007. ENPI pooled the funding tools since 2007 and thematic 
migration and asylum section allocates funding for the JHA related issues since 2007. 
The allocated financial assistance is considered high if it covers all the costs of the EU 
demand (Schimmelfennig 2009), medium if it covers some costs and low if no financial 
assistance is given in the area.  
3.5.4 Capacity and Technical Expert Groups  
When the EU launched the ENP it soon after also made some of its agencies available 
for the ENP countries participation. As these agencies provide technical expertise and 
cooperation and in general more expert contacts they may promote compliance with the 
EU standards. This variable is operationalised so that it is considered high if the EU 
related networks involve governmental actors through TAIEX, Twinning and 
FRONTEX and in addition to that involve cooperation with the international 
organisations and facilitate civil society partnership at the ground level. The expert 
group variable is considered medium if the EU programmes and agencies involve some 
levels of the society and low if there are no EU related capacity or expert groups in 
place. 
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3.5.5 Legitimacy 
As legitimacy varies only depending on the issue and not according to time or countries 
these values apply to all countries of the study and are discussed here instead of in each 
individual country chapters in order to avoid repetition.  
a. Border guard reform requests are also promoted by other organisations than only 
the EU. However, they are not codified in international law and the requests 
demonstrate a strong EU self-interest to increase its own security. Therefore the 
request is not considered as fully legitimate.   
 
b. The readmission agreement was established as an efficient way of fighting 
illegal immigration already in the PCA documents. The agreement, in addition 
to some third states, is also requested from all of the EU member states in order 
to have ‘shared responsibility’ on migration issues (Ferrero-Waldner 2006b). 
Even the own country citizens’ readmission is an obligation under customary 
international law (Cassarino 2010:13), there are no obligations for any country 
to readmit non-nationals who transited through the territory of the state en route 
to another destination (Roig and Huddelston 2008). In addition, the EU acts 
from self-interest by transferring responsibility for potential irregular migrants to 
be dealt with outside of its borders (Smith 2005:764). Furthermore, considering 
the low capacity, facilities and practices in the ENP states, it is unclear whether 
it will undermine human rights standards in regard to treatment of detainees.
14
 
There is not always time and resources to assess all of the people’s situations 
and this may result in cases where people are readmitted back to countries where 
they are faced with detention or execution.
15
 It may also put readmitted migrants 
into a position where they are likely to irregularly re-enter the EU even if it is 
often through desperate or fatal channels.
16
   Therefore  the request is low in 
legitimacy. 
 
c. Asylum protection and enhancement outside the EU’s borders has received 
controversial views: FRONTEX was for instance criticised by the European 
Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and the UN Refugee Agency 
                                                          
14
 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 46, Kiev, December 2009. 
15
 Author’s interview with an interviewee no.68, Kiev, Dec 2009. 
16
 See: UNHCR Migration and Development: a Human Rights Approach.  
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(UNHCR) for the EU posing double standards by strengthening its own borders 
so that it is difficult even to get access to an EU country and apply for asylum, 
when at the same time in third states the EU intends to enhance their capacity to 
deal with irregular immigrants and asylum seekers.
17
  Furthermore, the EU’s 
action is seen as driven from the EU’s self-interest as it would also reduce the 
number of refugees within in the EU and the EU’s responsibility to deal with 
refugees. However, as the focus here is particularly on protection of the refugees 
by respecting the principle of non-refoulement and minimum standards of 
protection which are to do with human rights and are coded in international law 
the request for these issues by the EU are also understood to be legitimate. 
 
d. The fight against human trafficking principles are presented internationally most 
importantly in the UN convention against transnational organised crime and its 
three protocols, Palermo Protocols and the OSCE action plan for combating 
trafficking in human beings. All of these regulations cover three main issues in 
regard to human trafficking: protection, prevention and punishment. For 
instance, Palermo Protocol covers punishment by recommending that ‘the State 
Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
establish as criminal offences the conduct set forth in article 3 of this Protocol, 
when committed intentionally’.18 The OSCE action plan calls for ‘legislative 
provisions for effective and proportionate criminal penalties, including 
imprisonment, that take into account the serious nature of this crime’. 19 In 
regard to the ENP states the EU has mentioned in the action plans the issue of 
human trafficking by referring both to the UN and OSCE principles especially 
pointing out the chapters III, IV and V in regard to Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine. The fight against human trafficking can be considered as a legitimate 
request as it is included both in international and EU law. 
                                                          
17
 Refugee Council and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) Joint Response to Select 
Committee on the European Union Sub-Committee F (Home Affairs): FRONTEX Inquiry, 2007. 
18
 UN General Assembly, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, 15 November 2000, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4720706c0.html 
19
 OSCE MC.DEC/2/03. 
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3.5.6 External Micro and Macro Level Pressures 
External macro and micro level pressures refer to conditions which are creating either 
cross-conditionality or cross-socialisation at the macro or micro level. It is considered 
important as cross-conditionality or cross-socialisation, referring to other institutions’ 
influence, can dilute the EU’s influence (Tangiashvili and Kobaladze 2006:13). Macro 
level influence is considered high if there are other countries or international institutions 
that have longer or deeper interdependence than the EU in the area and low if they are 
not competing with the EU. Micro level pressures and assistance are considered high if 
they are considered the primary source of pressure, assistance or conditionality instead 
of the EU and low if there are no organisations which are offering conditional benefits 
or technical assistance. 
3.6 Data and Sources 
The research design is longitudinal and data were collected for each variable. 
Longitudinal data allow measurement of change ‘from one period to another’ (Menard 
1991). Data are presented in a raw table which allows for drawing conclusions of the 
conditions when compliance takes place and also informing the conditions that are not 
relevant for compliance. In acquiring data, triangulation was aimed for by sourcing data 
by interviews (state, EU, NGO actors) by analysis of official documentation, and reports 
by civil society organisations and think tanks.  
Data were collected both from primary and secondary sources. Primary data consisted 
of interviews, EU and official documents, datasets and surveys. Secondary data 
included literature that involved Europeanisation on the CEECs, Europeanisation 
beyond the EU, external governance and new institutionalist perspectives as guidelines 
for the research design. Reports from international organisations, think tanks, NGOs 
and news from three country media sources provided insights on the development of the 
relations between the EU and the countries, developments in regard to challenges in 
implementation and compliance in the specific JHA issues.  
3.6.1 Primary Data 
3.6.1.1 Interviews  
In total 73 interviews and meetings were carried out in Tbilisi, Chisinau, Kiev, Odessa 
and Brussels (approximately the same amount in each country). They were conducted 
between December 2009 and June 2011 apart from a few which were already conducted 
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in April 2009.  Some interviewees were further contacted by email to acquire up to date 
information in July and August 2011.  The annex contains the names and affiliation of 
the interviews and in those cases where the interviewee preferred to stay anonymous 
only the place, status and time is indicated.  
All interviews were semi-structured and thus allowed interviewees to elaborate on their 
experiences. Apart from a few occasions all the interviews were tape recorded and 
transcribed subsequently. Most interviews were conducted in English apart from three 
that were conducted with the help of a translator. The purpose of the interviews was to 
gain information on sources not available on official documents or to clarify the EU’s 
positions in using its tools and conditionality and country’s governance actors’ 
motivations for compliance and the process that has been taking place in regard to the 
negotiation and implementation of law in each policy sector. They were important in 
understanding the measurement of the issue areas and in determining when they could 
be considered as compliant. They also shed light on the political processes and costs 
when other data were scarce and overall helped to check against other data.   
The questions posed through the interviews were open-ended and started with general 
questions which were directed to all interviewees. More specific questions dealing with 
the particular policies were directed for the specialists in the particular area. The more 
general questions covered relations before and after the ENP, priority JHA areas, and 
main obstacles in EU cooperation, implementation and motivations for EU relations and 
other external actors’ role in EU country relations. In the policy specific areas the 
questions aimed to establish the status before EU involvement, perception of the EU 
benefits and capacity tools, the challenges in negotiation and disagreements in regard to 
legal approximation and the domestic obstacles and challenges for implementation. 
Furthermore, it aimed to establish what the role of the other actors was in comparison to 
the EU and what the EU could do more to support the progress.  
To get an unbiased view the domestic actors in each country were interviewed from the 
following groups of people: in the target countries at the governmental level officials 
under the Europeanisation integration department were interviewed to gain general 
information of the motivations and EU-relations, the different ministry officials from 
the Foreign Ministry, Euro-Atlantic Integration and Ministry of Interior responsible for 
the four different issue areas were interviewed in regard to progress and challenges in 
each sector and political party representatives clarified their position on European 
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integration and future EU relations. EU delegation representatives were interviewed 
furthermore to provide understanding on the EU tools and in general relations between 
the EU and the target country,  local EU set processes and programme representatives 
i.e. EUBAM, Twinning, GEPLAC, EUSR Georgia, Bommoluk and Twinning agencies 
and projects provided more information on the specific tools and strategies and 
development on the ground, international organisations such as OSCE, Council of 
Europe, IOM and Söderköping process, were interviewed to gain a view on the 
cooperation with the EU and also to understand the EU’s leverage in comparison to 
other actors. Furthermore, local think tanks, independent experts and NGOs’ provided 
information on the processes on the ground.   
In Brussels interviews were conducted with representatives from the DG Home Affairs 
responsible for border management, migration management, asylum and the fight 
against trafficking of human beings. The DG EEAS desk officer for Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine provided country specific information and DG RELEX representatives 
were clarifying questions on financial aid. Furthermore, the future role of the EU and 
the EaP countries and the question of potential membership prospect were discussed 
with representatives from the Parliamentary Committee for the ENP and the EaP. 
Interviews also included representatives from Ukrainian and Moldovan missions for the 
EU which provided current information on EU relations in each JHA issue area. 
3.6.1.2 Official Documents, Datasets and Surveys 
Other primary data sources included official EU and government documents, datasets 
from international organisations and survey data. The data were used both for 
establishing the levels of the EU membership prospect and identification with the EU 
variables as well as levels of independent variables in regard to the four issue areas.  
To establish an understanding of the strength of the EU membership prospect and   
identification with the EU, foreign policy strategy, security documents and national 
action plans of each country were used as starting points as they demonstrate the 
orientation and future foreign policy stand and aims of the country.  
The questions to do with the EU membership prospect and the criteria toward the EU 
benefited from data that are already available from several institutions which have 
established standards and therefore facilitated comparison. These sources of data were 
beneficial for establishing the levels which the EU regard as crucial for its integration 
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i.e. democracy, human rights, rule of law and functioning market economy (i.e. 
Freedom House, Nations in Transit, World Bank).  
In regard to the public’s view on the potential of membership, NGO’s provided survey 
data collected by Razumkov centre in Ukraine, Viitorul, and Soros Institute in Moldova, 
Institute of Policy Studies and Open Society Institute in Georgia. 
At the society level the above mentioned NGO’s also provided survey data on European 
identity and motivations for joining the EU. Identification at the domestic level was 
established by using a dataset collected by Timuş which included opinions on major 
parties’ orientation toward the EU. In addition, the dataset on identity by Light et al. 
(2005)
20
 helped to establish perceptions on identity in Moldova and Ukraine. Overall, 
political leaders’ speeches and statements were used to measure the perception on the 
EU membership prospect and motivations for European integration 
In regard to issue-specific conditions covering the four JHA areas EU documents were 
assessed between 2000 and mid-2011. The main documents that were reviewed were 
the action plans, progress reports, financial programming documents and programme 
fiches, national action programmes and National Indicative Programmes (NIP) and 
country strategy papers in regard to each country. They helped to establish the EU 
demands, incentives and rewards in regard to requests and assistance, financial support 
and the level of progress.  
The domestic progress reports and monitoring scorecards that were made available by 
the Ukrainian and Moldovan mission to the EU and Georgian MFA Department of 
European Integration were beneficial in gaining more specified information on the level 
of progress that was only briefly described in the EU document.  
RefWorld data on migration and refugee related law proved a very beneficial source for 
providing translations of passed laws in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia in order to 
follow up the legal changes.  Furthermore, the available data on migration and asylum 
statistics from UNHCR and Söderköping Process were helpful for establishing the 
amount of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report 
data provided rich information on court cases and prosecutions in each of the countries 
from 2000 until 2011.  
                                                          
20
 Forthcoming in 2012 book by Light et al. consisting identity data beyond the EU.  
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3.6.2 Secondary Data 
Besides the guiding Europeanisation literature and external governance literature that 
was introduced in the previous chapter, the research used news sources from each 
country as well as reports from a variety of institutions such as ICG, Human Rights 
Watch, Transparency International, CEPS, IOM, UNHCR, ECRE which are rich in 
detail in the specific topics of the research and which are not yet covered in book length 
copies.  
3.7. Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the research design including case selection, methods and data 
for the research. It demonstrated that the research followed a principle of case study 
design and that case selection was allowing maximum variation and the measurements 
and methods were drawn on the previous literature, interviews, official documents and 
international datasets. This design sets the basis for the empirical nature of the thesis in 
the following chapters. Chapter four focuses on studying the levels of ‘strength of 
membership prospect’ and ‘identification with the EU’, in Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine before moving onto issue-specific chapters. 
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4. Strength of Membership Prospect and Identification with the EU in 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Following the Rose Revolution Saakashvili equipped all the institutional buildings and 
the Parliament with EU flags alongside Georgia’s own flag to denote that Georgia’s 
future orientation lay within the EU family (Grant and Leonard 2008). During the 
Russia-Georgia war in 2008 USA and EU flags were waved in the streets of Tbilisi. In 
Moldova people chanted ‘We want to join Europe’, flying EU flags while protesting 
against the Communist election victory in April 2009 (Wroeble 2010:1). Similarly in 
Ukraine ‘Euro-signs’ started appearing in the shop fronts in early 2000 reflecting that 
anything with Euro-affix would be something of a higher quality (Getmanchuk 2009). 
These three ENP states: Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, since the mid-1990s have 
announced their wishes to be considered as potential EU candidates and have expressed 
that their history and orientation lay with Europe in their rhetoric and through symbols.  
This chapter demonstrates how the levels of the strength of the EU membership 
prospect and identification with the EU vary between the three countries. The results are 
presented in the conclusion on a table which compares the indicators used to evaluate 
the differences between the three countries.  These macro level conditions are measured 
in order to test them together with the issue-specific hypotheses in the country study 
chapters 5, 6, and 7 and to allow the creation of conclusions on the logic of compliance, 
whether compliance is driven by macro or issue conditions related to EU or domestic or 
external reasons and the types of EU tools and conditions that are the most influential.  
This chapter argue that Georgia has the low prospect for EU membership, however, 
identifies most with the EU. Moldova’s strength of EU membership prospect was low 
until 2005, medium until 2009 and high subsequently and it identifies less with the EU 
because it holds loyalty to both Russia and the EU. Ukraine’s strength of EU 
membership prospect has also varied from the highest score of 2002-2007 to medium 
before and after it. Identification has also been hovering between the EU and Russia 
between the Western and the Eastern side of the country and also the elite.  
The first part of the chapter develops the arguments in regard to Georgia. The second 
section focuses on Moldova and the third section on Ukraine before concluding with the 
main commonalities and differences.  
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4.2 Strength of the EU Membership Prospect and Identification with the EU in 
Georgia 
A Georgia-EU relationship formed rather slowly as the EU’s attention throughout the 
1990s was focused on the Balkans and to the more immediate neighbourhood. Despite 
Georgia started expressing its interest for the first time in EU membership already in the 
late 1990s. While Georgia’s Europeaness has been debated, for instance becoming 
apparent during the accession negotiations to the Council of Europe, Georgia has 
always considered itself as a country which is European but is located in the non-
European geographical area (Jones 2003). This perception was created through 
experiences where it found itself to be different firstly from the neighbouring Muslim 
countries, and secondly as it considered itself separate from other countries under the 
Soviet Union because of its opposition to communism (Jones 2003: 89-92).  These 
differences made it associate itself with Europe with which it also shares Christian and 
historical roots, thus, allowing them to refer to themselves not only as Europeans but the 
most ancient Europeans (Müller 2011). EU membership prospect has not been strong all 
the time and the realisation of it not being a short term goal in Georgia is therefore 
unlikely to have been encouraging compliance with the EU standards. However, 
identification with the EU has been strong early on since its independence which may 
offer more of an explanatory factor for compliance.   
4.2.1 Strength of the EU Membership Prospect in Georgia 
4.2.1.1 Fulfilment of Europeanness and the Copenhagen Criteria 
Georgia’s geographical Europeaness has not always been agreed upon and consequently 
neither was its potential for EU candidacy. During the 1990s Georgia was seen 
geographically as a bridge between Asia and Europe rather than fitting into the 
European periphery and therefore ‘Georgia’s chance of being able to be fully integrated 
in the European Union may be regarded as nil’ (Coppieters et al. 1999:46). When 
Georgia started negotiations to become  a Council of Europe member it meant a lot for 
the elite  because in 1999 membership in the organisation was seen to serve as a 
confirmation of one’s ‘Europeanness’ (Siaroff 2000:35).  However, it was only when 
Georgia was included into the EaP that EU officials considered it as a European country 
which would also be able to apply for EU membership.
 21
  
                                                          
21 Author’s interviews with an interviewee no. 43 and interviewee no. 45, Brussels, June 2011. 
58 
 
Even though Georgia’s Europeaness was not agreed on by the EU institutions or its 
member states in the first years of independence, Georgia’s convergence with the 
Copenhagen Criteria has been the most successful among the three ENP states 
according to the six indicators covering the four political and economic criteria of the 
EU for accession states (see Figures 1-4 in the Appendix). Georgia has scored the 
highest in three issues out of six whereas Moldova and Ukraine scored highest only in 
two or one areas respectively, according to the datasets used for evaluation (democracy, 
rule of law, human rights, economic stability).   
The democracy indicator shows that Georgia’s scores situate between Moldova and 
Ukraine. It did not reach member or candidate states’ standards either. The score has 
also deteriorated since 2008 when Saakashvili managed to change the constitution to 
increase the President’s power. Consequently, the Freedom House removed Georgia 
from the list of electoral democracies in 2008 (Omelicheva 2010).  
Despite low democracy scores, in the second indicator, the rule of law, which consists 
of corruption and independence of judiciary ratings, Georgia has not only reached the 
member state levels but it has surpassed the average level of the candidate states from 
2008 onwards to date and its scores demonstrate an improving situation. Georgian 
scores also indicate that it is the least corrupted out of the three countries.  For 
independence of judiciary Georgia did not reach the levels of the candidate and member 
states and only had better ratings than Ukraine. Similarly to Ukraine its score has 
reduced from 2006 to 2009 when the latest results were available.  
The third issue area, human rights, includes standards both from physical integrity 
rights and empowerment rights.
22
 Georgia did not reach any of the levels of the previous 
member states or the candidate states in regard to physical integrity rights and has lower 
scores than Moldova and the same as Ukraine. In the new empowerment rights rating 
Georgia in 2008 had a higher score than the average of Romania and Bulgaria and also 
the highest of the three states.  
                                                          
22
 Integrity rights consist of Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance 
indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for 
these four rights);  empowerment rights consist of an index constructed from the Foreign Movement, 
Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly & Association, Workers’ Rights, 
Electoral Self-Determination, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government 
respect for these seven rights) to 14 (full government respect for these seven rights). (Source: CIRI 
Human rights dataset 2010). 
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The fourth issue area, functioning market economy, was evaluated on the basis of 
economic freedom dataset.
23
 It was the most successful area where Georgia surpassed 
the new member states’ average of the 2004 enlargement round since 2007, and also the 
new member states’ average of the 2007 enlargement round since 2006, and the average 
of the candidate states for the whole period except for 2000.  In fact Georgia was 
labelled as the ‘number one world reformer’ by the World Bank and had a GDP growth 
forecast at almost 7 per cent for the period 2007-2012 (Kratochvil and Lippert 2007). 
Out of these six indicators, which form the core of the Copenhagen Criteria, Georgia 
had the highest convergence levels in comparison to all three ENP states in three issues 
and also reaches the state of member and Balkan states in lack of corruption since 2008, 
human empowerment rights and economic freedom. Georgian scores were between 
Moldova and Ukraine for independence of judiciary, which has reduced since 2007, and 
in democracy which has also reduced since 2001, and human integrity rights which 
have remained the same as the average since 2001. The lowest score was only received 
out of the three states in democracy. Therefore, overall having three scores at the top 
level Georgia has been the most successful out of the three ENP states in fulfilling the 
EU criteria and especially it has been successful since 2008.   
4.2.1.2 Potential Threats and Opportunities of Georgia’s Integration 
Despite surpassing the levels of fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria in comparison to 
Moldova and Ukraine there are issues which may limit and also support the integration 
potential of Georgia. In essence, Abhkazia and South Ossetia’s status is making deeper 
integration harder both to the EU and NATO (Baramidze 2011).  In addition, it is also 
expected that the EU remains reluctant to open the option for membership in order not 
to upset Russia, especially since the Georgia-Russia war (Grant and Leonard 2008). 
Despite this the fact that Georgia is relatively small could make it an easier country to 
absorb than for instance Ukraine. Finally, in comparison to Moldova, Georgia also 
would provide strategic importance to the EU as a transit country for oil from the 
Caspian Sea, instead of needing to rely on Russia or the Middle East (Chira and Verdun 
2011).  
                                                          
23
 The dataset entails issues which form parts of functioning market economy: free interplay of market 
forces, free market entry and exit, macroeconomic stability, sufficiently developed financial sector and 
adequate legal system. 
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4.2.1.3 EU Support 
In comparison to Moldova and Ukraine, which both have received support from a 
variety of sources for their membership aspiration, Georgia overall has gained less 
support. In the 1990s Georgia, under Shevardnadze, received little support for 
membership prospect from the EU.  Georgia had misused funds that it had received 
from the EU and the US and this contributed to the West’s sceptical attitude toward 
Georgia’s promises (Omelicheva 2010). Even after the Rose Revolution, when the EU 
started to support Georgia’s new direction and acknowledged Georgian wishes to join 
the EU, there has not been support toward Georgia’s membership wishes by the EU 
institutions or member states. Only after the launch of the EaP, EU officials in principle 
agreed that EaP countries are eligible to apply for membership. 
24
 
4.2.1.4 Domestic Perceptions of the EU Membership Prospect 
Even if little support was achieved, domestic presidential rhetoric has maintained since 
early on that Georgia would soon enter the EU. During Shevardnadze the EU 
membership declarations were more of a tool to gain support when Shevardnadze was 
losing power rather than actually demonstrating real desire. For instance, when Georgia 
was still struggling with corruption and standards that would not be acceptable to the 
EU and when the EU was not even recognising Georgia as a purely European country, 
Shevardnadze in 2002 was announcing ‘Everything is being prepared so that we will 
soon enter the European Union. That will be a great step forward, even though that may 
require some time - maybe a year and a half or two years’. 25 He also maintained ‘We 
also have a real opportunity to join NATO’ (Nodia and Pinto Scholtbach 2006).  
When Saakashvili entered power after the Rose Revolution, similar rhetoric of the EU 
membership prospect was continued as a consequence of the Rose Revolution euphoria 
rather than being based on facts or shared by more than the president and the immediate 
elite. When Georgia was admitted to the ENP at their own request most of the officials 
considered the ENP ‘as a springboard for subsequent EU accession, while just a few of 
them would have properly read the ENP documentation’ (Gegeshidze 2006). 
Furthermore, Saakashvili announced in 2004 that Georgia would become an EU 
member during the tenure of the next Georgian president to be elected in 2009 (Di 
                                                          
24 Author’s interviews with an interviewee no. 43 and interviewee no. 45, Brussels, June 2011. 
25
 Shevardnadze, E.  ‘Eradicating corruption is not enough to sustain a country’ Interview by Babitsky, 
A. 2005, Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1051300.html. 
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Puppo 2008). In 2006 he had predictions of Georgia joining NATO in 2008 and the EU 
shortly after (Beatty 2006).   
Despite this presidential rhetoric and with the population maintaining a similar view
26
 
that it should happen soon (Müller 2011; Gordon 2005) the political elite had a 
consensus that it is indeed unlikely even it if wants to maintain it as a long term 
prospect (Baramidze 2011; Gogolashvili 2009). The main reasons why the elite does not 
see it as possible is that they are feeling that there are many other states before them in 
the queue, due to enlargement fatigue and also because they are not even sure if Georgia 
would be ready to commit to it fully. Firstly, because Turkey has not been proceeding 
with negotiations it has also sent Georgia a sign that it would not be considered for 
membership. As Ghia Nodia expressed in 2009, the concern of enlargement fatigue and 
how Turkey is treated reflects to Georgians that they should not have ‘illusions about’ 
membership. If Turkey would enter to EU, it also ‘would make Georgia's aspirations 
much more realistic’ (Nodia 2009).  
Secondly, the internal mismatch with the EU is likely to stop integration. The mismatch 
between Georgian and EU policies, which Georgians are not necessarily willing to 
meet, could cause insurmountable internal challenges for the membership prospect. For 
instance, Gogolashvili found that Georgia’s founding principle of deregulation would 
conflict with the ENP action plan commitments and also closer EU integration. 
Georgians are reluctant to set up regulatory agencies, especially in social and economic 
policy areas, as it reminds them about the past that they are trying to avoid.
 27
 Papava 
(2008) maintains that some issues related to the economics sector are not even 
considered to be necessary and therefore may hinder advancement with EU 
integration.
28
 Thus, the key dilemma also consists of whether Georgia, despite its 
wishes to join the EU, would in fact be ready to change from a liberal model to a 
regulatory model.  
As a consequence, because the likelihood of EU membership was not seen as high, 
Georgia has not taken EU accession as a primary goal. Rather NATO accession has 
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 A majority of the population expect EU accession to take place in the next few years and 93% want to 
join the EU according to CRRC (2009). At the same time knowledge on the EU is low as it is 
demonstrated in the same survey: L 32 per cent only know what the EU is and 16 per cent think that 
Georgia is already a member.   
27
 Author’s interviews with and interviewee no.35 and an interviewee no. 55,  Tbilisi, October 2010. 
28
 These issues are such as labour code, food safety and phytosanitary control, quality control of industrial 
goods, competition rules, consumer rights and environmental rules (Papava 2008). 
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been the priority in the last decade. The elite sees it as a more likely option to integrate 
to, but also their foreign policy relations are driven by the goal of guaranteeing 
Georgia’s security and currently NATO serves this goal best. Therefore, in regard to the 
EU only sectoral integration seems more likely. Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli 
maintained in 2006 that Georgian’s concerns about the future EU enlargement 
convinced them that it should pursue a free trade agreement instead of full membership. 
‘It is totally counterproductive to discuss with the European Commission or EU 
member states possible membership of the Union, totally counterproductive’ he said, 
because ‘there is a kind of enlargement fatigue in the European Union any discussion 
would be senseless’ (Beatty 2006). Even if the rhetoric of EU integration since the 
Russia war increased in 2008, this view is still maintained. 
In sum, the reality of membership prospect in unlikely due to the separatist areas’ status, 
far away location from the EU and a lack of Georgia’s own domestic drive towards it. 
Consequently, low prospect of the EU membership potential is unlikely to explain 
Georgia’s decision to comply with the EU standards.  
4.2.2 Georgia’s Identification with the EU  
This section argues that Georgian identification with the EU has been medium until 
2002 and high ever since. Before 2002 only some groups of the elite found the EU as a 
group to belong to; recognised with some European values and considered themselves 
as European but it was not shared across the elite and overall there was no specific 
separation between the West and the EU in their opinion. After 2002 identification with 
the EU has been high because, even though the US has been the primary partner to 
Georgia and NATO has been the group they have aimed to integrate with, Georgia has 
demonstrated that its identity, values and belonging has been with the EU and not 
shared by other directions or the East. These arguments are explored below through data 
drawn on presidential, governmental and political party opinions
29
 before discussing 
population identification which is analysed from population polls’ data conducted by 
the IRI and the domestic NGOs. 
 4.2.2.1 Elite Identification with the EU  
The first president Gamsakhurdia did not consider that Georgia belonged to the 
European family due to its different political system (Ditrych 2010) 
 
and neither had he 
viewed the West in a positive light as at the time of the separatist conflicts the West had 
                                                          
29
 See Figures 5-8 in the Appendix. 
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not come to the rescue and therefore little trust was vested in it (Jones 2003). 
Gamsakhurdia’s policy had nationalist tendencies (Papava and Tokmzishvili 2006) and 
he considered that Georgian identity lay with pan-Caucasia (Jones 2003; Nodia 1996). 
After the short lived presidency of Gamsakhurdia during which he did not have the 
opportunity to develop a clear foreign policy orientation (Nodia and Pinto Scholtbach 
2006), Shevardnadze took office and aimed to create good relations in all directions but 
did not put any special emphasis on the EU specifically but rather to the West in 
general. He retained Gamsakhurdia’s direction in viewing the Caucasus as a home for 
Georgia, not in a tribal sense but rather in terms of economics and security (Jones 
2003). He joined the CIS in 1993, and signed the Georgia-Russian friendship treaty in 
1995 (Jones 2003).  He also mentioned NATO and EU integration as the main goal for 
foreign policies (Nodia and Pinto Scholtbach 2006). 
Even though the two first presidents took no stand toward a European direction the 
foreign policy orientation of the Parliament, its Committees, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) and Ministry of Defence (MD) from 1994-1997 emphasised Georgia’s 
commitment to the Western model of liberal democracy, rule of law, minority rights and 
a free market (Jones 2003) which were expressed in the three most important policy 
documents during the time: 1. ‘Basic Principles of the Sustainability of Social Life, the 
Strengthening of State Sovereignty and Security, and the Restoration of the Territorial 
Integrity of Georgia’ (Basic Principles) 2. The ‘Georgian Military Doctrine’ and 3. 
‘Georgian National Security Concept’ (Jones 2003). None of the documents made 
reference to the idea of the Caucasian state and most considered Russia as an intruder at 
the time (Jones 2003). While this was indicating that the West was considered as the 
primary aspiration group to belong to, there was no particular separation of what the 
West meant and the EU’s particular role as a part of it.  
Political parties at the time did not either clearly orientate to the EU as demonstrated in 
the MFG datasets of the 1992 election. Only three parties out of 18 orientated to the EU 
(a total of 38 seats out of 225 in the parliament). Nevertheless, it was the clearest 
direction of the other alternatives as there were no parties demonstrating orientation 
either to US/Western states or Russia/CIS. In the second election in 1995 two parties 
out of eight had positive views on European integration (Union of Georgian 
Traditionalistas ‘KTK’ and  National Democratic Party ‘EDP’) thus representing a more 
positive direction toward the EU, however, still not representing more than a small 
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portion of the total seats. Again other directions (East inc. Russia or CIS or West and 
USA) were not supported.  In addition, most parties’ perceptions reflected nationalist 
tendencies. In sum, during the first years until 1997 identification with the EU can be 
considered to be medium due to the mixed record at the elite level even if the EU 
orientation was seen as primary in terms of origins, identity and values. 
Even if during his second term Shevardnadze’s identification with the EU was more 
apparent it was not yet shared by all the elite. Shevardnadze expressed a clear 
orientation to the EU by expressing his wish to be included in the EU. It was not only 
due to benefits but also due to shared history and values which were expressed for 
example when Mr. Zhvania at the end of the 1990s emphasised the potential link 
between Georgian-Basque roots thus demonstrating a European link or that the 
inclusion in the Council of Europe was so important for Georgia because they 
considered it to demonstrate that they were a European nation. In addition to the 
leadership’s willingness for EU integration and being recognised as European from 
1999 onwards the political parties demonstrated their increased orientation toward the 
EU. In 1999 two parties out of four, which occupied a majority of seats in the 
Parliament, were pro-European and two parties also agreed with the main Western and 
EU values, thus, demonstrating a European orientation in terms of belonging and values 
in 1999. While they were demonstrating European orientation and most of them agreed 
with the European values two parties also demonstrated nationalist tendencies in 1999. 
Thus, while it demonstrates overall higher identification with the EU values than before 
there still was not a full orientation or identification with the EU.  
The second term with high levels of identification took place when Saakashvili stepped 
into power after the events of the Rose Revolution and when the decision makers were 
replaced by EU and US educated young staff. Saakashvili and the leadership had a 
consensus on orientation toward the EU and NATO. The national addresses by 
Saakashvili were airing the same message: the president mentioned Georgia wishes to 
‘return to Europe’ (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010)30 and referred to them as the 
oldest Europeans (2007) and that Europe is the most important political vector (2007). 
This did not however reflect its goal of becoming a member because while all the 
annual addresses since his election emphasised ‘accession’ to NATO, EU membership 
                                                          
30 See: President of Georgia’s Annual Reports. Available at: http://www.president.gov.ge/en 
/PressOffice/Documents/AnnualReports 
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was not mentioned as a potential goal. It instead was referenced in terms of ‘closer 
integration’.  
At these times a clear majority of political parties were also wishing to belong to the EU 
and had no particular view on the West and the US and CIS/East since 2004 onwards. In 
addition to this, most parties also expressed support for EU and Western related values 
of human rights, democracy, fight against corruption and free economy. Only one party 
out of 8 demonstrated anymore nationalist tendencies in 2004 according to the MFG 
dataset.  Thus, from Shevardnadze’s second term and under Saakashvili there has been a 
clear orientation toward the EU, support of Western values and considering Georgians 
as Europeans. Also, since 2008 the parliamentary seats were occupied by the political 
parties that were by a majority supporting European orientation (Timuş 2008). 
While Georgia’s identification with the EU was high already before 2008 when it 
increasingly wanted to join the EU, after 2008 the EU was also seen more in terms of a 
security provider. Due to various events including the vacuum left due to the postponed 
NATO membership after the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 and also the decreasing US 
role in the region the EU was seen as the only option for security and territorial integrity 
matters (Khindasheli 2011). Thus, in sum elite identification was medium until 2002 
and high ever since.  
4.2.2.2 Population Identification with the EU 
The population’s identification has followed a similar pattern to the elites. Whereas 
before 2000 orientation toward the EU was not clear,  in fact the population poll data 
after independence demonstrated that Georgians saw that the future lay with Russia and 
less than a half saw the EU in positive terms, but coming closer to 2000 the majority of 
the population  believed the future lay with the US and the EU. For instance, in 1996 
public opinion polls 51 per cent of Georgians saw that the country’s future lay with 
Russia and only 11 per cent saw it lying with the EU (Müller 2011).From 2002 - 2011 
the US has received the first position according to population perception in regard to 
questions of where the future lays. While the primary partner for Georgia has never 
been the EU, the population has always wanted to become an EU member, thus, 
demonstrating at least willingness to belong to it even if the primary trust is vested in 
the US. In addition, the positive perception has also increased in regard to the EU. In 
1996 only 37 per cent had a positive perception on the EU but from 2002-2011 it has 
been as high as 71-91 per cent. Georgians also share a unique identity as Europeans. 
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This is reflected in the population polls where 54 per cent agree with a statement than ‘I 
am Georgian, therefore I am European’ (CRRC 2009). Even if since 2000 the main 
orientation and willingness to belong and identity seem to lie with the EU, the levels of 
identification are, however, at best medium because as de Waahl (2011) demonstrates, 
even if Georgians consider themselves as an ancient European civilisation it is quite 
different to the modern understanding of Europe. CRRC survey revealed that Georgian 
attitudes are very traditional toward different ethnic groups, the role of women and 
homosexuality. Therefore, identification with the population is considered to be low 
until 2002 and medium ever since. 
4.2.3 Summary of EU Membership Prospect and Identification with the EU in 
Georgia 
This section demonstrated the level of Georgian membership prospect in the EU and 
identification with the EU. It argued that the Georgian membership prospect has been 
low at all times and it has also been considered by the elite as being unlikely to happen 
and therefore it has not worked as an incentive for compliance in Georgia. Even if the 
Copenhagen Criteria have in general been more fulfilled than in Moldova and in 
Ukraine overall Georgia’s Europeanness was debated until 2008. Since 2008 when it 
was recognised as a European country by adding it to the Eastern neighbourhood 
initiative, which in essence recognised eligibility for EU membership, its democracy 
ratings have dropped, its relations with Russia deteriorated and overall awareness of the 
fatigue with EU and regulatory changes it would need to go through was gaining less 
support from the domestic actors. 
Identification in Georgia has been highest of the three countries as it has clearly only 
been orientated towards the EU in terms of identity, values and belonging since 2002, 
before which the Caucasus was also referred to a home to belong to. Even if the EU has 
been important ever since 2002, the US and NATO were always seen as the primary 
relations in order to provide security. Just after 2008 has the willingness to integrate to 
the EU increased because even if the EU had previously represented values and identity, 
since then it was also considered in terms of security. In comparison to Moldova and 
Ukraine, which demonstrate more orientation toward the EU due to benefits, Georgian 
orientation toward the EU primarily is motivated by the EU as value and  norms 
provider.  Therefore, identification with the EU can offer more of an explanatory factor 
than an EU membership prospect as in studying compliance in combination with the 
issues specific conditions in chapter five.   
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4.3 Strength of the EU Membership Prospect and Identification with the EU in 
Moldova 
Moldova became for the first time independent in 1991 within the current borders. 
Having been part of Tsarist Russia, Romania and the Soviet Union, not surprisingly 
these roots have left traces in its perception and relationship with the EU. Moldova has 
since early on expected to be admitted to the EU despite its poor reform record. Even if 
geographically European, Moldova has never exclusively considered Europe and the 
EU as its aspiration group to belong to due to identity or values.  In fact the results on 
the identification with the EU demonstrate that from independence to date the leading 
elite still equally shares belonging and identity with Russia even if from their  value 
base point of view they consider themselves as being European. This section argues that 
the strength of the EU membership prospect was medium until 2009 and high since then 
and that the ambiguity of the EU membership prospect has worked as an incentive. 
Identification with the EU has been medium at all times, belonging being split between 
the EU and Russia both at elite and population levels.  
4.3.1 The Strength of the EU Membership Prospect in Moldova 
4.3.1.1 Fulfilment of Europeaness and the Copenhagen Criteria 
Moldova’s Europeaness stems from its geographical location and having been part of 
Romania sharing its history, language and European tradition. Unlike Georgia, Moldova 
has always been considered as a European country (Lupu 2010) even if until 1998 it 
was cooperating with the EU less due to the elite’s eastward orientation (Danii and 
Mascauteanu 2011).  
In regard to fulfilment of the political and economic standards of the Copenhagen 
Criteria, Moldova’s scores demonstrate that besides a difficult beginning, since 2000 it 
has higher scores than Ukraine but worse than Georgia. Firstly, Moldova scores out of 
the three countries the lowest in the area of democracy apart from 2001 and 2002 until 
2011. Secondly, within the human rights standards, integrity rights had the highest score 
out of the three states and the Moldovan score for empowerment rights are between the 
Georgian and Ukrainian scores. Thirdly, the rule of law, formed of corruption and 
independence of judiciary indicators, is between Georgia and Ukraine but the scores 
demonstrate that independence of the judiciary is the highest in Moldova. Fourthly, the 
economic freedom rates have been improving in the last few years and have even 
reached Macedonian and Romanian average scores in some years (See Figures 1-4 in 
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the Appendix). Moldova’s WTO membership since 2001 has especially helped it to 
integrate into the world economy and with the EU (Lentine 2011). In sum, out of all the 
indicators utilised for assessment two areas have scored fully or partially highest out the 
three ENP states and therefore in comparison to the other ENP states overall Moldova 
comes second after Georgia in the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria.  
4.2.1.2 Potential Threats and Opportunities of Moldova’s Integration 
Apart from the rather low levels of Copenhagen Criteria fulfilment, the main issue 
which could keep Moldova from the EU is the secessionist area Transnistria 
(Phinnemore 2006). Nevertheless, contrary to the Georgian situation the Transnistrian 
conflict could not be seen as threatening to the EU’s security as it has not seen outbursts 
since the brief war in 1992. Furthermore, the latest developments also provide hope for 
a solution when Russia promised in March 2011 to take out Cold War-era arms dumps 
which are seen as having a great impact on the potential for a resolution (Rettman 
2011). In comparison to Georgia and Ukraine the relationship with Russia would be 
unlikely to cause problems for integration to the EU.
 31
 Thus, overall Moldova is posing 
the least threat out of the three and also the fact that it is small in size should therefore 
mean it could be more easily absorbed into the EU.
 32
 
Despite little potential threats to the EU from accession, it also has little to provide for 
the EU.
33
 Moldova has been known as the poorest country in Europe whose survival has 
been based to a large extent on its ability to receive foreign remittances (Chira and 
Verdun 2011). The only industry that Moldova could contribute to is the wine industry, 
which is not something it could compete with in the European market.
 34
 In addition, it 
holds little strategic importance in comparison to Ukraine or Georgia, having no 
position in regard to energy transit routes. The only contribution would thus be to 
demonstrate the EU’s power as the EU needs to have a success story in the 
neighbourhood: as they almost lost Ukraine, Moldova may have an opportunity for 
future membership.
 35
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 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 30, Brussels, June 2011 and with an interviewee no. 4, 
Chisinau, June 2010.  
32
 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 4, Chisinau, June 2010. 
33
 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 32 and with an interviewee no. 62, Chisinau, June 2010. 
34
 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 32 and with an interviewee no. 62, Chisinau, June 2010. 
35
 Author’s interview with an interviewee no.4, Chisinau, June 2010. 
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4.2.1.3 EU Support  
Moldova has received much more support from the EU than Georgia but only recently 
has it become the EU’s new favourite role model; before 2009 Ukraine was seen as the 
‘best pupil’.36 As early as 2003 Mr. Verheughen maintained, when talking about 
Moldova and Ukraine in regard to membership, that ‘it is true that the door cannot 
remain closed in the long term’ (RFE/RL Newsline 15/04/2003). While recognising 
Moldova’s Europeaness and, thus, the potential for accession in principle the official 
view in the Commission has been that because of Moldova’s low levels of reform, 
cooperation is needed to focus on the PCA and the ENP.  When the new government 
took office and Ukraine had at the same time lost the enthusiasm which was present 
during the Orange Revolution, the EU’s attention seemed to focus on Moldova’s 
aspiration for membership.
 37
 Interviews with the Commission officials also confirmed 
that the question of membership of Moldova depends on itself and that even if the EU is 
not in the position of enlarging due to its own situation at the moment, it supports 
Moldova anyway toward it. A representative of the delegation commented ‘It will come 
if it is necessary. Moldovans know it and Association Agreement is a sign of relations 
getting closer’. 38  
In addition to increasing support from the Commission, Moldova has gained support 
from some member states and the European Parliament for its integration wishes. 
Romania has been especially a committed supporter of Moldova’s accession to the EU.   
After the election of Traian Basescu for Romanian president in 2004 he promised to 
serve as a Moldovan ‘advocate’ within the EU after Romania’s entry in 2007 (Lupu 
2010). ‘When Romania enters the EU, hopefully on 1 January 2007, this will open new 
possibilities for Moldova’ Eugen Carpov said (Rettmann 2006). In addition, the 
Parliamentary Committee representative and the Chair for Moldova in the European 
Parliament maintained that there is willingness to support Moldova in acceding to the 
EU as it deserves it and now it is finally fully committed the Committee will support its 
preparation.
 39
 This attitude also got at least symbolic meaning when the amendments in 
the Association Agreement draft were made on 16.07.2011 according to Moldova’s 
requests to include the potential of membership (Horborwski 2011). The first point of 
the resolution read: the European perspective including article 49 of the EU treaty, 
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 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 65, Kiev, December 2009. 
37
 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 65, Kiev, December 2009 
38
 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 13, Chisinau, June 2010. 
39 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 43, Brussels, June 2011. 
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regarding EU membership, ‘is a driving force of the reforms and a catalyst for the social 
support for them’ (Horborwski  2011).  Thus, before the new Moldovan government the 
EU did not give much encouraging signs of supporting the potential for EU membership 
due to Moldova’s lack of reform. It has been evident ever since that the Commission, 
Parliament and some member states have given support for Moldova’s EU aspirations.  
4.2.1.4 Domestic Perceptions of the EU Membership Prospect 
Moldova’s elite has been hopeful of the prospect of EU accession from the mid-1990s 
onwards, first due to Moldova’s Europeaness and later on due to being included in the 
Stability Pact and the Council of Europe as one of the first countries. After 2001, even if 
expectations were never totally put aside due to Moldova’s eligible position as a 
European country, expectations of Moldova’s accession to the EU were not driven 
during the Communist government’s rule due to their overall reluctance to take on the 
required reform. Only after 2009 and the new government have membership 
expectations been high as it has been expected that the new government is able to 
deliver the change. 
Soon after independence expectations emerged about Moldova’s potential to become a 
candidate country. These expectations were demonstrated when the second president of 
Moldova Mr. Luchinschi and the elite around him raised the membership question for 
the first time as a strategic goal during his term from 1997-2001 and took steps, such as 
becoming involved in the negotiation of the central European initiative and arranging 
participation in the Southeast European cooperation process and the Stability Pact for 
South-Eastern Europe. These cooperation arrangements culminated in the expectations 
of Moldova being on the list of candidate countries in 1999 (Skvortova 2006). When 
Moldova did not appear within the six countries to which the EU decided to open 
accession negotiations with during the 1999 Helsinki summit, the decision shocked 
Moldova. Moldova, nevertheless, did not bury expectations for its EU membership 
prospect. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Nicolae Tabacaru responded with ‘We believe 
that Brussels and the countries - EU members cannot postpone the answer we are 
waiting for any longer’ (Skvortova 2006). Indeed Moldova demonstrated that it still was 
pursuing the membership through circulating ‘The Strategy of the Republic of Moldova 
for Association with the EU’ and then passing it to a Ministry discussion in April 2000 
(Skvortova 2006). It consisted of the issues that were necessary to be undertaken in 
order to come closer to the EU standards in the area of economic and legal reform. It 
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outlined participation in the regional and sub-regional bodies and cooperation with the 
South-Eastern European countries as objectives (Skvortova 2006).  
When Voronin and the Communist government took office in 2001 the expectations of 
membership taking place in the immediate future diminished when it became clear that 
Moldova’s Europeaness was not enough to guarantee membership but more reform was 
needed and this reform was not likely to be taken when Voronin turned policy 
eastwards. It was just in 2005 when the EU membership question came back on the 
agenda and Moldova’s policy turned toward the west again following Russian isolation 
and the realisation of not being able to survive on its own. At that time even Voronin 
was, at least in rhetoric, expressing the goal of EU membership and expectations that it 
will take place ‘one day’ (Botan 2008). This ‘one day’, according to Voronin, was when 
conditions are ripe: Transnistrian problem and corruption have been eliminated 
(RFE/RL News 04/02/2003). Despite this the Communist government was ineffective at 
committing to reforms and the EU membership prospect was not expected to materialise 
during their leadership.
 40
 
From 2009 onwards the membership prospect has been more connected to the belief 
that Moldova’s new government is committed and capable of delivering the reform. 
Consequently, a consensus in Moldova has been emerging on that Moldova will be soon 
ready for EU membership. The time since 2009 has stopped ‘stagnation’ of the 
Communist Party which was not interested in working efficiently toward European 
integration as the reform laws actually challenged their power base
41
 and has been 
replaced by pro-European orientation in the leadership and with new personnel 
committed to change.
42
 It is no longer a question of whether or not, but only when 
experts commented.
43
 Even though the EU was in the midst of enlargement fatigue and 
being beset with economic crises, the elite was committed to change and maintained 
that there is no need to talk about the time
44
 but it will commit to reform until it is ready 
as it knows that it has a right for membership due to its Europeaness. ‘We do not care 
about the talk whether we will enter the EU or not, in our opinion we will enter the 
European Union, that is why we do not need to have a European perspective to move 
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 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 54 and an interviewee no. 4, Chisinau, June 2010. 
41
 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 54 and with an interviewee no. 14, Chisinau, June 2010.  
42 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 13 and an interviewee no. 4, Chisinau, June 2010. 
43 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 13, Chisinau, June 2010. 
44 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 23, Chisinau, June 2010. 
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on’. 45 The difference with the new government is that instead of waiting for a clear cut 
opportunity for membership they act like it already has an opportunity for 
membership.
46
  
In sum, out of the three countries Moldova has the highest potential currently for 
membership. It has also worked as an incentive to drive Moldova’s change to some 
extent from 2005 to 2009 and increasingly so from 2009 onwards because Moldova has, 
despite the weak initial conditions, believed that membership will take place one day. 
4.3.2 Moldova’s Identification with the EU  
This section demonstrates that Moldovan identification with the EU at the elite level 
and population level has been medium at all times. The reason is that the presidents, the 
governments and the political parties demonstrated no belonging to the EU before 1998 
but equally preferred Russia as an aspiration group. Nevertheless, overall the majority 
of the parties simultaneously agreed with the western values. Only after 2005 s more 
emphasis on belonging to the EU appeared at all levels but it has been mainly to do with 
isolation from Russia, economic crises and a realisation of not being able to survive 
without the EU rather than identification. At the population level the questions of 
identification and values demonstrate especially a drive towards benefits rather than the 
importance of identity or values. These arguments are explored below through data 
drawn on presidential, governmental and political party opinions before discussing 
population identification which rely data from population polls conducted by IRI and 
the domestic NGOs. In sum, the argument that this part makes is that identification with 
the EU has not become a major question in Moldova. Its foreign policy has been mostly 
based on the search for economic survival. Therefore, overall the identification with the 
EU has not been a decisive question to a large extent with its motivation to comply with 
the EU standards. As an expert summed it up: ‘Moldova’s orientation and identification 
changes even depending on whether it is winter or summer or whether it needs energy 
or democracy’. 47   
4.3.2.1 Elite Identification with the EU 
The first two presidents after independence did not emphasise any belonging toward the 
EU but the goal was to establish the future status of Moldova. The first president Snegur 
was concerned about the potential of Moldova’s unification with Romania and just in 
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late 1993 President Snegur was prompted to clarify Moldova’s relations to the EU for 
the first time when CEECs in the neighborhood were included into the PCA (Ghregoriu 
1998). His purpose in demonstrating support for European integration was more to do 
with the fact that in order to maintain his popularity Snegur had to tone down his pan-
Romanist rhetoric. In addition, he also added nationalist rhetoric in 1996 to his politics 
(Crowther and Josanu 2004).  
The second president did not demonstrate clear belonging to the EU as he 
simultaneously drove CIS trade zone accession even if he pledged to belong to the EU 
(Viţu 2004; March 2007:604). These two goals would not have been possible to achieve 
as inclusion of only one trade zone is possible, thus, there was no clear orientation 
belonging with the EU either by Lucinschi. Overall the main reason for both Presidents’ 
orientation toward the EU was a perception that Moldova could not overcome economic 
and social difficulties or conflict without assistance from the West (Skortova 2006) and 
therefore orientation toward the EU was benefit driven. 
When Voronin became president he announced that his national interests lay especially 
in Russia and the CIS (Viţu 2004:34). His early statements included a clear message: 
Moldova ‘must resist in the face of Europe just as Cuba resists in the face of the US’ 
(Viţu 2004:36). His actions also demonstrated his orientation. Voronin met Putin nine 
times within the year from April 2001 to summer 2002. By 2002 he omitted EU 
membership as a priority from their agenda (Kuzio 2006a; Mosneaga 2007) and also 
dialogue with the EU had turned sporadic (Kuzio 2006a). Furthermore, there were 
proposals to have new school history courses, making Russian a second official 
language and revision of the privatisation process (Kuzio 2006a; Mosneaga 2007).  He 
drove a strong Russian orientated policy and there was little interest in EU integration 
and neither was he intending to focus on reform aspects important in regard to European 
integration.  It was clear that he did not want to worsen relations with Russia at the 
expense of getting closer to the EU as he saw that Russia after all was ‘in Moldova’s 
genetic code’ (Weiner 2006). Moreover, Voronin stressed that Russia remained one of 
Moldova’s ‘strategic partners’ (Weiner 2006).  
Besides the presidents, the governmental data demonstrated that there was no particular 
orientation or belonging to the EU before 2005. The EU did not feature either as a 
family or place to belong to among the government perception in the 1990s. The first 
three Moldovan government action plans under Mr. Druc, V. Murcsci and Sangheli 
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until April 1994 did not include any reference related to EU integration (Mosneaga 
2007).   
During Sangheli’s second term as prime minister during April 1994 - January 1997, the 
national action plan only mentioned EU integration on one line (Mosneaga 2007). The 
next government under I.Ciubuc (January 1997 – May 1998) also did not refer to the 
EU in their action plan. Thus, it was just under his second government and action plan 
between May 1998 – March 1999 when for the first time an interest in joining the EU 
was formally expressed (Mosneaga 2007). However, this was short lived as when the 
government of Braghiş from December 1999-March 2001 formed by left centrist parties 
emerged, Moldova took an eastern orientation.  
Also, political parties according to the MFG dataset results (See Figures 5-8 in the 
Appendix) demonstrate that during the 1990s more political parties preferred the eastern 
orientation than the EU until early 2000. After independence in 1994 only one out of 
four parties in the parliament was orientated to the EU according to MFG results while 
three parties oriented toward Russia. However, at the same time three out of four parties 
supported all EU/western related values in the MFG datasets and no nationalist 
tendencies were in place. In 1998 two out of four parties were pro-European but they 
occupied a minority of the seats in the parliament. Furthermore, still in 2001, all parties 
preferred Russia as an orientation as but only two parties out of three supported the EU 
orientation. Thus, until 2004 and Voronin’s first term a clear EU orientation had not 
taken place at the presidential level and the political parties had not set a clear 
prioritisation toward the EU even if they identified with EU/Western values. 
From 2005 until 2009 the relations with the EU grew closer. However, it was not related 
to identification and considering the EU as an aspiration group due to shared identity or 
values but more seeing the EU in terms of benefits. Coming closer to the second term 
Voronin at least had toned down his Russian orientation and was also emphasising 
European integration. He maintained that the policy was not only a process of returning 
to European culture and civilization but also a process of adjusting to the European 
politic-economic standards and norms (Moldova Suverană 18/04/2003). 
This increased orientation toward the EU was reflected in ‘Orientation to European 
Integration as a Strategic Guideline for the Country’ adopted by parliament (Mosneaga 
2007).  However, because the change was taking place in conjunction with the financial 
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crisis it demonstrates that it had little to do with identification or finding the EU as a 
home for Moldova rather than based purely on survival. This was demonstrated by the 
fact that the CIS integration was until 2009 still on Voronin’s agenda (Infotag News 
27/07/2009). 
During Voronin’s second term, the political party view already had started to reflect the 
EU as a primary orientation. Firstly, three main parties were pro-EU and only two out of 
three remaining were pro-Russian. Secondly, the main political parties PLMD, Liberal 
Party, Our Moldova Alliance and Democratic Party of Moldova contrary to Voronin 
shared the view of European integration being the primary policy goal (Grau 2010). 
Despite this the Communist Party’s true commitment was lacking and it was mainly 
used as a tool for gaining popularity in the election rather than reflecting true 
commitment for the European direction, therefore, identification with the EU until the 
new government was low.  
The third term representing a change of Moldova’s foreign policy started when in 2009 
the new government put the Communists into opposition by forming a coalition 
between four parties named ‘Alliance for European Integration’. It took Moldova to a 
new level of enthusiasm for EU integration as all parts of the elite had recognised EU 
integration as one of their priorities (Dura 2009). It marked a change by clearly 
clarifying that foreign policy is not any more ‘pro-Russia or pro-Europe but pro-Europe 
and how’. 48 The elite were replaced by new young educated officials and pro-Western 
previous NGO representatives.
49
 The final Government action plan in 2011 
demonstrated a clear commitment for integration but also the motivation based on 
accession benefits: ‘The coherent implementation of policies designed to socially, 
politically and economically “Europeanize” the country and an Association Agreement 
with the European Union will enable the Republic of Moldova to become, in a 
reasonable time, eligible for EU accession’ (Government of Moldova 2011). 
Besides the government’s and interim presidents’ enthusiasm toward EU integration, 
political parties’ preference toward the EU was not obvious. In 2009 all parties’ 
orientation was equally divided between the EU, Russia and the US in the MFG datasets 
and even if the majority demonstrated positive attitude to the Western values and no 
nationalist tendencies were present, no preference toward EU as the primary orientation 
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was demonstrated. Also, as the enthusiasm toward the EU since 2009 has been 
primarily due to high expectations of the membership accession, identification with the 
EU can be considered medium at all times.  
4.3.2.2 Population Identification with the EU 
Population identification with the EU has been at medium levels at all times. Even if 
EU membership support has received high scores, other results reflect that the 
population considers Russia as the primary partner and it sees the EU primarily in terms 
of economic benefits and only a small portion consider themselves as Europeans by 
identity.  The population poll results (see Figure 9 in the Appendix) demonstrate that 
Moldova has considered Russia as a primary partner at all times even if the factor of 
viewing it as a threat has also increased with time. Despite this, as in the case of 
Georgia, the support for EU membership has been very high. The percentage of support 
has been around 70 per cent at all times. However, overall identification among the 
population is not as high as in Georgia as even if a majority of people want to join the 
EU at the same time the CIS has also received high support. The slightly higher 
orientation toward the EU in the last few years does not reflect the belonging based on 
shared values and identity but rather benefits. For instance, the 2009 ENPI population 
poll found that EU integration was considered, by a majority of the population, to be 
important because of economic benefits. Just the second and third motivations for 
integration were human rights and democracy. In addition, only 9 per cent of the 
population often identified themselves as Europeans, and 25 per cent of the population 
sometimes considered themselves as Europeans, whereas 56 per cent saw themselves as 
rarely or never Europeans. Finally, Russia was continuously seen more positively by the 
population. For instance, in 2008 population polls Russia was viewed positively by 68 
per cent of the people, Ukraine 62 per cent and the EU received just the third highest 
score of 61 per cent positivity.  Thus, the results demonstrate that Russia was the 
primary direction to belong to and the EU belongingness was driven primarily from a 
benefit point of view. 
4.3.3 Summary of EU Membership Prospect and Identification with the EU in 
Moldova 
The strength of EU membership prospect in Moldova was at medium levels throughout 
its history until 2009 since when it has been high. Even if it has not fulfilled all of the 
expected criteria and has suffered from the separatist Transnistrian region Moldova has 
not stopped believing that the EU membership will take place sooner or later, which has 
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thus worked as an incentive for EU integration. The reason for Moldova’s high 
expectations for its EU membership has varied  but in the beginning it was related to its 
Europeaness and that it was the first member of the Council of Europe out of the Newly 
Independent States (NIS) and also that it was included in the Stability Pact, which at the 
same time only otherwise included countries which were considered as potential 
candidates. Until 2009, because of the poor reform record and the inefficient 
Communist government, the EU membership prospect was reduced due to the 
government’s inability to carry out reform even if it was still a long term goal and can 
therefore be coded as medium. Just when the new government emerged indicating a 
new commitment for reform in 2009 has the membership expectations been high. 
In regard to identification with the EU, Moldova’s perception has been mixed because 
even if it has become more European orientated, this development has been due to 
expectations of benefits related to EU membership rather than it considering the EU any 
more as a ‘family’ or an aspiration group to belong to. To a large extent loyalty lies with 
Russia and the Russian church and has still a major hold on the society.
 50
 From 
independence until 2005 orientation was emphasising Russia and the CIS without 
creating any priority toward the EU even if the European/Western values were agreed to 
be shared by a majority of parties. From 2005, even if integration to the EU was more 
emphasised, simultaneously it was portrayed from the perspective of necessity of 
economic survival rather than in terms of returning to Europe and considering it as an 
aspiration group. Even if the new government organised under the ‘Alliance for 
European Integration’ has voiced its commitment to make the EU a primary partner, the 
orientation is only related to the willingness for EU membership demonstrated in that all 
parties still mention Russia equally as their preferred orientation and therefore 
identification with the EU can be coded medium.  Population opinions demonstrate less 
orientation to the EU and have seen the East and Russia historically as the primary 
partner; the EU has been viewed mostly in terms of benefits and only a small portion of 
the population identifies themselves as Europeans. Bogutcaia et al. (2010) argue that in 
the light of changing political orientation the Moldovan elite reflect more pragmatism 
than commitment to shared European values. Overall, at the macro level the EU 
membership prospect in Moldova has more explanatory value in explaining compliance 
than identification with the EU.  
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4.4 Strength of the EU Membership Prospect and Identification with the EU in 
Ukraine  
Ukraine, as a large and strategically important country, has had a rather different 
attitude towards EU membership and also identification with the EU in comparison to 
either Georgia or Moldova. While Ukraine expressed its interest toward EU 
membership early in the 1990s when its bids were repeatedly denied Ukraine came to a 
conclusion that there is little point of taking expensive changes unless there is an end 
goal to pursue.  
Identification with the EU has varied more than in other countries due to its East-West 
split, its large size and its important strategic role in Europe. Ukraine demonstrates in its 
approach that it does not find it necessary to have an aspiration group to belong to but 
prefers to be a power in its own right. After independence Ukraine was taking a step 
away from Russia’s influence by aiming for the creation of relations with the West and 
the EU through emphasising its orientation and will to return to Europe. However, when 
the membership prospect was looking bleak for Ukraine, its European roots, history and 
values seemed to be less emphasised and also found a home in the East.  The population 
view had always been split between the EU and Russia but since the peak in orientation 
toward the EU in 2006 support has reduced in terms of willingness for integration, 
perception of the EU as the primary partner and seeing the EU in positive terms. Thus, 
identification with the EU has not been exclusive at any time.  
4.4.1 The Strength of the EU Membership Prospect in Ukraine 
4.4.1.1 Fulfilment of Europeaness and the Copenhagen Criteria 
Ukrainians have themselves perceived that their country is culturally, historically and 
geographically part of Europe and therefore has a natural right for membership (Kuzio 
2005a). Even if geographically Ukraine has been considered as European, until the 
Orange Revolution the EU did not see it as culturally European, due to the neo-Soviet 
political culture (Kuzio 2005a). In addition to the unclear question of Europeaness until 
the Orange Revolution, the prospect of EU membership has not been promising 
according to fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria, apart from a democracy score after 
2005.  
The ratings overall have been the lowest out of the three ENP states (See Figures 1-4 in 
the Appendix). Firstly, only the democracy rating has been the highest of the ENP 
states, however, it has not reached the levels of the new member states or candidate 
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states. The highest democracy rating was achieved from 2005 until 2010, but in 2011 it 
scored lower.  Secondly, the rule of law rating was the lowest, both in the indicators of 
corruption and independence of judiciary. There has been very little change in the 
corruption score despite a slight peak between 2005 and 2008. The independence of 
judiciary has received the lowest scores from 2005 until 2009. Thirdly, the human rights 
score is together with Georgia below the Moldovan score in integrity rights and in the 
empowerment rights it is the lowest of the three ENP states. In none of the ratings did it 
reach the levels of new member states or candidacy states except for the new Eastern 
member states’ level in 2007, in 2001-2002 and 2006 in the integrity rights. Fourthly, 
Ukraine also scores the lowest of the ENP states, candidacy states and member states in 
the economic freedom dataset. Overall, Ukraine’s score is the lowest out of the three 
states having only one issue area with the highest score.   
4.4.1.2 Potential Threats and Opportunities of Ukraine’s Integration 
Despite Ukraine’s poor reform in other areas except for democracy, the questions of 
other limitations for Ukraine’s accession mainly concerned Ukraine-Russia relations if 
Ukraine was to accede. For instance some analysts have suggested that gas disputes in 
2008 were sparked due to the EU and Ukraine relationship getting closer (Watson 
2009).  
Despite this, in many other aspects Ukraine has a better opportunity for accession. First 
of all, Ukraine does not have to deal with separatist areas in its territory which hold 
membership potential at bay for Moldova and Georgia. Secondly, while on the one hand 
Ukraine’s large size could pose a potential obstacle for the EU to accept Ukraine (Stent 
2007) especially taking into consideration that the East and West have very different 
levels of pro-Europeaness (Radyuhin 2010) on the other hand its  large size could also 
be seen as a positive factor for agricultural opportunities (Emerson 2006) or as a source 
of work force which the EU will need in the future.
 51
  
4.4.1.3 EU Support  
Ukraine has received more support from the EU and member states toward its EU 
accession. As in the case of Moldova, Ukraine has been viewed as a potential EU 
member state by some European states, Commission representatives and the European 
Parliament, especially during the time of the Orange Revolution.  
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After independence there was only a little support for Ukraine’s accession to the EU 
(Molchnakov 2004). Ukraine was seen merely as a ‘Soviet heir’ and there were 
concerns over Ukraine’s commitment to carry out Soviet obligations rather than seeing 
it as a county on its own merits. However, at the time of Orange Revolution Ukraine 
gained positive attention from the European institutions and member states in regard to 
its demonstration of democratic standards and willingness for reform.  
While the official opinion by the European Commission to Kiev has been that before it 
could be considered by the EU for membership it should ‘work to get its own house in 
order’ (Belmega and Paul 2011), the European Parliament has suggested that Ukraine’s 
aspiration should be acknowledged. For the first time the European Parliament 
acknowledged Ukraine’s bids for consideration as a potential candidate already in 2001 
by suggesting that the Council should take it into consideration. More recently in 2009 
and 2011 it published resolutions supporting the recognition of Ukraine as a potential 
candidate. In 2009 the Parliament resolution was seen as symbolic encouragement for 
Ukraine. Most recently,  on 1
st
 December 2011, the European Parliament adopted a 
motion which agreed ‘to recognise Ukraine’s aspirations pursuant to Article 49 of the 
Treaty on the European Union, provided that all criteria, including respect for the 
principles of democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, are 
met’ (European Parliament 2011).  
Furthermore Ukraine has been seen by the member states and the EU population as one 
of the most preferred potential candidates. Ever since 2000, in the elite polls Ukraine 
was preferred as a potential new member state over the current candidate states of 
Turkey or Croatia. TNS Sofers poll
52
 demonstrated that 77 per cent in Poland supported 
Ukrainian accession, 49 per cent in the UK and 58 per cent in France.  The support for 
Ukrainian accession to the EU was higher than for Turkey also among the EU 
population level (Eurobarometer 2006). 
4.4.1.4 Domestic Perceptions of the EU Membership Prospect 
Ukraine has a very different attitude to EU membership in comparison to Moldova or 
Georgia. It is aware of its strategic importance to the EU and has not accepted its 
treatment as the EU’s ‘little brother’ but wishes to be treated as an equal partner. 53 Its 
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TNS Sofres poll available at: http://www.yes-ukraine.org/en/survey/november.htm. 
53 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 65, Kiev, December 2009 and an interviewee no 22, 
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expectations of EU membership as a natural right became weary during the mid-1990s 
when Ukraine’s bids to be considered as a candidate were repeatedly ignored by the EU 
and culminated by late 2011 in a situation where it is not sure if expensive changes 
required will be possible to be taken without a certain membership prospect. While the 
membership prospect has been medium for the whole time, the ambiguity of the 
membership prospect has only worked as an incentive during the years of the Orange 
Revolution and therefore has been from 1991-2002 low/medium, from 2002-2007 high 
and since then medium.  
During the 1990s Kuchma’s bids for EU membership were repeatedly rejected and it 
became evident for Ukraine that they would need more reform if they wanted to have a 
potential for EU membership. When Kuchma took over a clear orientation was set for 
the first time with EU membership as the ‘primary foreign policy goal’ by the 
government in 1996 (Kubiček 2003c: 156). Soon after however it was clear that 
Ukraine’s hopes were short-lived when they were not able to make it into the group of 
countries that were envisaged as the potential candidates during the Luxembourg 
European Council of 1997 or the Tampere meeting in 1998 (Light et al. 2000: 86).  
While not yet giving up hope, Kuchma during his second term in 2002, also created the 
State Council for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration,
 54
 which aimed to increase 
intergovernmental coordination in the area of implementing reforms required for EU 
membership (Wolczuk 2007). On 31 May 2002 he also presented to the Verkhovna 
Rada ‘European Choice – Strategy’ (Conceptual Grounds of the Strategy of Economic 
and Social Development of Ukraine for 2002-2011) in his annual address which 
included a timetable for accession to the EU by 2011  (Haran 2002). Nevertheless, these 
expectations were not supported by the EU. It was frustrating for Ukraine as it had its 
democracy and market economy conditions in a better shape than Romania and Bulgaria 
in the 1990s (Kuzio 2009: 352).  Consequently, Kuchma soon pointed out that Ukraine 
would not be begging for the EU’s acceptance and that it would not ever be interested if 
the EU would grant them the prospect (Kuzio 2006a).  
For many the Orange Revolution meant a new impetus and represented Ukraine’s 
credentials as a democratic country and due to its remarkable changes from previous 
reform levels, Ukraine was expected to have good prospect for EU membership. At that 
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time widespread optimism took over in Ukraine that speed of reforms would open the 
EU’s doors (Kuzio 2006b).  As a consequence of the EU and particularly Polish and 
Lithuanian attention, sympathy and respect towards Ukraine’s rapid political and 
economic reforms, encouraged Ukraine to expect a sign of a possible candidacy status 
for membership (Bretharon and Vogler 2006: 153). 
Since 2005, Yuschenko straight away declared EU membership as his goal and 
membership was seen as a realistic aspiration because of the changes already taken and 
the ambitious reform plan. For instance, Yushchenko explained in his speech in 2005 as 
a part of an annual address to the Verkhovna Rada: ‘If the authorities work hard and 
persistently, if they are supported by the whole population, and if the intra- EU 
developments are positive, this aim can realistically be reached within a medium term’ 
(Derhachov 2007). Yushchenko further commented that his reforms will be real and 
once they are implemented ‘Ukraine will have changed so much that the EU itself 
would ask, why you, such a fantastic place, are not yet in the European Union?’ (Kuzio 
2006b). Yuschenko began a set of reforms that reflected Ukraine as a would-be EU 
candidate preparing for the accession process (Wichmann 2007). He outlined a four-
point plan for Ukraine to move towards accession to the EU: Ukraine to be 
acknowledged as a market economy, that it joins the WTO, that it becomes an associate 
member of the EU and that it ultimately becomes a full member. 
Following the Orange Revolution and the subsequent political standstill combined with 
a disappointing ENP as a framework for reform, expectations of EU membership 
diminished. By 2007 and after a couple of years of fighting among the political 
leadership, it became apparent that in a political environment where decision making 
had become impossible, there was little potential for EU membership. The political elite 
were describing that the Orange Revolution’s momentum had been lost. 55 In addition, 
the population lost the trust in the leadership and also simultaneously belief in the 
prospect of becoming an EU member state.  
Since then Ukraine has been insisting that it needs to have a membership incentive 
before it can afford to undertake expensive changes that the EU expects, while the EU 
expects change before it could consider Ukraine as a potential candidate. After the EaP 
Yuschenko maintained that ‘he had not abandoned hope Ukraine could eventually join 
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the EU’ (Barber 2008). Nevertheless he did not want EaP to be an alternative for 
membership and acknowledged that it may ‘slow down the efforts by the states like 
Ukraine to enter’ (Trend news 24/03/2009).  
When the least pro-European candidate, Yanukovych was elected as a president in 
2010, it was expected to be a stop any EU membership expectations. Contrary to 
expectations Yanukovych has kept EU accession on the agenda. Indeed during the 
Association Agreement negotiations the elite has tried to push the EU to include a 
promise of recognising that Ukraine could be recognised as a potential candidate.
 56
 
Yanukovych has also described the Association Agreement ‘as it is not only a paper 
document but a key instrument towards achieving Ukraine’s “goal” of one day joining 
the EU’ (Banks 2011). Yanukovych maintained that Ukraine will be in the EU in 10 
years: ‘We know what to do, and know how to achieve this’ (Kiev Post 19/08/2011). 
However, still at the end of 2011 it was not ratified because of Ukraine’s reluctance to 
commit to legal reforms, exemplified with the imprisonment of former Prime Minister 
Yulia Tymoshenko according to Commission officials (Euractiv News 2011b).  
Overall, contrary to Yuschenko’s reaction to the lack of membership prospect who was 
claiming to continue reform until the EU cannot say ‘no’, Yanukovych seems to think 
there is no point in taking difficult regulatory commitments when there is no end goal in 
sight. Yanukovych has demonstrated that he wants to have a clear answer to the EU 
membership potential. For instance, when the EU set requirements on 22 November 
2010 for visa free travel being conditional on democratic reforms and improvements, 
Yanukovych said that it was not enough and Ukraine wanted to be given clear hopes of 
joining the EU and also Association Agreement should be reflecting this (Euractiv 
News 23/11/2010). Therefore, the high EU membership prospect can be seen as a 
potential explanatory factor for the reform between 2002-2007 and less so before and 
after.  
4.4.2 Ukraine’s Identification with the EU  
Ukraine’s identification has been split between the East and West. While the elite has 
orientated toward the Western direction during the years of the Orange Revolution 
Ukraine has always considered at the same time how its actions influence Russian 
perception on them. The population perception has varied on where the roots lie and is 
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differentiated between Russian speaking East and the Western and pro-European parts 
of Ukraine. Thus, Ukraine’s identification with the EU has been changing according to 
the same timelines as the membership prospect; it has been low until 2002, medium 
until 2007 and low since then. Russia was the preferred foreign policy orientation or at 
least received equal support together with the EU until the Orange Revolution.  
During the Orange Revolution the references of belonging to the European family 
emerged and overall the EU was seen as ‘a faraway miracle associated with good, 
democracy, human rights and liberal values’ and representing anything of higher 
standards
57
. However, when the reform did not follow the expected plan, much due to 
the political standstill and fighting in the leadership, EU support was diminishing both 
at the elite and population level. The elite was not satisfied that the EU did not give a 
clear membership prospect and that Ukraine had to continue cooperation through the 
ENP which was seen as  creating more of a buffer zone than an integration tool. This, as 
well as the increased understanding of the EU and its complex structures and 
bureaucracy was also creating some euro-scepticism among the Ukrainian elite.
58
 
Population level support for the EU has been diminishing consistently since 2005 to 
date.  
4.4.2.1 Elite Identification with the EU 
The first phase of low levels of identification with the EU took place from independence 
until 2002 when neither the president, leading elite, government nor the political parties 
found the EU as an aspiration group to belong to and their references to joining the EU 
were not rising from European common values and identity but rather orientation was 
driven by potential benefits and to gain more independence from Russia. 
The presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma expressed their interest in joining the EU, 
however, Kravchuk was using the EU as an orientation to take a break from Russia’s 
influence (Kuzio et al 1999) and at the same time he was creating closer relations to the 
CIS and therefore the EU orientation was more to counterbalance Russia’s influence.   
In 1994 Kuchma guaranteed his victory after years of poor economic reform with his 
campaign for economic reform, closer Russian relations and a fight against corruption 
(Elliott and Kolomayets 1994). While he was especially appealing to pro-Russian 
sentiments in Eastern Ukraine he was also maintaining Euro-Atlantic integration as a 
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long term goal which gained leverage for votes against Medvedchuk who lacked any 
interest in Euro-Atlantic integration (Kuzio 2005). Kuchma considered that European 
choice to be evident as Ukraine belongs to a European Christian civilisation (Kuchma 
1996). Kuchma wished in his declarations to re-join the West and become members of 
the European family and ‘return to Europe’ became a slogan (Kobzar 2009). Despite 
Ukraine fitting geographically into European borders there was no reference to 
European values and indeed his direction seems to have been more driven by the fact 
that the EU was a convenient option to balance Russian dependency and amicable 
relations with the West that would help Ukraine benefit from foreign aid (Molchnakov 
2003). 
During his second term, which was characterised and won by pro-Western policy goals, 
Kuchma’s policy soon after shifted to a pro-Russian one. This move was motivated by a 
so called ‘Kuchmagate’ scandal where he was involved in secret audiotape recordings, 
high-level corruption and an unwillingness to resolve opposition journalist Gonggadze’s 
murder in 2000 (Kuzio 2003b).  It was also a result of isolation from the USA after 9/11 
when Russia-US relations became a priority. After this Kuchma steered Ukraine to 
became a Eurasian Economic Community observer, which was seen as an alternative to 
the EU (Kuzio 2005a). He however denied contemplating membership which would be 
contradictory to EU membership (Kuzio 2005a). These actions reflected more of a 
multi-vector policy than any belonging to the EU and besides his rhetoric there was no 
ideological foundation for Kuchma’s foreign policy: it reflected his own interests 
(Kuzio 2005a). When EU membership desire was expressed multiple of times  and not  
responded to by the EU, Kuchma was also at the same time quick to announce that 
Ukraine would not even be interested in joining and assumed a stronger orientation to 
Russia, demonstrating that the orientation was not to do with identity or values but 
rather a drive toward membership. He declared: ‘If I were today invited to join the EU, I 
would refuse’ (Kuzio 2003a). In addition it was evident that EU integration was not in 
his plans as he appointed Yanukovych as his ‘heir’ who at that time was not pro EU 
integration. 
There was also no consensus on the EU as a direction among the political parties (See 
Figure 8 in the Appendix). During the first presidencies the political scene was split 
between two political camps, the Western (Social Democrats and Liberals) and the 
Slavophils (Socialist and Peasants). While they saw CIS relations during Kravchuk’s 
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rule either as an opportunity for a ‘civilised divorce’ from Russia (Kuzio 2003c) or a 
potential restoring of the USSR, 95 per cent of the centre-right political party Rukh 
members and 86 per cent of Derzhavnist (Statehood Block) deputies insisted that 
Ukraine would quit the CIS (Malinkovich 1999:186) and the Alliance of National 
Communists and National Democrats promoted so called Baltic options that saw Russia 
as the ‘other’. However, the parliamentary elections were won by the Communist Party 
and especially Russophone eastern Ukraine opinion polls since 1992 showed support for 
a pro-Russian orientation, CIS integration and its economic space participation and a 
Russian-Belarus Union (Kuzio 2005a).  
In the election in 1994 a similar perception was maintained as demonstrated in the MFG 
datasets. Nine parties out of 16 were orientated toward the Russia/CIS vector whereas  
seven parties toward the EU. At the same time only three parties of the total 16 parties 
were viewing positively the western values of human rights, democracy, market 
economy and the fight against corruption. Furthermore, 6 parties had nationalist 
tendencies. While by 1998 the perspective of the EU had over taken the Russia direction 
and half of the parties stood by the EU standards, in 2002 no parties were positively or 
negatively orientated to the EU. Three parties were, however, orientated to Russia/CIS 
and only one party agreed with all the four values representing the West and the EU, 
therefore, demonstrating that identification was low until then.   
The second period took place after 2002 when identification with the EU started 
appearing. In 2004 when president Yuschenko came into power, as a consequence of 
the events of the Orange Revolution, the orientation was fully set toward EU 
integration. The President in his annual addresses was referring to EU integration as the 
main priority and also called in his speeches for returning to the European family and 
the common roots that Ukrainians share with Europeans. In 2005 Yushchenko 
expressed when speaking to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) in February 2005: ‘we, along with the people of Europe, belong to one 
civilization. The realization of the strategy of our foreign policy aim is membership in 
the European Union’ (Kuzio 2006b). This view was also shared by the others in the 
leadership seeing the EU as a policy goal, even if they differed in view on NATO.  
Political party poll results indicated that all the main parties (Communists, Socialists, 
Yulia Timoshenko Bloc, Our Ukraine and For United Ukraine) supported the European 
integration goal in 2002 (Wolzuck 2004). Even if Party of Regions was known as the 
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most pro-Russian, it also confirmed that they only differ in their perception on when the 
EU integration should take place but not on the question of whether.
59
 Our Ukraine only 
saw it necessary to pursue within 5 years time whereas the Socialist and For United 
Ukraine saw it being necessary in 10 years and the rest in 20 years time. They however 
were split between their perception on maintaining relations with the CIS which was 
supported by the Timoshenko Bloc and Our Ukraine whereas others wanted increased 
cooperation.  
The trend also continued since then and the MFG datasets on the results of the parties in 
2006 and 2007 also reflect that the parties demonstrate a majority support toward EU 
integration. Three parties out of five support the EU vector whereas only two parties 
supported the CIS and Russia vector. However, despite this only one party out of five 
was fully agreeing with the western values and also nationalist tendencies existed 
among two of the parties. Similarly, in 2007 a majority of the parties orientated to the 
EU positively but shared values again were only agreed by one party as well as national 
tendencies present among two parties. Thus, in sum orientation toward the EU was clear 
until 2007 but however was at best mixed because while the membership prospect was 
pursued, the CIS and Russia vector also remained almost as popular and the EU values 
were not agreed on by a majority and finally, nationalist tendencies were present.  
The third phase of identification with the EU took place between 2007 and 2010: 
Ukrainian relations with Russia were deteriorating due to gas disputes, Yuschenko’s 
failure to deliver expected promises on European integration and economic reforms 
because of the difficulties in the coalition government and the external situation of the 
economic crisis. The events were followed by the election victory of Yanukovych in 
2010. As a consequence the West expected that Yanukovych would have shifted to a 
pro-Russian position (Wydra 2010) but it has been proven wrong thus far.  This was 
demonstrated in the gestures since Yanukovych’s leadership. Instead of organising a 
first trip to Moscow he visited Brussels which was seen as a sign that European 
commitment in Ukraine was still present (Wydra 2010). He also pledged that ‘European 
integration is the key priority for Ukraine’, in Brussels on 1 March 2011 (Euractiv News 
2011a). This was also backed by Prime Minister Mykola saying that European 
integration will remain the same as before and was even addressed in the ‘Law on the 
Basic Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy of Ukraine’ (Wydra 2010). Ultimately 
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Yanukovych’s reaction in April 2011 to Russia’s invitation of cutting its gas bills by 8 
billion dollars per year if it joined Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in a customs union 
was making it clear that Ukraine preferred to finalise a free trade deal with the EU and 
this would make it impossible to join the ex-Soviet trading block. ‘Our main priority is 
integration into the EU’, ‘We are ready to sign the Association Agreement this year’, 
‘We want the prospects of Ukraine entering the EU to be included in this accord so that 
the accord would not be empty’ Yanukovych maintained (Choursina 2011). Therefore, 
it indicates that elite identification with the EU still exists to some extent in terms of 
belonging, having chosen EU cooperation instead of Eastern orientated cooperation.  
In sum, Ukraine’s identification has been shifting between the EU and Russia since its 
independence. Even while its leading Elite, Since Orange Revolution, tried to 
emphasise its western orientation it has also always considered the consequences of it to 
Russia and therefore at most has been at medium levels.   
4.4.2.2 Population Identification with the EU 
The population level demonstrates the lowest levels of identification with the EU out of 
the three states. A majority of the population, according to a Razumkov survey from 
1992 until 2002 had answered that Ukraine’s future lay with Russia instead of the EU. 
The percentage for Russia or Eastern orientation has been between 30-54 per cent 
whereas EU support has been between 12-33 per cent at all times. Therefore, by 2003 
there had not been any orientation toward the EU as an aspiration group to belong to at 
the population level. After 2003 until 2008 answering the question where the future lies 
also always receives a higher score for Russia which was between 28-52 per cent while 
the EU support was only between 25-33 per cent at all times. Also, the willingness to 
join the EU was at the lowest in Ukraine out of the three states and in addition, was 
experiencing a reducing trend in support and a growing opposition to membership. For 
instance, in 1992 82 per cent of the population was supporting EU membership, in 2002 
the support rate was 65 per cent but since 2008 there has been a reducing trend and only 
around 48-57 per cent between 2008-2011 and by 2011 only around 40 per cent were 
pro, and as many as 30 per cent against EU membership. The perception of the shared 
values among the population received little support in Ukraine as well as in Moldova. 
The economic benefits were found to be the most important thing that Ukraine would 
gain from the EU, leaving democracy and human rights in the lower positions. In 
addition, Ukrainian’s did not either find themselves as Europeans according to 
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population poll in 2000. The statement ‘I am European’ had only 8 per cent support 
among population whereas 57 per cent did not identify themselves as Europeans (Light 
et al. 2000). 
4.4.3 Summary of EU Membership Prospect and identification with the EU in 
Ukraine 
This section demonstrated that membership prospect in Ukraine has been medium at all 
times but it has only had a partial ability to motivate Ukraine to take on changes during 
the Orange Revolution as Ukraine has been particular on its important role to the EU 
and maintains that there is no reason for expensive changes without a prospect for EU 
membership.  Identification with the EU in Ukraine did not take place before the 
Orange Revolution and after it has been fluctuating in relation to the perceived prospect 
of EU membership. Ukraine having been included in the CIS through observer status 
since 1994 and participation in the formation of the CIS Single Economic Space (CIS 
SES) in 2003 with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan was perceived by the West as a 
signal that Ukraine had forgotten its earlier objection to deeper integration with the CIS 
(Kuzio 2006a). Belonging to the European family rhetoric was mainly driven by the 
leading elite during the Orange Revolution whereas when the membership prospect was 
seen to have been lost also the rhetoric has then emphasised EU relations on an issue by 
issue basis. The population has overall demonstrated very little identification with the 
EU in terms of belonging, values or identity and it has preferred the East as a partner. 
Therefore, in comparison to Georgia, identification with the EU has been lower in 
Ukraine and in comparison to Moldova, it has only been emphasised by some groups of 
the elite while in Moldova the population identifies more with the EU. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the domestic conditions in the three ENP states that enable the 
evaluation together with the issue-specific factors on the conditions under which 
compliance takes place. The chapter  analysed the levels related to each country across 
both macro variables and highlighted the implications in regard to acting as influencing 
factors for explaining compliance. Having done so, it demonstrated that the membership 
expectations in Moldova was the highest, in Ukraine medium and in Georgia lowest 
while identification with the EU was highest in general in Georgia, whereas Moldova 
and Ukraine had lower levels. The implication in the case of Moldova is that 
membership can be seen as a driving force for compliance from 2009 onwards. In 
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Ukraine it can work as a possible explanatory factor between 2002 and 2008 whereas in 
Georgia it is unlikely to explain the compliance at any time. However, identification 
with the Georgian case may offer more explanatory value than in Moldova or Ukraine.  
The levels of both variables and implications of their potential in promoting compliance 
are used for analysis together with the issue-specific conditions in the following 
chapters. The following case study chapters where the variables are put into practice 
allow conclusions to be made on the conditions under which compliance takes place and 
what role the EU has in the ENP countries. 
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Table 4.1 EU Membership Prospect 
 
 
Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
Europeaness - + + 
Copenhagen Criteria 
fulfilment 
+ +/- - 
Least threats of 
accepting the country 
- +/- + 
Most benefits of 
accepting the country 
+/- - + 
Support - + + 
Overall prospect for 
EU membership 
- + +/- 
Country Perception of 
EU membership and 
its likelihood to 
motivate change 
Long term perspective 
‘NATO-priority’ 
EU Membership 
prospect does not work 
as an incentive 
Low impact 
Short/medium term 
perspective  
‘Will converge until 
the EU cannot say no’ 
EU Membership 
Expectations medium 
until  2009 and high 
since 2009 
Medium term 
perspective  
 ‘Expects the EU to 
give a credible 
membership prospect 
before full commitment 
for expensive change’ 
EU Membership 
Expectations  2002 -
2007 high  and 
low/medium other 
times 
* + high, +/- medium, - low  
Table 4.2 Identification with the EU 
 
 
 
Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
Identification with the 
EU 
Medium 1992-2002 
High 2002-2011 
The EU referred as the 
only orientation where 
to ‘belong to’ 
NATO and US security 
providers 
Medium 1992-2011 
Loyalty to Russia, but 
European values 
Low/Medium 1992-
2002  
High 2002-2007 
Medium 2007-2011 
Elite split between East 
and West 
Overall score 
+ +/- +/- 
*+ high, +/- medium, - low 
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5. The EU’s Influence in the Area of JHA in Georgia 
5.1 Introduction 
As a consequence of unemployment, poverty and instability as many as one million 
people of Georgia’s small population left the country between 1990 and early 2001.  60 
Georgia also became the country with the highest amount of asylum seeker 
applications in the Caucasus to the EU (Eurostat 2008; 2009). In addition, weak 
border controls have presented opportunities for trafficking and illegal border 
crossings (Fritz 2004). 
The EU’s attention towards Georgia developed slowly in general and in migration 
management issues specifically. It took incidents such as the murder of an EU 
delegation staff member, the Tacis contractor kidnapping in 2002 and achievements 
during the Rose Revolution before the EU reviewed its policy on Georgia and adopted 
a revised Country Strategy Paper in September 2003 (European Commission 2005a). 
The EU acknowledged Georgia’s commitment towards integration into the European 
structures and recognised that inclusion in the ENP could help Georgia with its 
efforts.  Previous EU relations with Georgia only had a limited focus on JHA related 
issues; the main cooperation areas were the textile industry and agricultural issues.
 61
  
In June 2004, Georgia was included in the ENP, at its request, and following a 
recommendation made by the European Commission (Ivaniashvili 2004). The EU 
action plan was launched in 2006 to cover five years and forms the basis of 
cooperation, besides the PCA commitments, before the Association Agreement is 
completed, for which negotiations began in July 2010 (Ashton 2010).   
 
This chapter traces the EU’s leverage to promote compliance in the JHA sector in 
Georgia. The first part discusses border management reform, secondly it discusses the 
readmission agreement, followed by asylum and refugee protection, and 
criminalisation of trafficking in human beings. Each issue sector is structured in the 
following manner: first the background is discussed by addressing the initial 
conditions of the issues in the country. Then the EU objectives in the action plan, 
including conditional incentives that are offered in regard to completion of the task, 
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 Georgian Population amounts to just under 4.5 million; See: 
http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=473&lang=eng. 
61
 Georgia-EU related data reviewed in Prelex and Comitology register since 1991. 
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financial assistance available for each sector, and technical and capacity building tools 
are discussed. It is followed by a discussion on issue-specific domestic conditions, 
focusing on costs before examining alternative explanatory factors both at macro and 
micro levels. Finally, an analysis of compliance is presented, which also draws attention 
to the country-specific macro conditions that were introduced in the previous chapter 
and legitimacy that was already discussed in chapter three.  It reveals the conditions that 
were present when compliance took place, the variation in the dependent variables and 
captures the EU’s role and Georgia’s motivations for compliance.  
 
This chapter argues that the EU’s influence was evident only to a limited extent in 
promoting compliance with its action plan demands in Georgia. The successful areas of 
compliance were border guard reform and readmission agreement, with the help of the 
EU’s capacity building cooperation and the incentive of visa facilitation respectively. In 
the area of trafficking of human beings, the EU was a major contributor indirectly as it 
helped to facilitate justice reform sector which enabled higher levels of prosecutions by 
increasing efficiency and reducing corruption. Overall, these cases demonstrated that 
the EU’s involvement in Georgia was more supporting the direction in which Georgia’s 
own reform plan was going rather than specifically triggering compliance.  
5.2 Border Guard Reform 
Georgia adopted the old Soviet-style system for its border management after its 
independence staffing with conscripts contributed to corruption and inefficiency as 
border guards were insufficiently trained and they were paid low wages which made 
survival impossible with honest means.
 62
  Georgia started addressing these challenges 
in the ‘Law on the State Border’ which was adopted in 1998. 63 
The EU focused on border guard reform in Georgia for the first time when it allocated 
Tacis funding in Annual Programming in 2002 for the Georgian State Border Guard 
Service.  However, the launch of the ENP and the action plan in 2006 sparked increased 
interest and more continuous attention on a wider range of issues and in border 
management specifically. The EU acknowledged the border deficiencies in Georgia as a 
potential threat to the EU in its country strategy paper maintaining that ‘because of its 
location between Europe and Central Asia, Georgia could, without strengthened 
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 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 60, August 2011. 
63
 The Law on State Border 1998, Available at: www.dcaf.ch/content/download/36279/527775/file/State-
border.pdf. 
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controls at its borders, become a transit country not only for energy and goods, but also 
for illegal migration, illegal trafficking and criminal activities’ (European Commission 
2007b). Overall, border management became more topical for the EU after the terrorist 
attacks in the US in 2001 (Welt 2005) and after a realisation that this unstable area was 
coming closer to the EU due to Bulgaria and Romania’s accession (Kobaladze  and 
Tangiashvili 2006).  
The EU-Georgia action plan, in regard to border management, focused on the following 
issues: a comprehensive border management strategy to be developed in cooperation 
with the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) (implementation date: by 
2006); to fulfil its commitments on border management reforms (increase budget, 
integrate the Georgian State Border Guard Department into the Ministry of Interior, 
reform of the Ministry of the Interior etc.); to continue EU-Georgia cooperation on 
border management issues; to enhance inter-agency cooperation among state authorities 
involved in border management as well as cooperation with neighbouring countries, 
including proper border delimitation, demarcation and control (EU-Georgia action plan, 
2006). It also recommended full implementation of existing and planned multilateral 
and bilateral border cooperation agreements and protocols; development of a 
comprehensive education and training strategy on border management for the relevant 
Georgian agencies (including improved understanding of the Schengen rules and 
standards) and enhancing the efficiency of relevant Georgian authorities (Police, State 
Border Service, Customs). This can be completed according to the EU action plan 
through providing modern equipment, adequate infrastructure, facilities and appropriate 
training in order to increase the security of the Georgian borders and the effectiveness of 
border crossing checkpoints and to adopt and implement a strategy for an integrated 
system of border management (implementation date: 2007).  
 
As learned in chapter two, border guard reform, within the border management sector, 
will be the focus of this thesis. Reform is considered as a transformation of the border 
guard agency into a civilian law enforcement agency and therefore involves 
demilitarisation of the service, granting of investigatory powers to the unit as well as the 
provision of professional training to border guards.  
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5.2.1 EU Conditionality, Assistance and Capacity and Technical Expert Groups  
The EU-Georgia action plan did not make any direct reference to an incentive in regard 
to compliance with the border guard reform objectives.  However, before the launch of 
the EU-Georgia action plan in 2005 there had been talks about potential visa facilitation 
for third countries for complying with a readmission agreement which also listed as one 
of the issues border management. For instance, the Common Approach on Visa 
Facilitation- maintained:  
 
 ‘The EC should take account of the following factors inter alia in deciding 
whether to open negotiations on visa facilitation with third countries: whether a 
readmission agreement is in place or under active negotiation; external relations 
objectives; implementation record of existing bilateral agreements and progress 
on related issues in the area of justice, freedom and security (e.g. border 
management, document security, migration and asylum, fight against terrorism, 
according to the standard counterterrorism clause agreed by COREPER on 6 
March 2002, organised crime and corruption); and security concerns, migratory 
movements and the impact of the visa facilitation agreement’ (Council of the 
European Union (2005) 
 
Therefore, border guard reform was already indirectly linked to the incentive of visa 
facilitation from 2005. In addition, since the EaP and the launch of Integrated Border 
Management Strategy (IBM), the EU has provided an opportunity for visa-free travel as 
a long-term incentive to all of the EaP members under the condition of also fulfilling 
border management requirements among other issues (Rettman 2009). Thus, direct 
conditional benefits in regard to the fulfilment of border management demands were 
low until 2005, medium until 2009 and since then high.  
Georgia has received financial assistance from the EU since its independence.
64
 The 
first years after independence, EC assistance was focused mostly on humanitarian 
assistance and food aid (see: European Commission 2003). In 2000 it started paying 
attention to technical aspects including the border management sector.  Since 2002 
Tacis and Aeneas funding and since 2007 the ENPI and thematic funding have been the 
main contributors of funding in the border management sector. From the launch of the 
EaP onwards in 2009 border management has also been financed through the IBM 
programme. In addition to Tacis and the ENPI funding instruments thematic funding 
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 The total EU assistance to Georgia from 1992-2006 amounted to €505.2 million, thus, per year average 
was €36.1 million. From 2007-2010 the country programme  provided €120.4 for three years, indicating a 
slight increase since the ENPI launch, as per year it meant €40.1 million allocated to Georgia. €180.29 
million for the period 2011-2013 was allocated, again increasing the portion from the previous time 
period. The amount of EU funding was per capita €26 (ECRE 2008). 
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has also been allocated to Georgia.
65
 Funding has covered the following projects: 
Georgian border guards received €100,000 in June 2003 to purchase equipment to 
improve monitoring of the department of the Georgian State Border Protection and the 
OSCE Border Monitoring Operation (Fluri 2005). Annual programming in 2004 
allocated a total of €6.8 million in the same section for six issue areas, one of which was 
border management. It covered support for the transfer of the Border Guards 
Department into the Ministry of Interior, capacity building of the Ministry of Interior 
and also elaboration on secondary legislation covering border guards.  The 2006 
programming cycle also allocated assistance to border management which was one of 
three sections under the rule of law receiving €7.9 million. These amounts represented 
before 2007 just below 20 per cent on average of the funding annually given to Georgia 
in total.
66
 
Since 2007 the ENPI has coordinated EU funding in Georgia. The border management 
sector since then has continued to receive on average 20 per cent of the funding Georgia 
has received in total. The EU funding has been delivered mainly since through the 
South Caucasus Integrated Border Management (SCIBM) program implemented by the 
UNDP.
 67
 The IBM programme is one of the flagship initiatives launched since the EaP 
in 2009. The EaP mentions that funding for IBM is focused especially on support efforts 
to establish IBM systems, including cooperation on border control and border 
demarcation (European Commission 2008:2). It also included a budget for three of the 
Caucasus states of €1.4 million to promote ‘continuation of training and support for the 
implementation of the upcoming IBM system strategy and the reform of the 
ministries/agencies concerned’68.  In addition, the EaP allocated a total of €600 million 
from 2010-2013 to the six EaP states out of which IBM is also financed. Overall, direct 
funding programmes on border management allocated approximately €37 million until 
September 2011.
 69
 This is the highest receiving area as migration management and 
readmission issues received in total around €20 million, asylum related issues €1.3 
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 See list of programmes at: http://undp.org.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=40. 
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 Author’s calculation on the bases of the NIP and action fiches. 
67
 See: www.undp.org.ge/files/project_files/annex1-SCIBM-description.pdf. 
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 Programme description available at: tp://undp.org.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=40&pr_id=116. 
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million (IDPs received €174 million) and human trafficking around €3 million. 70 Thus, 
EU funding for the border management sector in Georgia was high.  
Besides financial assistance, the EU aims to influence border guard reform through 
EUSR,
 71
 FRONTEX, Twinning and TAIEX.  The EUSR Border Support Team was 
established by the Council Joint Action of 28 July 2005. EUSR’s mandate was 
extended until August 2008 when it was replaced as a Monitoring Mission (EUMM) 
and extended again until 14 September 2011.  Since the initiation of the team the EU’s 
focus has been supporting both formal and behavioural compliance with the border 
guard reform objectives.
 72
 It provides support through assessment of the border 
situation, facilities, confidence building between Georgia and Russia and assists the 
Georgian border police and other relevant government institutions in Tbilisi with 
implementation of the comprehensive IBM strategy (Council of the European Union 
2010). The contribution at the legislative level has been through the IBM strategy 
which was drafted with the help of the EUSR team who recommended a move away 
from a conscript based system and overall encouraged to aim for a similar system as 
in the Western Balkans.
 73
  
In addition, in December 2008, FRONTEX signed a working arrangement with the 
Georgian border police. Its objectives were to facilitate information exchange and to 
contribute to risk analysis, training, research and development, and coordination of joint 
operational measures.
74
 The agreement also enabled the Georgian Border Police to 
benefit from FRONTEX training tools such as the Common Core Curriculum for basic 
border guard and forgery detection training which are financed by FRONTEX.   
The TAIEX and Twinning programmes have had a limited use in the border 
management area. So far there have been two TAIEX workshops regarding movement 
of people and mobility in 2008. One Twinning project has taken place since 2010, 
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 Author’s calculation on the basis of the NIP and action fiches. 
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 The EUSR Border Support Team in Georgia was established following the closure of the OSCE Border 
Monitoring Mission (BMO) in Georgia. The Council Joint Action 2005/582/CFSP of 28 July 2005, 
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Caucasus, established the EUSR Border Support Team in Georgia. The EUSR Border Support Team had 
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2006/121/CFSP of 20 February 2006. 
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 Author’s interview with an interviewee no.60, August 2011.  
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 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 60, August 2011.  
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See: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art50.html. 
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focusing on strengthening both the national customs and sanitary-phytosanitary border 
control.
 75
  
In sum, the main EU approach to influence border guard reform has been through its 
indirect incentive from 2005 in regard to visa facilitation and from 2009 the visa 
liberalisation potential.  In addition, the EU has promoted compliance through funding 
which it has provided since 2000.  After 2005 it has also engaged via its own agencies, 
especially EUSR, which have been closely involved in law drafting and facilitating 
training. Twinning and TAIEX type of programmes have been limited to a few 
workshops.   
5.2.2 Domestic Conditions and Costs 
The border control was weak when the EU first paid attention to border guard reform in 
Georgia. The border guards in 2005 were still ‘relative to armed forces’ even if it was 
structured under its own border unit (Lynch 2005). Moreover, it was also under-funded, 
under-equipped and under-trained (Lynch 2005). For instance, while the OSCE mission 
reported 800 illegal border crossings across the Russian-Georgian border in 2005, the 
Georgian border guard reported none (Lynch 2005). 
The adoption costs against this backdrop, when reforming the military orientated border 
unit into a rule enforcement agency, consisted of border guards training and the phasing 
out of conscripts. The political costs at the adoption level in reforming the agency to a 
rule enforcement agency, which in the case of Georgia involved bringing it under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), were low as the decision among 
the stakeholders did not cause any disagreement because the MIA is one of the most 
influential ministries.
 76
 At the implementation level economic costs were high because 
adoption of a professional service meant that border guard training was required and 
wages needed to be increased.  This was necessary in order to be able to reduce petty 
corruption that took place at border checkpoints (Welt 2005). The wages were raised 
from 80 Lari to 605 Lari in 2004,
77
 which also created more economic costs for the 
government.  
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5.2.3 Macro and Micro Level External Pressure and Support 
The other main actors apart from the EU were the NATO, the IOM, the US state 
department, the OSCE, and regional cooperation programmes which aimed to promote 
border guard reform through guidelines or financial and technical programmes.  
NATO informally has criteria to be adhered to if the country wishes to become a 
member and therefore could be a competitive influencing actor in the ENP countries 
(Trapans 2005). Georgia has had close relations with NATO since its independence and 
particularly in 1992 when Georgia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
78
 and 
further deepened cooperation by joining the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994 
and the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1999 and from 2002 onwards 
expressing its desire for membership.
79
 In its goal to become a candidate for NATO 
membership since 2004 Georgian officials have been aiming to fulfil an Individual 
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which is a programme for modernisation and 
democratisation of the defence system (Miller 2005). One of the IPAP commitments 
includes an enhanced border and thus could also offer a competitive explanatory force 
to the EU’s influence.80 While NATO membership potential could have been a 
motivating factor for Georgia, since 2008 and the Russia-Georgia war, the potential to 
accede was put on hold because of the potential instability that accession could have 
(Nichol 2008; McGuiness 2011). Thus, ever since 2008 the conditionality by NATO has 
had little impact for Georgia’s willingness to comply, even if it has had a desire for 
membership since 2002. Therefore, this desire may have provided an incentive between 
2002 and 2008.   
Other organisations have no potential to use membership leverage in Georgia which 
would have consequences for the border management sector. Despite this the presence 
of other organisations in Georgia may have had socialisation or capacity building 
impact since they have been in the country: the US, the OSCE since 1992, the IOM 
since 2000 and the Council of Europe since 1998.  
The main two aspects of support have been training and IBM standard transfer. The 
abovementioned organisations have focused on providing training but not particularly 
on promoting the institutional change that the EU requested in the action plan. The 
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 Later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. 
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 See: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988.htm. 
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 See the list of Georgia’s Commitment Under the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with 
NATO – 2004-2006. Available at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=11448. 
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border guard training has been implemented by the IOM though a project from March 
2005-December 2005 called Capacity Building in Migration Management (CBMMP) 
which was focusing on training for up to 1,400 border guards and was funded by the 
Titan Corporation and the US state department.
81
 The OSCE had a mandate from 
December 1992 until December 2008 in Georgia
82
 and it provided training from 2005 
onwards as earlier mandates were focusing on border guard security. Since 2005 in one 
year 12 training courses were completed and the following year in the capacity building 
programme a further three courses were conducted. In 2007 a memorandum of 
understanding was signed between the border police and the OSCE.  
International organisations have additionally supported the Georgian transfer to IBM 
standards. For instance, the OSCE on ‘Transitional Institutional Support Programme’ 
facilitated 10 seminars and 13 further courses in 2008-2009, until the mission liquidated 
in Georgia at the end of 2008.
 83
 The IOM has also been cooperating with the EU and in 
May 2008 a programme was created for the development of the border management 
system according to the IBM strategy for Georgia.  
In sum, the only organisation to be considered in regard to affecting domestic decision 
making is likely to be NATO from 2002-2008, an institution which offered membership 
conditionality. However, the EU has been the most involved entity in border 
management reform in regard to structural development. Training and implementation 
has been mostly supported by the OSCE and the US, however, the EU has prevailed 
since 2008 when the OSCE was liquidated.  
5.2.4 Process and Extent of Formal and Behavioural Compliance  
In 1992 the Georgian Border Service was founded and became a part of the Ministry of 
Defence. Equipment and infrastructure were poor and corruption was widespread 
(OSCE Newsletter 03/2008). The structural transformation to a law enforcement agency 
started in 1994 when the unit was separated from the Ministry of Defence and when it 
in 1996 became the State Department of State Border Guard of Georgia. Two years later 
the changes were put into law by adopting ‘State Border of Georgia’. Despite legislative 
changes that took place before the Rose Revolution, implementation of the legislations 
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was mostly only rhetoric (Lynch 2005). The real reform toward international standards 
started just after Saakashvili decommissioned the security service in 2004 which was 
corrupt and based on the Soviet inherited system (Lynch 2005).  
 
In 2005 the transformation started with ‘Concept of Development for the Georgian 
Border Service’ document which outlined all the required changes. It also recognised 
the need for a new law that would be developed in line with NATO and EU 
recommendations.
 84
 When the law was adopted in 2006 it was compliant with the EU 
standards as it defined the principles, objectives and structure, primary tasks and also 
included provisions for collection, storage and exchange of data. It entered into force at 
the beginning of 2007 (Chindea et al. 2008). Along with the new law regulations on 
social security for the border guard personnel, the rules of service and the standard 
operations procedures were approved by the President.
85
 In sum, as the agency 
distanced itself from a military type agency and outlined practices of the border guard as 
a civilian agency with investigatory powers and as it was incorporated into the MIA, it 
was compliant with the action plan recommendation  at the formal level in 2006.  
 
The implementation of the law has been compliant with some aspects of the action: 
staffing has fully moved away from conscript service and investigatory powers have 
also been introduced according to legislation.
86
 Professionally contracted personnel 
have been given higher salaries and have been trained in a new training centre (IOM 
2008a). However, there still is a need for further training and it is not yet fully 
compliant with the EU standards.
87
 In order to be a fully functioning agency on the 
ground information exchange between ministries needs to be enhanced and illegal 
crossings should all be reported which is not currently the case.
88
 In regard to required 
incorporation into the MIA, some restructuring took place in December 2008, thus, 
formal compliance took place in 2006 and behavioural compliance partially occurred in 
2007-2008.  
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5.2.5 Conditions and Logic for (non)Compliance 
5.2.5.1 Formal Compliance 
Compliance took place in 2006 through the creation of a new law that established the 
border guard service as a rule enforcement agency which uses demilitarised and 
professional staff. At that time conditions which were favourable for compliance were 
high identification with the EU, visa facilitation as an indirect incentive, sizeable 
financial assistance, EUSR presence, low political costs and NATO membership 
incentive. Low EU membership prospect and low legitimacy did not stop compliance.  
Because compliance with the EU standards already took place in 2006 it suggests that 
progress was under way toward the new law already before EU involvement because it 
was adopted only a couple of months after the ENP action plan was launched. As 
funding toward the sector was more focused on projects at the implementation level it is 
unlikely to have influenced the decision making to create a new law. As a consequence 
it suggests that the willingness for NATO membership was a driving force for the 
border guard reform decision which was initiated around the same time when NATO 
membership became a goal.  In fact NATO membership wishes were expressed since 
2002. While this can have been a motivating factor for the initial change the help that 
EUSR was giving at a practical level was found to be important.  EUSR was already 
active in Georgia in 2005 and a team, together with the local and international experts, 
was directly involved in the drafting of the law.
89
  In sum, logic of compliance reflects 
the importance of external cross-conditionality and the EU using its capacity building 
cooperation agency such as the EUSR. Therefore, it can be concluded that while the EU 
did not trigger compliance, it did have a partial role in assisting with drafting the law for 
border guard reform.  
5.2.5.2 Behavioural Compliance 
Behavioural compliance took place partially as border guard conscripts began to be 
replaced and the border guard system was reformed into a law enforcement agency with 
investigative powers and appropriate training. Partial compliance took place mostly 
under the same conditions except for higher economic costs, although some capacity 
building costs were supported by international organisations and also the costs of the 
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IBM programme were mostly covered.
90
 The main challenge for efficient training is still 
currently  that the wages in the public sector are far lower than in the private sector and 
the staff are not interested in staying in the position for more than a few months and 
often the knowledge is not passed on.
91
 In this situation support that is delivered by the 
international organisations in assisting the countries is going for waste as it is not passed 
on. Thus, it demonstrates that the EU and international training efforts have only been 
offering a temporary solution unless the whole staffing structure is further reformed and 
made to be more attractive to work for.  
Table 5.1 Conditions for (non)Compliance-Border Guard Reform in Georgia  
*Low cost marked + (referring to a favourable element for compliance and vv). 
5.3 Readmission Agreement 
Georgia has become both a source and a transit country for illegal immigration as a 
consequence of the two secessionist areas, unemployment,
92
 relaxed border control and 
visa regulations, and the lack of a tracking system on entry and exit (Lomsadze 2010).  
There are estimations that up to 20 per cent of the population have left the country in the 
last few years.
 93
 Georgia is a transit country for migrants only to a small degree due to 
its underdeveloped transport connections and travel conditions even if it has a liberal 
entry and admission regime (IOM 2008a). Georgia also had the highest number of 
asylum-seekers applying to the EU from the South Caucasus in 2009 according to the 
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UNDP statistics: 4,700 applications were placed, compared with 4,000 for Armenia and 
1,900 for Azerbaijan (Lomsadze 2010).  
The EU mentioned readmission agreement for the first time in article 26 in the PCA in 
1999. It notified that the Cooperation Council ‘shall examine which joint efforts can be 
made to control illegal immigration, taking into account the principle and practice of 
readmission’ (1999:2). Within the PCA framework, Georgia already agreed to conclude 
bilateral agreements with member states including the readmission of nationals of other 
countries and stateless persons who have arrived to the territory if they so request’ (art 
75:2). For instance, Georgia negotiated bilateral readmission agreements with Bulgaria, 
Italy and Germany and was proceeding on negotiations with the Benelux countries, 
Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Sweden (European Commission 2010:73).  
 
After the PCA, a readmission agreement, which would replace the bilateral agreements,  
was not brought up in the cooperation documents again until the ENP action plan called 
for strengthening ‘the dialogue and cooperation in the preventing and fight against 
illegal migration, which could possibly lead in the future to an EC-Georgia agreement 
on readmission’ (IOM 2008).  
 
In this section compliance with readmission agreement both at formal and behavioural 
levels are traced. At the formal level compliance is considered to have taken place when 
Georgia signs the readmission agreement with the EU and at the implementation level it 
is considered compliant when the preparation for readmission agreement 
implementation is fulfilled in regard to four areas: implementation protocols, bilateral 
readmission agreements, detention centre conditions and reintegration programmes.  
 
5.3.1 EU Conditionality, Assistance and Capacity and Technical Support 
The action plan demand did not clearly mention a visa facilitation incentive, however, it 
was clear to the political authorities what to expect if they concluded the readmission 
agreement.
 94
 Besides the potential for visa facilitation, the readmission agreement was 
portrayed as a prerequisite for further cooperation with the EU. For instance, Mr Füle 
reported to the EU Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee that signing the agreement 
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in 2010 would pave the way for the EU to prepare for the launch of negotiations on 
Association Agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (Füle 2010). EU 
incentives were, therefore, high from 2006 onwards.  
EU financial assistance has been used since 2006 to help address consequences of 
readmission implementation: reintegration of Georgia’s own citizens and providing 
temporary accommodation for third country citizens. Already before signing the 
readmission agreement, under the Aeneas programme, with an EC contribution of 
€511,354.37 and the Danish Refugee Council as an implementation partner, a two-year 
project from the end of 2006 until the beginning of 2009 titled ‘toward durable re-
integration mechanism project’ was launched (Danish Refugee Council 2007). It aimed 
to enhance the capacity of the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation (MRA) to 
support re-integration of returning migrants, rejected asylum seekers and other 
displaced groups (European Commission 2007).  
After the readmission agreement was signed financial assistance has been higher. The 
ENPI allocated financial assistance which aimed to increase capacity in addressing 
repatriation of refugees, returned nationals and also supporting reintegration. In Annual 
Programming 2008 a fund of €6 million was created to support returned citizens with 
shelter and income generation projects and also by providing safe and dignified 
repatriation of refugees and disabled persons (European Commission 2008). Moreover, 
the ERGO project (Enhancing Returns to Georgia Operationally) was conducted from 
March 2009 until September 2010 with a budget of €789,000 and was implemented by 
the Danish Refugee Council. It aimed to enhance capacity by the creation of a 
practitioner network, and a manual and assistance packages for the use of protection of 
returnee rights in the ‘Ministry of IDPs from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation 
and Refugees of Georgia’ (MIDPFOTAR).95 In 2010 a further €3 million was allocated 
to readmission agreement implementation through a programme ‘Supporting 
Reintegration of Georgian Returning Migrants and the Implementation of the EU-
Georgia Readmission Agreement’.96 It was established to cover three years and was 
implemented by nine EU member states and supervised by the Czech Ministry of 
Interior with the IOM and local authorities.
97
 In 2011 the ‘framework programme’ has 
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also supported EU-Georgia agreements’ implementation with €9.73 million (European 
Commission 2011) out of which one supported agreement was readmission in addition 
to  DFCTA, Association Agreement, visa facilitation and the visa liberalisation 
roadmap. Lastly, on 13 May, 2011 two new projects were launched and funded by the 
EU and implemented by ICMPD. They aimed for capacity building and were focusing 
on ‘Building Training and Analytical Capacities on Migration in Moldova and Georgia’ 
(GOVAC) and ‘Supporting the Implementation of the EC visa facilitation and 
readmission agreements in Moldova and Georgia’ (REVIS). By the end of 2011 the 
total allocated amount was approximately €20 million. This level of contribution makes 
it the second highest area of support in regard to the investigated areas in this research 
in Georgia.  
In addition to financial assistance, EU agencies and tools have also supported 
implementation of the readmission agreement after 2008. The main activities have been 
conducted in the framework of TAIEX, GEPLAC and FRONTEX and through mobility 
partnership initiatives but they have been so far limited to a few initiatives since 2008. 
There has only been one TAIEX workshop in December 2008 which aimed to inform 
the MFA and the consular services of their role in the implementation of readmission 
agreements (European Commission 2010). FRONTEX has completed six projects in 
Georgia so far, beginning in 2010 and focusing on organising return of persons from the 
EU Schengen territory to the country of origin
98
 and also in two other joint projects 
directed towards Georgia and Armenia.  
In sum, out of the EU’s tools, conditionality was weak until 2006 and high after visa 
facilitation was included in general to readmission practices. In addition, financial 
assistance and technical support agencies started evolving just in 2006 and 2008 
respectively, thus, the EU has mainly approached readmission agreement promotion by 
setting incentives for legal approximation and supporting the implementation through 
financial and technical assistance just after the readmission agreement was signed. 
5.3.2 Domestic Conditions and Costs 
While under customary international law a country has an obligation to readmit its own 
nationals and bilateral agreements are signed to facilitate this, readmission agreements 
that are signed with third countries also include an obligation to readmit third country 
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citizens even if they are not part of the international customary law (Roig and 
Huddleston 2007). The costs that a country faces are to do with both groups of people. 
 
In regard to signing the agreement the political adoption costs were low in Georgia as 
the decision to sign the readmission agreement did not encounter resistance from any 
decision makers and in fact there has been no real debate in regards to the signature of 
the readmission agreement. As a consequence it was agreed by all the stakeholders after 
a brief discussion.
99
 There were already many bilateral readmission agreements in place 
so the principle of it was understood.
100
 Moreover, as the amount of third country 
readmissions is small it did not cause any disputes.
101
 The population neither challenged 
the elite over it, nor showed dissatisfaction with the decision, thus, causing no concern 
for state stability.
102
  In fact it was welcomed as easier procedures for issuing visas 
attracted strong public attention (Pataraia 2010). 
 
Economic costs emerged from the implementation of the readmission agreement. Even 
if transit costs are borne by the requesting state, the recipient states also faces costs 
related to both own citizens and third country nationals. Most of the readmitted are 
Georgia’s own citizens as Georgia is not to a large degree a transit country and therefore 
the costs in regard to them are low. However, in regard to own country citizens 
economic costs can emerge due to the loss of remittances and consequences of 
reintegration.  Firstly, remittances can form a large part of cash inflows to Georgia, 
thus, the loss of these can create costs for Georgia. Secondly, costs can arise from the 
integration activities that need to be organised for the own nationals after their return. 
The IOM estimated that 22.9 per cent of Georgia’s population has emigrated i.e. 
900,000 (IOM 2008a) and nearly 80 per cent are illegal migrants.  Out of that some 72 
per cent send remittances back to Georgia (World Migration Report 2010). 40.4 per cent 
i.e. 400,000 are estimated to be in Western Europe with 36.5 per cent estimated to be in 
Russia (World Migration Report 2010). Thus, the concerned population can be 
approximately 288,000 people that are potentially facing return from the EU with a 
significant potential loss of remittance. The amount of remittances in total in the four 
years from 2006-2010 varied from 7 per cent to 8.5 per cent of the GDP (National Bank 
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2010). Some amount of this would also include remittances from the EU as most 
remittances to Georgia are sent from Russia, United States, and Greece (Trauner 2008). 
While this indicates that the costs could be high for Georgia, the experiences so far 
suggest that the amount of readmitted own citizens in fact is very small. Georgians are 
not a major group of concern and their return is not often the primary concern for many 
European states.
103
 Indeed the experience of implementing a bilateral agreement 
between Georgia and Germany had demonstrated that the amount of Georgians in 
Germany has been so small in comparison to other countries that it had not even 
prompted Germany to act
104
. Thus, economic costs are only medium as there are some 
costs but due to small number of people being readmitted they are not high.  
 
5.3.3 Macro and Micro Level External Pressure and Support 
There has been no direct pressure from other international institutions for Georgia to 
sign the readmission agreement, thus, the EU has been the only actor involved in its 
promotion.
105
 However, the influence of Russia has also had a role in the cost-benefit 
calculations. Completion of the readmission agreement became very important for 
Georgia as it was seen as the only way to receive visa facilitation which was pivotal 
when Russia signed a visa facilitation agreement with the EU in 2006 (Barbé and  
Johansson-Nogués 2008). It consequently meant that the almost 70 per cent of residents 
in the secessionist regions with Russian passports would have a better chance of 
entering the EU than Georgian citizens.
106
 President Saakashvili stressed urgency in the 
meeting with Barroso in Brussels in February 2007 to start the negotiations immediately 
with Georgia for visa facilitation (European Parliament 2007). Otherwise, rather than 
propelling a solution for the separatist areas, it could have contributed to maintaining 
the frozen conflict as its citizens in the separatist areas would have much more of an 
incentive to apply for Russian citizenship (Hernandez i Sagrera 2010).  
The EU has relied on agencies such as IOM, ICMPD (International Centre for 
Migration Policy Development) and UNHCR in implementing the EU funded projects 
especially focusing on reintegration and returns. For instance, ICMPD has supported 
two projects in regard to the readmission agreement: to enhance the government’s 
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ability to offer facilities for reintegration to Georgia from January 2011 until June 2012 
and through a programme aimed at Georgia and Moldova in supporting implementation 
of the agreement by enhancing the capacity of institutions by issuing support documents 
for visa applicants to international standards. The IOM has also been jointly 
implementing the second initiative ‘Support to the Authorities of Georgia for the 
Implementation of the Readmission agreement with the European Union’.107 
5.3.4 Process and Extent of Formal and Behavioural Compliance 
Considering that the PCA initially brought attention to the readmission agreement, it 
took fairly long before proceeding to negotiations. Whereas Georgia had been 
cooperative through bilateral agreements in regard to its own citizens throughout the 
years,
108
 the negotiations for EU wider readmission agreement started just in 2008.  
Since then the agreements were completed after only two rounds of negotiations. The 
first meeting was held in June in Tbilisi and the second one in Brussels in November 
2009. During the second meeting the agreements were concluded and at the same time 
the EU and Georgia signed a mobility partnership (EU Rapid 2009). Georgia signed on 
17 June 2010 visa facilitation (European Commission 2010) and on 22
nd
 November 
2010 the readmission agreement (European Commission 2010). 
Readmission came into force in March 2011 in Georgia. In practice it concerned 
implications for three groups of people: own state nationals, third country nationals and 
rejected asylum seekers (Kruse and Trauner 2008).  
Implementation of the readmission agreement involves conditions of when and how 
countries take back the returned persons. While these procedures require a long list of 
obligations from time limits for replying to a readmission request, creation of a joint 
committee, to regulations about the entry and how the identity is verified (see IOM 
2008a; Cassarino 2010; Aktoprak and Willams 2010) due to the recent nature of the 
implementation stage of the Georgian readmission agreement only preparation for 
implementation is analysed, i.e. implementation protocols, other bilateral arrangements 
being signed with the countries outside of the EU, accommodation centre arrangements 
and reintegration (Praxis 2011). 
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Georgia has already started signing implementation protocols and so far it has 
completed agreement with the Netherlands, the UK and Latvia.
109
 It also has created 
bilateral agreements actively with countries outside the EU.
110
 Also MIDPFOTAR hosts 
a three year initiative within the mobility partnership framework which aims to support 
reintegration of Georgian returning migrants (Migration Policy Brief 2010). The 
initiative established a mobility centre within the MIDPFOTAR and offers assistance to 
returned migrants by preparing for reintegration and provides support with job searches, 
emergency health treatment and temporary accommodation when there is a need 
(Migration Policy Brief 2010). In sum, all levels of preparation for implementation of 
readmission agreement are taking place and therefore can be considered compliant with 
the EU recommendations.  
5.3.5 Conditions and Logic for (non)Compliance 
5.3.5.1 Formal Compliance 
Formal compliance took place when the readmission agreement was signed in 2010. 
Compliance took place under high identification, high issue-specific incentives, high 
financial assistance and external pressure due to Russia having a visa facilitation offer 
before Georgia. Low legitimacy, weak EU membership prospect or lack of technical 
cooperation did not prevent compliance. Under similar conditions since the PCA but 
without the EU’s visa facilitation incentive, technical and financial assistance and 
Russia’s visa facilitation as a ‘push’ factor, compliance had not taken place. Therefore, 
high identification on its own was not a sufficient condition before for compliance, 
while other conditions were unfavourable for compliance. Georgia also started receiving 
assistance for the consequences of the readmission agreement already since 2002 and 
therefore is not capable of explaining the reason for signing the readmission agreement. 
Therefore, visa facilitation and the urgency caused by Russia receiving its visa 
facilitation prior to Georgia were the factors influencing the legal adoption of the 
agreement. In fact Georgian officials requested a readmission agreement immediately 
when the Russian visa facilitation negotiations began and therefore, this case 
demonstrates the EU’s successful role in a country with a short term clear incentive in 
combination with being motivated by pressure from the Russian factor in the cost-
benefit calculations. 
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5.3.5.2 Behavioural Compliance 
Behavioural compliance had also taken place in regard to all four preparatory tasks. 
Bilateral readmission agreements with the EU member states were already being   
prepared for before the readmission agreement, while the others took place after the 
readmission agreement was signed. Compliance took place under similar conditions as 
formal compliance: low membership expectation, high identification, high incentive, 
low legitimacy, assistance and technical support from the EU and low costs. 
Compliance with preparation for the implementation of the readmission agreement is 
explained by low costs and that visa facilitation was able to motivate compliance. As an 
interviewee argued, visa facilitation was seen as important issue in Georgia and there 
was no debate even about whether or not to comply with readmission related issues but 
if something was asked for, it was decided that it would be done.
111
 Moreover it was an 
easy task as Georgia is not a transit country and only needs to deal with a few transit 
migrants as well as its own citizens because they are not the primary group targeted in 
the EU countries.
112
  Thus the case is best explained by a rationalist logic. 
Table 5.2 Conditions for (non)Compliance - Readmission Agreement in Georgia 
*Low cost marked + (referring to a favourable element for compliance and vv). 
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5.4 Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees  
Georgia is currently primarily a country of origin for asylum applications to Europe and 
only to a small degree a transit and destination country for potential asylum seekers. 
Most of the applications it has received are from the ethnic Kists who fled Chechnya 
during the wars (UNHCR Gap Analysis 2009).  During the first war from 1994 until 
1999 only a small amount of refugees arrived in Georgia, however, during the second 
war since 1999 there was an increase (UNHCR Gap Analysis 2009). Due to an increase 
of asylum seekers, Georgia used so-called group determination refugee status whereby 
each member of the group was regarded as a ‘prima facie’113 refugee and in 1999 
Georgia granted the status to around 7,000 people. Chechens settled in the Pankisi 
Gorge close to Kists who are their ethnic relatives. Currently there are still around 900 
Chechen refugees in Georgia (UNHCR Global Appeal 2011). In addition, Georgia also 
receives small numbers of refugees from other countries. Overall there are about 20-30 
asylum seekers from different countries arriving in Georgia each year seeking asylum 
(UNHCR Gap Analysis 2009). The main group of people that are suffering from the 
lack of legislation and facilities have been the internally displaced people.  It is 
estimated that Georgia has between 247,000 to 249,000 internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) (Kabachnic et al. 2010; IDMC 2010). They are a consequence of two separatist 
areas (UNHCR Global Appeal 2011), which uprooted 223,000 people in the early 1990s 
and again some 127,000 in August 2008 when conflict broke out between Georgia and 
Russia (UNHCR Gap Analysis 2009). 
International organisations have, in their annual reports, identified serious flaws in 
various aspects of asylum seeker and refugee protection and in regard to the IDPs in 
Georgia  including access to asylum, identification as a refugee, access to education, 
minimum standards for accommodation, food and travel documents (UNHCR Gap 
Analysis 2009).  
Despite the seriousness of the lack of protection for refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs 
in Georgia, the EU did not make recommendations in regard to the situation before the 
action plan of 2006. In the action plan the EU expressed a large set of demands 
including protection of refugees and IDPs including the implementation of a national 
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action plan on migration and asylum, organising training for officials, exchanging 
information on various issues (entry and stay, integration, Eurodac system, temporary 
protection, reception conditions for asylum seekers, detention of illegal migrants) and 
cooperation on reintegration of returned asylum seekers and illegal migrants and 
assistance to refugees (European Commission 2006). It also requested modernisation of 
the refugee system in line with international and EU standards referring to the principles 
of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol and strengthening the department for 
IDPs to improve their protection, assistance and integration (Williams 2011). Since the 
action plan, asylum system reform has also been addressed in the section of JFS 
cooperation in the country strategy paper 2007 - 2010 which stated that the ENPI will 
be paying attention to the development of an asylum system fully in line with European 
standards (European Commission 2007b: 39). 
Asylum protection issues become especially important when countries that have signed 
readmission agreements may see an increase in the numbers of refugee and asylum 
seekers being returned from EU member states. This section will trace granting 
subsidiary protection, recognising the principle of non-refoulement and minimum 
standards for receiving/treatment of refugees which are at the core of all international 
and EU regulations as discussed in chapter two. 
5.4.1 EU Conditionality, Assistance and Capacity and Technical Support      
Apart from listing asylum system enhancement as one issue under the JHA section of  
the action plan, which would greatly contribute to Georgia’s opportunity to benefit from 
visa facilitation, there were no specific incentives set in regard to asylum sector 
compliance before 2006 apart from mentioning asylum in the common visa facilitation 
document like the other JHA related issues. In the ‘mobility partnership programme’, 
increased mobility was promised in exchange for ‘facilitating the reception and 
adaptation of asylum seekers’, and concerning building capacity of the ‘Georgian 
government to implement asylum policy’ among other JHA issues. It was signed with 
Georgia in November 2009 (Council of the European Union 2009). Therefore, issue-
specific incentives were low before 2006, medium before 2009 and high since then.   
114 
 
Most of the financial assistance was directed to IDP’s in Georgia and totalled over €170 
million
114
 from 1992 onwards. Asylum and refugee protection received very little 
financial assistance in comparison. The EU has been granting financial assistance since 
2004 in the asylum sector in Georgia. Before the ENPI, the Aeneas programme funded 
an informed migration programme from 2005 for two and a half years focusing on 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, with a contribution of €777,397 where the IOM 
acted as an implementation partner (Aiolfi and Charpin 2011). It focused on 
enhancement of ‘legislation and national practices with regard to asylum protection’ 
(Aiolfi and Charpin 2011).  Furthermore, a 2-year project from the end of 2006 until the 
beginning of 2009 ‘toward Durable Re-Integration Mechanism Project’ with an EC 
contribution of €511,354.37 and Danish Refugee Council as an implementation partner 
was launched (European Commission 2007a).  
After the launch of the ENPI, financial assistance has increased. The EU-funded 
UNCHR implemented the ‘Strengthening Protection Capacity’ project initiated in 2007 
with €800,000. In 2008 as a part of the sectoral support fund €6 million was given for 
the returned people with shelter and income generation projects and also safe and 
dignified repatriation for refugees and disabled persons (European Commission 2010). 
The financial assistance has in total been €1.3 million before the ENPI and after 
approximately €6 million.  
The EU’s role through other means is limited in the asylum sector. There are no directly 
involved EU agencies, TAIEX or Twinning programmes related to refugee and asylum 
seeker protection in Georgia. The EU has not launched regional protection programmes 
in Georgia like it has in Moldova and Ukraine. The only EU agency indirectly related to 
asylum protection is FRONTEX which created a cooperation agreement with Georgia in 
2008. It aims to train, according to a common core curriculum, the border guards which 
may, therefore, support the sector through better recognition of asylum seekers and their 
treatment. 
In sum, out of all the EU strategies, incentives have been present since 2005, assistance 
from 2004 onwards and low scale technical cooperation from 2008. 
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5.4.2 Domestic Conditions and Costs 
Adoption of refugee and asylum protection standards respecting the principle of non-
refoulement and offering subsidiary protection and minimum standards pose low costs 
because even if it requires amendments to or new legislation, there were no 
disagreements among the decision makers as usually issues related to human rights have 
been agreed on without any objections.
115
 At the public level it is not causing instability 
because even though asylum seekers come from diverse cultural, racial and religious 
backgrounds they are rarely targeted (UNHCR Gaps Analysis 2008). Therefore, 
political costs for adopting EU and international asylum standards are considered low.   
Implementation costs in regard to offering alternative protection to refugees, minimum 
reception condition for refugees and non-refoulement are also low as there are very 
small amounts of refugees in Georgia (UNHCR factsheet 2011). 
5.4.3 Macro and Micro Level External Pressure and Support 
There is no other conditionality proposed by any other organisation even if many 
international organisations,  most importantly UNHCR and the IOM, are promoting 
refugee and asylum protection standards and have had a longer established role in 
Georgia. Whereas the EU requests compliance with the EU and international standards 
in its action plan it does not specifically point out the differences between the UN and 
EU law. However, the 1951 UN Convention does not offer subsidiary protection and 
thus the EU regulation goes further to address the gaps for asylum seekers who need 
protection but do not fulfil the 1951 refugee definition. Thus, by tracing whether the 
ENP states also adhere to the EU standards on subsidiary protection that go beyond the 
UN standards give further understanding of their willingness to follow EU rules, 
because minimum standards and refoulement clause are covered both in the EU and the 
international regulations. 
 
At the practical application level the main contributors are the UNHCR, the IOM and 
the USAID which support asylum protection through technical and financial assistance 
besides being implementation partners in the EU-funded projects. In addition to 
international actors and the EU there are also a variety of NGOs providing assistance on 
the ground such as Technical Assistance Georgia (TAG) which provides health care to 
refugees; the Georgian Centre for Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture (GCRT) which  
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provides psychological counselling; the United Nations Association of Georgia 
(UNAG) which provides legal counselling, advocacy and training; and the Co-
ordination Council of Chechen Refugees in Georgia which promotes local integration of 
refugees, information-sharing among refugees and awareness-raising about refugees’ 
contribution to Georgian society (UNHCR Gaps Analysis 2008). Whereas the 
international organisations have contributed through capacity building to the legislative 
approximation matters the local NGO's have been supporting the asylum conditions on 
the ground.  
5.4.4 Process and Extent of Formal and Behavioural Compliance 
Refugee legislation began developing in Georgia soon after independence. The first step 
in recognising asylum seeker protection issues was when the Right of Asylum was 
included in the 1995 Constitution of Georgia and article 49 declared that ‘foreign 
persons and stateless persons living in Georgia have the right and obligations equal to 
the right and obligations of citizens of Georgia with some exceptions envisaged by the 
constitution’ (UNHCR Gap Analysis 2009). The ‘Law on Refugees’ was adopted on 
18th February 1998. The Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation regarded that it 
widely recognised the principles on 1951 and 1967 and that it was based on Georgia’s 
constitution (Shevardnadze  2001:5) and a year later in May 1999  Georgia ratified the 
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. Even if Georgia has had a basic framework for 
refugee protection since 1998 when the law was created (IOM Gaps Report 2008) it still 
did not fully comply with EU or international standards either at the legislative or 
implementation levels.  
Some changes to the law were made by the amendments of 2006 in regard to Law on 
the Status of Aliens and amendments in 2005 to the ‘Law on Refugees’, but they did not 
change enough to comply with the international or EU legislation and major problems 
in regard to the status of a refugee, principle of non-refoulement and minimum 
standards for protection still remain today both at the legislative and at the also 
implementation level. 
Firstly, the Law on Refugees differed in its definition of a refugee and it has not yet 
introduced complementary forms of protection as previously most asylum seekers were 
granted refugee status on a ‘prima facie’ basis (IOM Gaps Report 2008; Gabrighidze 
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2011). It also excluded a specific provision for the most vulnerable (UNHCR Global 
Appeal Update 2011).  
Secondly, the principle of non-refoulement was not fully in line with the refugee 
convention or European convention on human rights as it did not include aspects of 
torture as principles of denying return and therefore violates the principal of non-
refoulement at the legislative level.
116
  
Thirdly, in regard to minimum standards of the refugees in Georgia there were some 
achievements in 2007 such as granting issuance of temporary residency permits to 
refugees as regulated by the 2006 ‘Law on the Status of Aliens’ and on issuance of 
documents in April 2009. Thus, it can be concluded that at the legislative level refugee 
protection is not adhering to EU or international law in all aspects but there have been 
amendments for some provisions in recognising refugee rights according to minimum 
standards. 
The practical application of refugee status, subsidiary protection, non-refoulement and 
minimum standards for reception also has deficiencies. Firstly, no other forms of 
protection were granted besides protection under refugee status. Moreover, some of 
those who had a refugee status, experienced a cancellation of their previously granted 
refugee status (IOM 2008a). This was done on the grounds that the Ministry of IDPs 
Accommodation and Refugees (MRA) saw that these people met conditions for 
acquiring Georgian citizenship, or were registered as citizens. However, due to poor 
registers in fact these individuals had failed to acquire it and were risked becoming 
stateless refugees.  
 
Secondly, the fact that Georgian agreements cover most of the aspects of the principle 
of non-refoulement and also that the criminal code prohibits penalisation for illegal 
aliens entering the country, asylum seekers are in danger of refoulement due to lack of 
identification or the cancellation of their refugee status.
 117
   As the law on refugees or 
on border police does not expect that border officers identify asylum seekers, they are 
referred to the investigation unit in the border police which is responsible for referring 
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cases to the office of the prosecutor, rather than referring them to the MRA. Therefore, 
there are some cases where aliens are charged with illegal entry and risk a 3 - 5 year 
prison sentence for illegal entry and/or refoulement (UNHCR Gaps Report 2008).  
 
Thirdly, most of the aspects of implementation of minimum standards of reception are 
lagging even if there are some improvements with an accommodation centre and 
identification documents sector. Even if the refugee law requires assistance for refugees 
in finding employment, it is not available to most refugees due to ‘location and limited 
job opportunities’ as they are situated in a remote area in the Pankisi valley. Moreover, 
in theory, schooling is available to refugee children in the Pankisi valley, however, as 
Russian language schools are unofficial, the school certificates are not recognised by 
other authorities, making it difficult to move into further education.
118
 Despite primary 
schooling there are no government-funded vocation programmes for refugees in the 
Pankisi valley.   
 
Lastly, these previous issues directly related to location are unlikely to be altered in the 
near future. Those IDPs who are residing in Tbilisi are since 2010 been given new 
housing, which is on one hand a positive development as it gives  them an opportunity 
to gain better conditions than they had before,  in abandoned houses often with lack of 
running water or heating (IOM 2008), but on the other hand the new houses are built in 
remote villages where they indirectly undermine other refugee rights such as 
accessibility and possibilities for employment, schooling or healthcare (Kirtskhalia 
2010). The replacement of the old accommodation has raised a question of violation of 
human rights when they started in December 2010 due to the forceful and short notice 
evictions from around 25 buildings in Tbilisi (Tskhvirashvili 2010). Continuous protests 
took place since late 2010 to draw attention to MRA practices which ultimately 
escalated in the dismissal of the MRA in March 2011 (Rustavi II News 23/05/2011).   
 
Out of these basic standards the only success is regarded to be the issuance of travel 
documents which was started in 2009. It was an improvement on the situation as 
previously asylum seekers were not receiving formal documentation (European 
Commission 2010).  Based on these issues it can be concluded that to date neither 
formal nor behavioural compliance has fully taken place, expect for improving 
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minimum standards including travel documentation issuance and improving 
accommodation conditions which are easier tasks to implement and the costs were 
covered to large extent by the EU in the accommodation centre and international 
organisations in regard to documents.  
5.4.5 Conditions and Logic for (non)Compliance 
5.4.5.1 Formal Compliance 
The favourable conditions that were present from 2000-2011 were medium/high 
identification, high legitimacy, and low political and economic costs and support from 
international actors. There was low membership belief, low/medium credible benefits 
until 2009 and low EU related technical and capacity groups. Even if identification as 
well as legitimacy were in place, in the absence of clear incentives, low expectations for 
the EU membership prospect and low EU side technical cooperation, no change in 
legislation in regard to subsidiary protection or protection against refoulement have 
taken place. Compliance only took place in regard to issues at the minimum standards 
for protection level, which could be perceived to be an easy or more technical task, i.e. 
when ID document provision was set into legislation.  
The lack of compliance, therefore, suggests to be stemming from the lack of capacity or 
political will. While adoption of a law does not require costly or complex procedures 
the lack of legal compliance in Georgia is likely to be emerging from lack of political 
will. Interviews suggested that asylum is not a priority area in Georgia as there are 
concerns more with the IDP’s and also the officials perception sometimes is that asylum 
seekers are considered as criminals which does not give  the issue needed urgency to 
tackle.
119
 As the EU has only intended to promote in the sector through the indirect 
incentive of increased mobility including also the sector of asylum system reform and 
some funding, the EU’s leverage to influence is not enough. It was furthermore felt that 
the EU did not feel the need to be more involved.
120
 In sum, the EU’s leverage in the 
area is low and the compliance that has taken place has been IO driven and mainly 
involved UNHCR assistance.  
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5.4.5.2 Behavioural Compliance 
Under the same conditions as legal promotion behavioural compliance was only partial 
as there were problems with offering access to asylum and also the principle of non-
refoulement was not respected. The only successful changes that have taken place since 
2009 are related to minimum standards of reception/treatment of refugees and asylum 
seekers and in regard to documentation and accommodation centres. On the ground 
conditions for refugees and asylum seekers improved due to the joint effort of 
international organisations. UNHCR support was important in providing documentation 
as it agreed with Civil Registry Agency to cover the costs of 5,000 Convention Travel 
Documents (CTDs), which are issued to all recognised refugees (UNHCR Gaps Report 
2008). Accommodation centre was constructed with EU and international assistance 
(European Commission 2011b).  
The reason for lack of behavioural compliance can also be explained by a lack of 
capacity due to the primary focus being on the IDP’s and due to a lack of political will 
as Georgia did not consider it as a priority issue. In sum, the EU’s influence in this case 
can be concluded to be low in regard to promoting the standards even if it assisted 
through temporary accommodation centre. It reflects the EU’s own lack of interest in 
getting more involved the area demonstrated by lower incentives, funding and 
cooperation networks.   
Table 5.3 Conditions for (non)Compliance-Protection of Asylum Seekers and 
Refugees in Georgia 
*Low cost marked + (referring to a favourable element for compliance and vv). 
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5.5 Criminalisation, Prosecution and Punishment of Human Trafficking 
Georgia is mostly a country of origin for trafficking of human beings. Instability in the 
region, deregulation of the borders and rising unemployment, especially affecting 
women as a consequence of the state reforms in the health and education sectors since 
independence, have contributed to victimisation (Glonti 2001). Weak borders in the 
secessionist conflicts’ areas have further contributed to the number of trafficked. Also, 
street children have become vulnerable to human trafficking (Glonti 2001).  Georgia is 
also a transit country for human trafficking but to a much lesser extent due to its 
underdeveloped transport system and geographical location. Most victims from Georgia 
are trafficked to Turkey even if evidence of trafficking from Armenia, Iran, Russia and 
Ukraine via Georgia to Turkey and the EU has also been found (IOM 2008a). IOM 
estimates that every year approximate 500 women in Georgia fall victim to trafficking 
(Corso 2006). 
When the EU and international focus on Georgia’s situation emerged in the late 1990’s, 
Georgia’s criminal code did not even contain a definition of human trafficking (Glonti 
2001). Consequently, there were neither statistics nor court protocols on human 
trafficking. The lack of recognition of the problem and inadequate cooperation with law 
enforcement agencies in neighbouring states had resulted in a situation that the police 
were not equipped to deal with this crime (Glonti 2001).  
The EU did not address human trafficking issues in its PCA in regard to Georgia; the 
first time it showed concern was in its country strategy paper of 2005.
121
 The action 
plan categorised human trafficking within organised crime issues in section 4.3.3. It 
recommended continuing implementation of the national action plan, implementing 
actions recommended by the OSCE action plan to combat trafficking in human 
beings
122
 focusing on Chapters III, IV and V
123
 and to enhance cooperation in the 
framework of relevant international organisations (OSCE, UN). In addition, it suggested 
that Georgia promote co-operation regionally between law enforcement bodies (police, 
border guards, customs and judiciary) and develop protection, assistance and 
rehabilitation mechanisms for victims (European Commission 2006). These 
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recommendations demonstrate that despite having its own standards in the JHA 
acquis
124
 in regard to human trafficking, the EU action plan for Georgia referred only to 
IO’s standards for the fight against trafficking. 
 
This section focuses on the fight against human trafficking and traces back the EU’s 
influence in promoting criminalisation and punishment of trafficking in Georgia, which 
is covered in section III of the OSCE action plan.  Compliance with the human 
trafficking action plan recommendations are regarded to have taken place when 
punishment of trafficking has been set into Georgian national legislation and 
prosecutions are carried out.
125
 The time of punishment that the EU sets as a standard 
provides a comparative aspect on whether the countries follow the EU regulation even 
though the EU refers to the international standards in the action plans. In order to 
comply with the EU standards it would mean having a separate law which would have 
sentences similar to the EU and carry them out accordingly. 
5.5.1 EU Conditionality, Assistance and Capacity and Technical Support 
The EU action plan did not mention, in regard to compliance, any benefits apart from 
financial support which relates to all aspects of EU-Georgia cooperation.
 126
 Later, the 
Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership introduced the possibility for more mobility 
for Georgians in exchange for various security, organised crime and migration related 
issues, one of which is the fight against human trafficking (Council of the European 
Union 2009). Thus, the EU incentives were low as the EU did not mention any clear 
incentives for compliance before 2009 and medium since 2009.   
 
The financial assistance that the EU allocated to Georgia for the fight against human 
trafficking was small. The first time Georgia received financial assistance addressing 
trafficking of human beings was in 2008 when €3 million was directed to all the United 
Nations (UN) member states. Georgia as an UN member received a part of this 
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assistance (European Commission 2008a). Most of the funding addressing the 
trafficking of human beings was allocated through implementation partners such as ILO 
and ICMPD in Georgia. There has been three EU funded projects that have been 
implemented by the international partners since 2006. The first was ‘Development of a 
Comprehensive Anti-trafficking Response in South Caucasus’; the second, 
‘Strengthening of Comprehensive Anti-trafficking Responses in South Caucasus’127 and 
finally, ‘Enhancing Development Impact of Migration in South Caucasus through 
Policy Dialogue, Capacity Building, Partnerships and Pilot Actions’.128  Furthermore, 
Georgia was also included as one of the recipients of the EU funding between three 
countries of origin, transit and destination (Georgia, Greece and Ukraine) from 2007-
2008 and implemented by La Strada and Human Rights Defence Centre and People’s 
Development Society Association.
129
 It focused on three aspects: policy dialogue, 
illegal immigration and the fight against trafficking of human beings for which the EU 
contributed €1.1 million. In sum, EU funding has addressed the fight against trafficking 
with less than €5 million in Georgia. In comparison to other issue areas this area has 
received the lowest amount of financial assistance.  
 
The EU programmes and agencies have not been involved in the fight against 
trafficking in Georgia. The EU TAIEX workshops and events in Georgia in regard to 
trafficking have only focused on drugs trafficking in 2007 and on firearms trafficking in 
2011. Twinning projects have not been conducted in regard to addressing human 
trafficking in Georgia. In sum, most of the EU’s input is through its international 
implementation partners where the EU has been a funding provider since 2006.  
5.5.2 Domestic Conditions and Costs 
Georgia had no legislation that would criminalise trafficking in 2000 as criminalisation 
was operated on the basis of laws prohibiting slavery, forced labour, detention, 
kidnapping and rape, and the sentences handed down were from between 3 to 20 years 
(TIP 2000), which thus, the minimum sentence needed to be increased to five years in 
order to comply with the EU standards.  The costs of adoption arose from the need for 
preparation of a law as it did not previously exist, however, as the human trafficking 
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related issues did not face political challenges the decision the costs of adoption were 
medium
130
.  
 
Implementation of the legislation meant that it would face some costs as prosecutions 
were going to be carried out for the first time and as the process is continuous. 
However, as the amount of trafficking cases in Georgia are not that high (Corso 2006) 
the economic costs are considered to be low. 
 
5.5.3 Macro and Micro Level External Pressure and Support 
No conditionality was set by any international organisation or other country for 
promotion of the fight against trafficking, however, many international organisations 
have been engaging in Georgia already since the late 1990s through technical and 
financial assistance such as ILO, ICMPD, the OSCE,  the IOM and US aid. IOM has 
been engaging in counter trafficking in Georgia since 2000. It has organised campaigns, 
training of officials for assisting safe return and reintegration (IOM 2008a). It has also 
been contributing to the national counter-trafficking action plan. ODHCR has assisted 
with the creation of national action plans for trafficking and ILO has been involved 
since 2007 fostering regional and international cooperation and focusing on prevention, 
protection and assistance of victims. Also, OSCE was involved in organising capacity 
building and networking, and supporting the development of legislation. It has 
especially facilitated cooperation at the legislative level by organising a working group 
of experts from GYLA (Georgian Young Lawyers' Association), international 
organisations, the General Prosecutor's Office, and the Ministries of Justice and Interior. 
They have cooperated in drafting amendments to the trafficking law (Sakiqi 2007). The 
US state department has been one of the main providers of financial assistance toward 
the fight against trafficking of human beings in Georgia (European Commission 2010). 
5.5.4 Process and Extent of Formal and Behavioural Compliance  
Human trafficking legislation began developing in Georgia in early 2000. At that time 
there had not been any trafficking arrests or a legislative framework to prosecute them. 
There was even confusion over which department was actually responsible for 
trafficking. For instance, the Ministry of Interior’s anti-trafficking unit was focused on 
illegal adoptions rather than trafficking (TIP 2004). Furthermore, corruption levels were 
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high and it was not unheard of that government officials were themselves involved in 
the protection of traffickers (TIP 2001).  
Due to the slow start in developing human trafficking law the IOM in 2001 suggested 
that it would be more beneficial to focus on amendments to the current Criminal Code 
as existing laws would suffice to tackle human trafficking rather than launching a new 
anti-trafficking law (IOM 2001). The suggestion was followed through when the 
Criminal Code of 2003 criminalised trafficking for the first time and which was 
followed by changes to prohibit trafficking in Article 143 and trafficking of minors in 
Article 172 (IOM 2008a). It provided penalties of 5-12 years imprisonment with a 
maximum of 20 years for aggravated circumstances.  
The US also suggested the need for a fight against trafficking law and the same year 
drafting of the anti-trafficking law began.
131
 In 2006 Georgia adopted a Law on the 
Fight against Trafficking in Persons including provisions for punishments after a series 
of OSCE supported discussion (Sakiqi 2007). It also established a permanent Anti-
Trafficking Council and the third action plan for trafficking (TIP 2007). In 2006 
Georgia also increased punishments for traffickers. It amended the previous 2003 
Criminal Code and established a minimum of seven years imprisonment and a 
maximum of 20 years and a life sentence in the case of minors being trafficked (TIP 
2006). Besides setting punishment at the national legislation level according to 
international standards, it also ratified the Palermo Protocol to prevent, suppress and 
punish trafficking in persons and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings. At the legislative level full compliance was recorded in 
2006. 
Impressive progress was also taken at the implementation level since 2005: a new anti-
trafficking unit with a staff of 49 was established and in its first few months it 
investigated 13 cases and arrested 30 traffickers (TIP 2005; see table 5.1) demonstrating 
that prosecution was starting to take place. The average sentence which was given was 
also according to regulations and was 3 to 14 years imprisonment. Contrary to 
Moldova’s difficulties in the prosecution of officials involved in trafficking, Georgia 
has also since 2004 taken action against complicit officials as demonstrated in August 
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2004 and February 2005 when three passport officials were arrested as they had been 
facilitating trafficking (TIP 2005).   
Even if in 2005 there were some backward steps taken when there was a lack of 
progress in convicting and sentencing traffickers, the TIP reports from 2007 onwards 
show that Georgia has been prosecuting all the offenders. Furthermore, all the other 
aspects are working efficiently and there were no reports of trafficking-related 
complicity of law enforcement personnel from either NGOs or the government. The TIP 
report as a consequence categorised Georgia from then in the tier 1 section of countries, 
which signifies that it fulfils all the aspects in the fight against trafficking.  
Table 5.4 Human Trafficking Convictions and Sentences in Georgia 
 
 
 Source: Author’s constellation of available data from TIP Reports 
Conditions and Logic for (non)Compliance 
5.5.5.1 Formal Compliance  
The conditions under which compliance took place in 2006 were low membership 
perspective, high identification, low EU incentives and low EU assistance. The costs 
were low both at legal and implementation levels, while legitimacy was high. Because 
the EU did not influence through assistance or support programmes before 2006 and as 
Georgia focussed on cooperation with the existing organisations and especially the US 
on trafficking issues, the likely reason for compliance in the human trafficking area is 
its cooperation with the USA, international institutions and the NGO’s which already 
since early 2000 supported Georgia in developing its anti-trafficking system.  There had 
been strong support and influence from the USA and Council of Europe and especially 
the statements made by the USA were very important in Georgia and they took them 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Convictions  
Sentences 
127 
 
very seriously.
132
 For instance, an interviewee contended that ‘Georgia had a strong 
relationship with the US and would trust their judgement in that if there was a needed 
change they would just accept it.
133
 In addition, an OSCE lead team was assisting in the 
drafting process of the law (Sakiqi 2007). Therefore, this case demonstrates that there 
was little role for the EU in the legal approximation level as Georgia received  
assistance and advice from OSCE and the US, which had had a long established role in 
Georgia, and therefore this case demonstrates the EU’s lack of influence.  
Thus, the results indicate that the EU had little influence with the success in the 
criminalisation of human trafficking. The reason why the EU was not influential was its 
lack of contribution; evident in small amounts of funding and little institutional 
involvement. It was also doubted whether the EU was even interested as it would not 
benefit itself.
134
 It was also felt that some EU states are behind Georgian standards and 
therefore the established international standards were seen as the framework to refer 
to.
135
  While legitimacy and identification with the EU were high, the already stronger 
relationship between international organisations, the US and Georgia in trafficking 
related issues were the socialisation influences for Georgia rather than the EU.  Thus, 
the logic that explains compliance took place because Georgia found it important to 
protect issues related to human rights
136
 and because of capacity and socialisation 
related factors related especially to the US and international organisation assistance. 
5.5.5.2 Behavioural Compliance 
Behavioural compliance took place under the same conditions as formal compliance: 
low EU involvement through funding and technical cooperation groups with no 
incentive offered apart from the indirect incentive for mobility since 2009. The 
favourable conditions were high identification, low economic costs, and external 
assistance. 
 
These three conditions cannot explain why there was a change from 2004 onward. 
Whereas external institutions were involved in the legal approximation level they did 
not directly have influence on implementation of the prosecutions and legitimacy. Level 
of identification and legitimacy had also been constant and is also not explanatory.   
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Therefore, at the behavioural level compliance was facilitated due to the increase of 
effectiveness of the prosecutor’s office itself, which was an independent body. The 
increased effectiveness seemed to coincide with justice sector reform. The reform was 
especially influential in cutting out corruption
137
 which therefore can offer a causal 
explanation for increased prosecutions. Because justice sector reform was mostly 
conducted with the financial
138
 and capacity building assistance of the EU (Delcour and 
Duhot  2011), the success in behavioural compliance can be accounted to the indirect 
EU capacity building influence.  
 
Table 5.5 Conditions for (non)Compliance - Fight against Human Trafficking in 
Georgia 
*Low cost marked + (referring to a favourable element for compliance and vv). 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the EU approaches and domestic conditions and responses for 
approximation with the EU action plan recommendations in four selected issues of the 
action plan: border guard reform, readmission agreement, asylum protection and 
punishment for the crime of human trafficking in Georgia. The assessment considered 
compliance both at the formal and behavioural levels.
139
  
It found that out of the EU tools used only direct conditionality was given to two areas 
which were strategically most important for the EU’s own security: border management 
and readmission. They were also the areas which received most funding. In the asylum 
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sector and human trafficking sector the EU’s contribution was smaller in regard to the 
amount of financial assistance and lack of direct incentives and cooperation 
programmes.  
Compliance took place at legislative and behavioural levels in three cases: border guard 
reform was fully complying with EU recommendation of transferring to a law 
enforcement agency and partially functioning as a professional service, readmission 
agreement was adopted and implemented and therefore compliant. Criminalisation of 
trafficking also complied with EU and international standards at both levels. The 
asylum and refugee protection only complied partially in regard to more technical 
issues.  
Compliance took place regardless of the EU incentive and funding differences between 
the sectors. In border management formal compliance was motivated by NATO 
conditionality but the drafting of the law received assistance from the EU while 
motivated by reasons other than the EU’s encouragement for reform, it was benefitting 
directly from EU help in drafting the law according to EU standards. In the readmission 
agreement case the EU incentive for visa facilitation was not enough on its own to 
trigger compliance with the readmission agreement before Russia’s visa situation 
pressurised Georgia to adopt it. In the human trafficking sector the EU did not have a 
role in promoting formal approximation when Georgia found only the international 
regulations as its framework, however, indirectly the increased  volume of prosecutions 
were benefitting from justice sector reform, which included a reform of the prosecutor’s 
office, which was mostly thanks to EU funding and capacity building programmes.  
Overall, the EU has not been on its own enough to motivate compliance with the EU 
standards in Georgia; however, it has improved the practical enforcement level by 
capacity related projects, which have contributed to the conditions on the ground. 
Therefore, the EU’s leverage in Georgia was limited to areas when Georgia’s own 
reform plan coincided with the EU’s assistance, rather than the EU being able to have 
leverage to influence solely.  
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6. The EU’s Influence in the Area of JHA in Moldova  
6.1 Introduction 
According to estimations 40,000 Moldovans had intended to enter the EU illegally 
between 1999-2000, approximately 40 per cent of Moldovans were working temporarily 
or permanently outside Moldova and one million were based in the EU either legally or 
illegally (Gutu and Tomescu-Hatto 2005). Moldova’s porous border, corrupt border 
guards and lack of attention to illegal migration and trafficking attracted more attention 
from the EU in early 2000 when the EU recognised that Moldova could pose soft 
security threats due to its position directly bordering the enlarged EU.  
Before the preparation for enlargement, EU-Moldova cooperation did not address JHA 
issues but was focused on agriculture, public administration and the energy sectors.
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The PCA only addressed the readmission agreement as a tool for illegal migration but 
did not include other migration related issues. When the ENP was launched, the JHA 
sector became one of the priorities. 
This chapter focuses on the same four issue areas which are present in all of the three 
countries’ action plans and examines Moldova’s compliance with the EU standards 
from 2000 until the end of 2011.  It finds that Moldova has been complying with most 
of the requested EU standards or committed to do so both at formal and behavioural 
levels within its capacity limits. It has responded to EU incentives of visa facilitation 
and overall its compliance can be explained by a rationalist logic as it is aiming to gain 
EU membership and benefits from visa facilitation and liberalisation.  
These arguments are developed firstly by discussing border guard reform, followed by 
the readmission agreement, then asylum and refugee protection and lastly 
criminalisation of trafficking of human beings. The conclusion draws together the 
findings, the logic of the cases and the EU’s role in promoting compliance with its 
standards both at formal and behavioural levels.  
6.2 Border Guard Reform 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Moldovan border guards were established by 
presidential decree in June 1992 (BGS-Moldova 2010). The Moldovan Border Guard 
system focused on defence rather than facilitating movement and used conscripts 
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instead of professionally trained border guards. The system suffered from severe 
corruption, a lack of capacity and low wages made conscripts vulnerable to bribery. 
Because border guards stayed on duty for only 1-2 years retention experience from 
previous training was difficult (Sushko et al. 2005). When the EU began paying 
attention to border management issues under its ENP action plan in 2005 it 
recommended Moldova to focus on the creation of an efficient and comprehensive 
border management system, including the transformation of the border guards into a law 
enforcement agency and to amend the national legislation accordingly (section 49). This 
meant demilitarisation of the service, the addition of investigatory powers for the 
professional staff and separating the service from the state security department. This 
section traces border guard reform according to EU standards set in the action plan. 
6.2.1 EU Conditionality, Assistance and Capacity and Technical Support  
In order to promote compliance with its recommendations in the action plan, the EU 
stated that financial assistance was conditional on commitment to the fulfilment of the 
PCA, however, it did not mention any direct benefits for border guard reform in the 
action plan (European Commission 2005). The common approach on visa facilitation 
however included a section on border management in 2005 thus creating an indirect 
incentive for visa facilitation. After the launch of the EaP in 2008, an increased potential 
for mobility was set up as a conditional incentive for increasing security in the border 
management sector. More specifically, through implementing ‘mobility security pacts’  
and when efforts for corruption, organised crime and illegal migration were addressed 
including ‘upgrading asylum systems to EU standards and the establishment of 
integrated border management structures’ the EU promised easier legitimate travel 
(European Commission 2008b). However, just when the visa liberalisation plan was 
launched by the EU in 2010 and the plan having identified relevant conditions which 
needed to be completed through a process of dialogue set up after the Prague Eastern 
Partnership summit on 7 May 2009 the incentive was directly linked to visa facilitation 
Therefore, while incentives were financial before 2005, medium until 2010, since 2010 
they have been high as border management reform became conditional for the goal of 
visa liberalisation.  
 
The EU has also exercised influence through its financial assistance. Tacis, regional 
funds and cross-border cooperation since 2000, until the ENPI pooled funding under 
one instrument in 2007, have been the main contributors of financial assistance in the 
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border management sector. In total it has been the highest funded area in the JHA 
(ECRE 2008) out of the four issue areas receiving financial assistance.  Between 2000-
2002 Moldova received only limited funding toward the border guard reform process. In 
2000 €0.9 million was given through a regional fund for training Moldovan border 
guards and in 2002 under the Tacis fund €1.85 million was given to Moldova for 
equipment and training (European Commission 2001a).  
 
However, since the EUBAM was initiated, funding has been increasing. EUBAM is an 
advisory body that was established after a joint letter from Moldova and Ukraine  
requested President Barroso and High Represenative Solana to arrange support for  
border managment (European Commission 2005a). EUBAM which has been operating 
on the Moldova-Ukraine border since October 2005 has received the largest bulk of the 
EU funding. The total amount so far has reached €68 million between Moldova and 
Ukraine.
141
 Particularly on the transformation on the Moldovan border guard in 2007 
the annual programming allocated €11 million in total for a two year period through an 
EUBAM programme. Then in 2008, €10 million was allocated in order to bring the 
border guards and the asylum system fully in line with European standards according to 
country strategy paper 2007-2013 through ‘Improving Border and Migration 
Management in the Republic of Moldova’-programme. In total the EU allocated to the 
border management sector over the years €160 million. 142 
  
The EU has also supported border guard capacity building through projects which are 
implemented by international implementation partners. The IOM and UNDP have been 
the main partners. IOM implemented programmes such as the €1.1 million project 
funded by Tacis and co-funded by IOM to improve training toward the European 
standards. In addition, ‘Capacity Building and Technical Cooperation’ project was 
carried out with a €900,000 contribution from the EU and was implemented by the IOM 
(European Commission 2007e). The UNDP project Bommoluk received €3 million to 
implement ‘improvement of Border Controls at the Republic of Moldova-Ukraine 
border’ from 2006-2008 and received additional funding of €6.6 million allocated until 
2012.
143
 The UNDP has also been working since 2004 to enhance border control 
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through ‘Enhancing Border Control Management Programme’ with equipment and 
training fully funded by a Tacis project worth €1.85 million (Dubikaitis et al. 2005).  
Despite financial and project based assistance the EU has also sought to influence 
through specialised agencies that were originally dealing with the candidate states but 
which have, since the launch of the ENP, also been available to the ENP countries. 
They have started supporting border guard reform in Moldova since 2008. One agency 
with a particular role in the border management sector is FRONTEX. Cooperation 
between FRONTEX and the Moldovan Border Guard Service has been taking place 
since August 2008 when a working arrangement was signed. It enables the Moldovan 
Border Guard Service to benefit from FRONTEX training tools, all funded by 
FRONTEX, such as the Common Core Curriculum
144
 used for basic border guard and 
forgery detection training. FRONTEX also finances Moldova's participation in 
information exchange, risk analysis and other training activities (FRONTEX News 
12/08/2008). In 2009 it trained 400 border guards (European Commission 2010b) and 
launched on 1 September 2010 training in accordance with FRONTEX’s Common 
Curriculum.  In addition, four TAIEX events have organised training for border guards 
focusing on document security since 2010.
145
  
In sum, the EU has influenced in the sector through conditionality for visa facilitation 
since 2009, through financial assistance since 2000 and to a lesser extent through 
FRONTEX (2008) and TAIEX workshops (2010).  
6.2.2 Domestic Conditions and Costs 
The Border Guard Department became independent already in 2000 through being 
removed from the Ministry of State Security and becoming directly controlled by the 
government (Dubikaitis et al. 2005). When the EU requested border guard reform, in 
the 2005 action plan, the border guard system was based on the law ‘Concept of State 
Border Guarding of the Republic of Moldova’ (Nr. 479-XV) (Official Monitor 2004) 
which was a component of national security. The status of personnel was regulated by a 
law ‘on the Military’s Status’ (Law No. 162- XVI) and on the law on ‘Preparation of 
Citizens for Defending the Homeland’ (No.1245-XV) (Government Decision No. 1212, 
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27/12/2002) meaning that both the agency and staff were still having a militarised status 
prepared for defence rather than facilitating mobility.  
 
Under these starting conditions, political costs for border guard reform were high as the 
elite could not agree whether to include the border guard unit as an autonomous 
institution within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) or not (Litra 2011). The 
dilemma was that the MIA was under-reformed and could therefore reduce the speed of 
the reform process of the border guard service but if it were to be included it would give 
the service penal prosecution competence which was also a necessary requirement of 
reform (Litra 2011). 
At the implementation level Moldova needed to train staff to a high standard rather than 
rely on conscripts which meant continuous and high economic costs. There were 
approximately 6,000 border guards in Moldova of which 50 per cent needed to become 
professional border guards (Sushko et al. 2005). Furthermore, economic costs would 
occur from the salaries of the staff employed when the conscripts were replaced by 
hired officers (Dubikaitis et al. 2005). Therefore, costs at the legislative level and 
implementation level were both high. 
6.2.3 Macro and Micro Level External Pressures  
In addition to EU conditionality, socialisation and capacity building techniques, 
international actors have also been involved in the enhancement of border management 
in Moldova but only on the basis of financial and capacity building assistance and 
without external pressure or conditional incentives.  
NATO also included the task of reforming the border guards into a law enforcement 
agency in the IPAP section 2.7. However, its conditionality has not had a great impact 
on Moldova because Moldova has maintained that ‘the Republic of Moldova does not 
pursue the objective of NATO membership through the implementation of IPAP’ 
(NATO 2006). Therefore, only the international organisations’ capacity and financial 
assistance tools could have been explanatory factors for change in Moldova. The main 
organisations have been the IOM and the OSCE. 
The IOM started its cooperation with the EU already in 2003 on a two year project, 
which focused on capacity building and assisting adherence to the EU standards. It used 
best practice European expertise to design and carry out training courses for about 150 
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Moldovan border guard officers which was part delivered by invited experts
146
. They 
also compiled legislative acts into the first ever pilot hand book and provided training in 
the use of equipment and shared knowledge on converting to a European standards 
control system.  
Apart from being an implementation partner for some EU funded projects, the OSCE 
has also provided training in its own projects such as a training programme organised 
for Moldovan officials in March 2011 in Dushanbe. In addition, an announcement was 
made in December 2011 about training courses which are initiated by the OSCE and 
will start taking place from 1
st
 March 2012 onwards (Border Guard Service News 
28/12/2011).  
In sum, NATO has not been able to use conditionality in Moldova as the official stand 
has remained not to pursue NATO membership. The international organisations that are 
focusing on border guard reform have mostly been acting in cooperation with EU 
funding and focused on border guard training in cooperation with a multiple of actors 
through EU funded programmes and only a few programmes were conducted 
independently. Financially the only other external donor according to NIP 2007-2013 
matrix for border management is the US.
147
  
 
6.2.4 Process and Current Status of Formal and Behavioural Compliance 
The original legislative base for border guards was created in 1994 by adopting the Law 
on the State Border (Law 108-XIII). It dictated that the border guard service was to be 
subordinated into the Ministry of State Security and described the use of military troops 
for the state border surveillance and control.
148
 In 1999 the border forces were 
transformed into the Department of Border Forces, however, they were not 
demilitarised as the border guard staff was regulated by Law No.1245-XV (18/07/2002) 
‘On Preparation of Citizens for Defending the Homeland’. The first stages towards 
demilitarisation were taken when the Parliament of Moldova adopted the ‘Concept of 
the State Border Guard’ on 4 December 2003 (Law 479-XV) which created objectives 
for its transformation from 2003 until 2007.  The Concept’s implementation envisaged 
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the development of the system for border guards and the preparation of a draft law on 
the State Border Guard Service, which would fulfil the goals of becoming a law 
enforcement agency and demilitarisation of the border guards (Dubikaitis et al. 2005). It 
also noted that investigatory powers for border guards, that a law in 2001 had annulled, 
should be restored (Dubikaitis et al. 2005). 
 
When the law ‘On the Border Guard Service’ (No 162-XVI) was adopted by the 
parliament on 13 July 2007 and came into force on 5 October 2007 (Government of 
Moldova 2008) it defined the border guard service as a law enforcement agency. While 
this law made the agency partly compliant with the EU standards, it did not grant it 
investigatory powers. Just when decision no.1212 from 27 December 2010 on the 
‘National Strategy on Integrated State Border Management for 2011-2013’ was 
approved did it acknowledge that in order to comply with the EU law the ‘Law on 
Border Guard Service’ (No.162- XVI) would be amended to invest the border guard 
service with new powers such as the judicial expertise of travel documents and criminal 
investigation (Border Guard Service-Moldova 2010).  
 
The envisaged amendment took place on 28 December 2011 when the Moldovan 
parliament adopted the Law on Border Police. It also maintained that border police 
powers will be extended and that in doing so it addresses the key aspects of the 
fulfilment of the action plan on visa liberalisation (MBGS News 28/12/2011).  It also 
stated that border police officers will have the same criminal investigative rights as the 
Ministry of Interior, Customs or the Centre for Combating Economic Crimes and 
Corruption (CCECC) (European Commission 2012). Therefore, border guard reform at 
the legislative level complied with the EU standards in December 2011 and it is 
expected to be in force in July 2012 (MBGS News 28/12/2011). 
 
At the practical application level, as the new law took place just recently it is not 
possible to assess its practical application and it is yet to be seen how it performs. 
However, in regard to phasing out of conscripts, work began in 2005 and aimed for 
completion within two years in the EU/UNDP supported programme but has not yet 
fully been completed (2011).   
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6.2.5 Conditions for (non)Compliance 
6.2.5.1 Formal Compliance 
Demilitarisation of the border guard system, granting of new powers and inclusion 
under the Ministry of Interior between 2007 and the end of 2011 were adopted into law 
and therefore the recommendation of reforming border guard complies fully at the 
formal level with the EU standards.   
At the time of compliance the country-level conditions of strength of EU membership 
prospect had increased and EU integration expectations were at their height especially 
with the new government. Identification with the EU was at the time medium as it still 
formed its decision on the basis of needs rather than being loyal to a particular 
aspiration group. The issue-specific conditionality was high as the possibility for visa 
free travel became an incentive since 2010, including a visa liberalisation plan. The 
adoption of the new law was not economically costly even if political costs were high in 
regard to restructuring of the institutions. With the help of EUBAM, which was active 
since 2005, FRONTEX since 2008 and since 2003 international organisation’s 
involvement compliance took place even under low legitimacy and high costs at the 
political levels. Because EU assistance had been in place together with the international 
organisations already since early 2000, the motivated government aiming for EU 
integration and also the visa liberalisation incentive triggered compliance with the EU 
standards.  The rationalist logic can best explain compliance in this case.  
6.2.5.2 Behavioural Compliance 
  Partial compliance in regard to organising training and phasing-out of conscripts has 
taken place since 2005, however, it is not yet fully completed. The conditions were the 
same as for formal compliance, however, in 2005 EU membership was not yet 
enthusiastically pursued under the Communist government and high economic costs 
were also present. Since 2007 training has taken place in a border guard training centre. 
High implementation costs have not stopped the process but have delayed it (European 
Commission 2009).  Conscripts are reduced every year but due to a lack of financial 
resources they are only replaced in a ratio of one to one (UNDP 2005).  Furthermore, 
the passing on training and experiences is complicated because it is difficult to motivate 
the staff to engage in new responsibilities when the average wage is €300 per month for 
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civil servants.
149
 Despite this Moldova has demonstrated its commitment to the 
continuation of the process by committing itself to the adoption of National Integrated 
Border Management Strategy which was a clear sign that the introduction of EU 
standards in border management is an important priority according to Head of EUBAM,  
Udo Burkholder (EUBAM News 15/11/2010). 
Thus, at the implementation level the high costs and lack of knowledge being passed on 
stopped timely compliance in training.
150
 The solution would require further support for 
capacity as well as government commitment to the engagement motivation of the lower 
level staff that are responsible for the retention of knowledge by allocation of funds for 
the department and staff wages.  
Table 6.1 Conditions for (non)Compliance: Border Guard Reform in Moldova 
*Low cost marked + (referring to a favourable element for compliance and vv). 
6.3 Readmission Agreement 
Out of the total population of 4.2 million people, the Bureau of Statistics in Moldova 
estimates that there are around 600,000-1 million Moldovans abroad, while independent 
studies show that as many as 25 per cent of the economically active population works 
overseas (IOM 2008b). Of this amount only 80,000 are staying in the countries legally 
(Sander et al. 2005). Most common destinations for illegal migrants from Moldova are 
Russia, Ukraine and in the EU, Romania, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain (Jaroszewiz 
2011).  Moldova is also a country of origin of illegal migration and a country of transit. 
Most transit migrants are from the former Soviet Union territories (Rettman 2011). As 
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part of the EU’s strategy to fight against illegal immigration and also share the 
responsibility for it, the readmission agreement was first mentioned in the case of 
Moldova in Article 26 of the PCA: ‘The Cooperation Council shall examine which joint 
efforts can be made to control illegal immigration, taking into account the principle and 
practice of readmission’ (European Commission 1994:17). This section traces 
compliance with ratification of the readmission agreement and its practical application.  
6.2.1 EU Conditionality, Assistance and Capacity and Technical Support 
Even though the EU had already brought the readmission agreement into discussions in 
1999 there were no developments in regard to it before the ENP was launched and when 
the action plan was negotiated. Visa facilitation was not mentioned in the action plan as 
an incentive for readmission agreement, however, the opportunity for visa facilitation 
was already clear to Moldova since June 2006 when President Voronin had a meeting 
on June 21-22 in Brussels with Franco Frattini, Vice-President and Commissioner for 
Freedom, Security and Justice and Commission officials, which resulted in the 
opportunity to open a readmission agreement for Moldova (Söderköping Process News 
19/12/2006).  Moldova also knew that it would have the incentive as the officials were 
already proactively following Western Balkan countries’ road maps as models and were 
preparing for the readmission agreement before it was even set as an option for them as 
they knew what to expect from the EU.
151
 In addition, at this time the EU had started to 
treat readmission and visa facilitation as ‘a package deal’ and they were negotiated 
together right from the start (Kruse and Trauner 2008). In 2009 the implementation of 
the readmission agreement was also set as a precondition for the start of negotiations on 
visa free travel (Söderköping News 17/12/2009). The visa liberalisation action plan 
maintains that implementing readmission is an ‘underlying condition for the 
continuation of the visa dialogue and is of paramount importance for the establishment 
of a sustainable visa-free regime’ (European Commission 2010c: 2).  Therefore, while 
incentives did not exist before 2006, since 2006 they were high for approximation of the 
agreement and since 2010 for its implementation.  
 
EU financial assistance in readmission issues has been project-based with international 
organisations acting as the implementation agencies. The projects have been addressing 
the consequences of the readmission agreement concerning own citizens, stateless and 
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third country citizens. From 2005 onwards the Migramol Project, implemented by IOM 
with Tacis funding of €700,000, established temporary accommodation centres for 
migrants. Following this a three year project from the beginning of 2006 until the end of 
2008 called ‘Consolidation of Migration Management in Moldova and Belarus’ 
(Migramol-Migrabel) donated a total of €755,000 to build capacity for protection of 
irregular migrants. In addition, a thematic programme amounting to €7 million in total 
was also allocated for Ukraine, Moldova and Russia to support the ‘implementation of 
readmission and visa facilitation agreements signed with eastern European countries’ 
(IOM 2006). While no assistance was made available by the EU between the years 2008 
- 2010 in the readmission sector, in July 2011 SIREADA ‘Implementation of EC 
Readmission Agreements’ project was launched with IOM support. It focused on 
voluntary return and reintegration for two years with a total of €467,652 funded partly 
by the EU and the Austrian Development Agency (ICMPD). It was the first project 
addressing reintegration needs as before project funding had been focusing on the transit 
migrants. Thus, on average Moldova was benefitting from €4.4 million assistance in the 
readmission related sector. In comparison to other issue areas it is rather low as the 
border management area benefited from €37 million, asylum sector from €8.2 million 
and counter trafficking from €3.4 million. 
 
In addition to rather small financial assistance allocated to the sector by the EU, there 
have been no TAIEX events in regard to readmission agreement implementation.
152
 
Twinning cooperation did not either take place.  
 
In sum, the EU’s main tool was the visa facilitation incentive to encourage the adoption 
of the readmission agreement and financial assistance to address the implementation 
aspect of readmission in absence of other types of governance tools.  
6.2.2 Macro and Micro Level External Pressures 
The EU has been the only actor offering conditional incentives to facilitate Moldova’s 
commitment to the readmission agreement. However, as in the case of Georgia, because 
the Russian visa facilitation agreement has been in force before the Moldovan 
agreement those who lived in Transnistria and had Russian passports (70 per cent of 
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population) had an advantage over the population of the west side of the river to have 
easier access to the EU (EU-Moldova Parliamentary Cooperation Committee 2011). 
This scenario could be a factor in maintaining the frozen conflict rather than supporting 
a resolution, which is mainly surviving due to the fact that the Moldovan side has not 
been attractive to Transnistrians in the first place (Popescu 2005). Consequently, in 
order not to continue to do this, the conclusion of the visa facilitation agreement with 
the EU was especially important to Moldova. 
 
Besides EU efforts and external pressures at the domestic level the consequences of the 
agreement have not benefited from international organisations involvement except that 
REVIS Project has been supported by the IOM and ICMPD as implementation and 
funding partners respectively. 
6.2.3 Domestic Conditions and Costs 
As in the case of Georgia, political adoption costs were low as readmission was 
unilaterally agreed upon as it was felt that it was the only way to guarantee visa 
facilitation.
 153
 Furthermore, after 2008 and when the political change was taking place 
in Moldova the new leadership saw that visa facilitation was the most important step for 
the country to get closer to the EU.
154
  The costs are medium for implementation of 
readmission concerning third country nationals, as Moldova is not, to a large degree, a 
transit country (Calun 2007), however, on the ground the allocation of space for 
accommodation centres, reintegration programmes and voluntary return programmes 
demand continuous economic costs and use of resources.
155
 
 
With reference to own nationals the economic costs of readmission are the highest of 
the three countries. Moldova has 25 per cent of its population outside its borders. This 
would first of all mean strong pressure for a country where unemployment is high and, 
secondly, it would be highly influencing the wellbeing of many Moldovans as it is one 
of the countries with the highest dependency on remittances with 87 per cent of the 
remittances coming from Europe (UNDP 2009). With remittances from migrants 
estimated at up to 30 per cent of GDP ($1.8 billion) they constitute a major source of 
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income for the people whose relatives have left Moldova and in general for the national 
economy (IOM 2008b).  
6.2.4 Process and Current Status of Formal and Behavioural Compliance 
The negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission started in February 2007 and after 
eight months of negotiations the EU signed on 10 October 2007 visa facilitation and 
readmission agreements with Moldova, with both agreements entering into force on 1 
January 2008 (Kruse and Trauner 2008). The readmission agreement clause on return of 
third country nationals entered into force in November 2009 (European Commission 
2010b) and the request can be considered to be complied with at the formal level.  
 
Moldova has already concluded implementation protocols with a large number of EU 
member states and also engaged in negotiations for future conclusions (European 
Commission 2011b:5). It has also started completing readmission agreements with 
countries beyond the EU to facilitate return. Russia, Bosnia and Montenegro are in the 
process of completion and Serbia has already been completed (European Commission 
2011b:5). A detention centre opened in 2009 after legislation approved accommodation 
for irregular migrants (European Commission 2009). In 2010 illegal nationals were 
placed in the centre and in 2011 the Commission progress report found the situation 
progress to be positive (European Commission 2011b). In 2008 the Moldovan 
government passed the national return plan for reintegration of returning migrants and 
already 350 migrants have been helped so far. In sum, implementation has been 
complaint at all the four levels. Therefore, addressing the implementation level and 
practical consequences of the agreement can be considered to have taken place since 
2009 and is compliant with the EU action plan request.  
6.3.5 Conditions and Logic for (non)Compliance 
6.3.5.1 Formal Compliance 
The readmission agreement was signed under country-specific conditions of high 
strength of membership prospect and medium identification and at the issue-specific 
levels under high benefits since 2006. Other present conditions included low costs for 
formal compliance, low legitimacy and low external involvement until 2010 and 
external pressure from the necessity of having visa facilitation to counterbalance 
Russia’s visa facilitation agreement. Therefore, the favourable conditions present were 
the visa facilitation incentive and membership prospect when compliance took place. 
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Lack of legitimacy of the demand and low support for implementation did not prevent 
compliance.  
 
The high strength of the EU membership prospect was not enough to encourage change 
on its own as it had already before been present and therefore the EU’s incentive of visa 
facilitation holds importance as an explanatory factor for compliance. However, it is 
also unlikely that visa facilitation would have been enough to elicit influence on its own 
as previously visa facilitation had not been a strong enough incentive when the 
Mediterranean states of the ENP, which do not have even the slightest membership 
prospect or identity with the EU, had not managed to conclude a deal with the EU.  
 
Thus, it indicates that the combination of the importance of European integration 
expectations and visa facilitation were in conjunction able to overcome the prohibitive 
associated costs. This case demonstrates the EU’s successful role in a country which has 
an expectation of their membership accession and a recipient of a short term clear 
incentive and is best explained by a rationalist logic. 
6.3.5.2 Behavioural Compliance 
The readmission agreement came into force in 2008 and meant that from then onwards 
Moldova was responsible for its implementation. The conditions from the time when the 
agreement was signed changed when the new government emerged in 2008 and 
announced their priority to be European integration which was backed up by a 
consensus to pursue it. Also, a large range of support programmes were initiated at the 
end of 2009 toward supporting implementation of the agreement with the help of 
implementation agencies.  Economic costs increased as the tasks created continuous 
costs. 
The favourable conditions were membership belief, medium level identification, high 
incentives, as the visa liberalisation goal was also launched in 2009. Also EU technical 
assistance was available on the ground to support the human rights aspect of the 
implementation. The lack of EU agencies or international organisations and low 
legitimacy of the request did not prevent it.  
All of the four conditions studied at the implementation level were fulfilled: signing 
implementation protocols, temporary accommodation centre, reintegration programmes, 
bilateral readmission agreements, even if two of them were reflecting more the EU 
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interest and the two latter were only also beneficial to Moldova itself. The reason for 
partial compliance depended from the political willingness which could have risen from 
the high expectations for EU membership but also lower costs than in larger countries. 
When comparing Moldovan experiences to Ukraine, which also had a clear incentive 
for visa liberalisation, it was found that the factors which were beneficial for Ukraine 
itself were only complied with whereas Moldova complied with all of the 
recommendations.  This case is therefore explained best by the rationalist logic.  
Table: 6.2 Conditions for (non)Compliance - Readmission in Moldova 
*Low cost marked + (referring to a favourable element for compliance and vv). 
6.4 Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees 
Moldova is mainly a transit country and to a very small degree also a country of 
destination for asylum seekers. Most asylum seekers originate from Turkey, Jordan, 
Sudan, Armenia and Lebanon even if there are applications from over 30 countries 
(UNHCR 2011b). The transit refugees come from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, the 
Middle East, and from African countries.
156
 On average Moldova receives 80-100 
asylum applications annually and in 2011 there were 148 refugees and 81 asylum 
seekers in Moldova (UNHCR 2011b).   
The first time the EU became involved in the asylum sector was when it launched the 
ENP as neither the PCA nor any other cooperation document made reference to asylum 
issues in Moldova prior to this. The main challenges at that time were weak socio-
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economic rights of refugees, local integration opportunities (ECRE 2008) and very slow 
progress with the implementation of refugee law (ECRE 2006). Especially access to 
interpreters and a free legal service, lack of provision for housing and integration into 
the labour market were recognised (ECRE 2008). Moreover, there was evidence of low 
recognition rates of asylum determination claims and lack of training among officials 
who come into contact with asylum seekers (ECRE 2008). 
Consequently, the action plan objectives included in the asylum and refugee sector 
(section 46) are implementation of Moldova's National Action Programme on Migration 
and Asylum Issues; approximation of Moldovan legislation to the EU norms and 
standards; implementation of the 1951 UN Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to 
the status of refugees, including the right to seek asylum and respect for the principle of 
non-refoulement (European Commission 2005). In addition, it requested the 
approximation of state authorities responsible for realisation and implementation of 
legislation on asylum and refugees to EU norms and standards (European Commission 
2005).   
This section assesses the formal and behavioural compliance with the asylum protection 
issues and considers them to be compliant when Moldova has incorporated into its 
national legislation opportunities for protection beyond the refugee status i.e. subsidiary 
or complementary protection, the principle of non-refoulement and minimum standards 
for protection on the ground, including accommodation, education, opportunities for 
integration and travel documentation and when it implements them accordingly.   
6.4.1 EU Conditionality, Assistance and Capacity and Technical Support 
As in the case of Georgia, the EU recommended approximation of Moldova’s asylum 
system with its own and international standards in its action plan even if its acquis also 
has sections on asylum protection. The action plan did not mention conditional 
incentives, however, the common approach for visa facilitation in 2005 also outlined the 
asylum sector in the list of issues which it considered before opening up visa facilitation 
negotiations with the third countries. Otherwise there were no clear incentives set in any 
documentation between the EU and Moldova. Therefore, EU conditionality was low 
until 2005, medium until 2010 and high from 2010 onwards when the visa liberalisation 
action plan again maintained that visa free travel would only be possible upon 
strengthening asylum policy.   
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Moldova did not receive financial assistance from the EU for the asylum sector before 
2004 as evidenced in the 2002-2006 NIP and programming documents.
 157
 Financial 
assistance for asylum related issues was made available as stated in the Country 
Strategy Paper 2004-2006 and the indicative programme for 2005-2006 and since 
Aeneas.
 158
  It was delivered through the thematic instrument Aeneas before the ENPI. 
The funding was project-based and projects were implemented by international 
organisations. Five projects took place in total from 2005-2007 before the ENPI, which 
were mostly multi-country programmes with Moldova being one of the beneficiaries.  
The first project was directed towards Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia, called the 
‘Protection of Refugee Asylum Seekers and Forced Migrants’ and was supported with 
an EU contribution of €529,705 and which used ECRE as an implementation partner 
from 10 December 2005 for three years. The second programme ‘Strengthening Asylum 
Systems in Ukraine and Moldova’ saw the EU contributing to basic needs such as 
accommodation and health care for irregular immigrants with a total budget of €1.6 
million and was implemented between April 2004 and November 2005. Thirdly, in 
2005 Tacis provided €700,000 for a Migramol Project implemented by the IOM to 
establish a temporary accommodation centre for migrants in Moldova. Fourthly, in 2006 
asylum protection also benefitted from €500,000 funding through an Aeneas project 
directly in Moldova with implementation partners being Save the Children, Migration 
and Asylum Bureau, the UNHCR Moldova, Charity Centre for Refugees and Society 
for Refugees. Lastly, the ECRE, the IOM and the ICMPD have acted as implementation 
partners with the EU funded programmes in ‘Protection of Refugees Asylum Seekers 
and Forced Migrants’ which was implemented between 2005-2009, with an EU 
contribution of €705,311. In total the financial allocation was around €6 million before 
the ENPI launch.  
After the ENPI, from 2009 onward a project called ‘Monitoring Safe and Dignified 
Return and Conditions of Detention: Protecting the Rights of Asylum Seekers, Refugees 
and IDPs in Belarus, Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine’ was launched with 
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€647.381.98 funding and ECRE as an implementation partner.159 In neither 2010 nor 
2011 did the asylum sector receive financial assistance under either the ENPI or 
thematic section. Therefore, the total amount of financial assistance was approximately 
€8.2 million and in comparison to other areas in Moldova asylum has received more 
than readmission or human trafficking but less than border management. 
 
Besides financial assistance the EU agencies were also involved directly since 2009 in 
facilitating technical and capacity assistance operated through its own regional 
protection programme, TAIEX and Twinning programmes and its agencies of 
FRONTEX and Europol. The EU initiated a Regional Protection Programme (RRP) in 
Moldova on 16 September 2009 and allocated €400,000, which was intended to 
increase the capacity of authorities and the civil society to strengthen access of persons 
in need of protection. It has been implemented with the help of UNCHR. The EU 
projects under TAIEX in the area of asylum have taken place just since 2009. Two 
expert missions and one study visit on the reception of refugees and integration of 
refugees have been organised so far.
160
 Twinning has also contributed with two 
programmes in the asylum field called ‘Enhancing the Asylum Conditions and 
International Protection in the Republic of Moldova’ from 2008 until 2011 and ‘Local 
Integration of Refugees in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine’ (Andrysek and Rantala 
2008). The EU’s direct influence through its agencies such as FRONTEX and Europol 
is limited in the area of asylum and refugee protection as their role has focused mostly 
on the prevention of illegal immigration even if they also contribute to information 
exchange, capacity building and training on border practices. 
In sum, EU conditionality was low before 2005, medium until 2010 and high since then. 
EU financial assistance was allocated to Moldova since 2004 and EU agency 
involvement took place just after 2009 and therefore conditionality and financial 
assistance were the main tools for the EU to exercise influence. 
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6.4.2 Macro and Micro Level External Pressures 
Even if the EU was the only actor able to use incentives in Moldova in regard to asylum 
sector reform recommendations, many other actors are also cooperating on the EU 
funded projects. The UNHCR, the IOM, the ECRE and local NGOs have an important 
role both at the legal approximation level and implementing asylum protection 
according to international standards in joint cooperation projects.  
The UNHCR has the most active role in asylum protection in Moldova. In addition to 
implementing the EU regional protection programme, it has since 2003 also been 
responsible for producing statistics about refugees and asylum seekers until Moldovan 
officials took over (UNHCR 2011c). It assisted, together with the civil society, the 
elaboration of a law on asylum, which was adopted in December 2008 (UNHCR 
2011c). In addition, it has committed to monitoring that asylum seekers have access to 
asylum procedures since UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Border Guard, Bureau for Migration and Asylum and the Law Centre for Advocates-
NGO for joint protection monitoring.  
 
Moldovan and international NGOs have got involved in supporting refugee conditions 
on the ground through implementing the ‘Monitoring Safe and Dignified Return and 
Conditions of Detention’ which employs ECRE and ten NGO partners from Belarus, 
Moldova, Ukraine and Russia and is funded by ENP Migration Thematic programme 
for 2009 and 2010. 
6.4.3 Domestic Conditions and Costs 
The domestic costs for legal approximation in Moldova were low as the asylum 
protection law did not require complex institutional changes but rather just passing a 
law addressing a wider scope of protection. It did not challenge the stability of the state 
as there was a consensus between the officials for asylum sector improvement.  Among 
officials it was perceived that if the EU suggested something in regard to asylum sector 
to Moldova it was felt that it was a good idea and no controversial view was taken.
 161
 In 
addition, the security environment for refugees and asylum-seekers is favourable in 
Moldova (UNHCR 2011c) and therefore does not cause extra pressure on the 
government to address consequences at the population level.  
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The implementation costs are medium. Moldova is not a primary country for transit for 
asylum seekers and as mentioned above since 2003 only 80 to 100 persons have applied 
for asylum annually (ECRE Annual Report 2007). However, since the readmission 
agreement came into force it could potentially increase numbers of asylum seeker 
applications in Moldova (Kruse and Trauner 2008). This meant that more resources and 
more staff were required which were capable to deal with applications and integration 
possibilities.
162
  
6.4.4 Process and Current Status of Formal and Behavioural Compliance 
Moldova started the development of its asylum system very late; it did not have any 
official system for dealing with refugees before 1999 (Jandle 2003). Moldova entered 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol just on 1 
May 2002 and 31 January 2003 respectively (ECRP 2009). It also took until 10 May 
2001 before the first draft on ‘Law on Refugees’ was examined and approved by the 
Parliament in its first reading.  On 25 July 2002 the parliament of Moldova adopted the 
‘Law on Refugee Status’ which entered into force on 1 January 2003 and it was just 
considered to be better than no law at all as, for instance, it did not make reference to 
humanitarian protection or the issue of non-refoulement.
163
  
 
However, some provisions were subsequently set to address the conditions of refugee 
protection. Government decision no. 71 on 30 January 2004 decided on the creation of 
an accommodation centre. In 2005 humanitarian protection, which is a complementary 
form of protection, was introduced in the national legislation (UNHCR 2011). Then on 
28 June 2005 the Moldovan government passed a resolution on refugee documentation 
which required issuance of identity cards to refugees and their children for a period of 
five years and travel documents for one year to those with humanitarian protection 
status (ECRE 2006). 
 
Just in 2008, when the new law no. 270-XVI replaced the ‘Law on Refugee Status’ 
from 2003 was Moldova satisfying most of the EU and international standards. The law 
no. 270-XVI provided for access for asylum and in article one also for protection 
beyond refugee status in the form of humanitarian and temporary protection and 
political asylum. In addition it provided for laying the minimum standards for the 
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reception of asylum seekers, however, non-refoulement was not totally up to EU 
standards. 
Firstly, the wording was similar in terms of humanitarian and temporary protection to 
that which was also in the EU acquis:  
‘humanitarian protection is a form of protection, recognised by the Republic of 
Moldova, granted to a foreigner or a stateless person for other reasons than the 
ones provided for by the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951’.  
The temporary protection in Article 1 maintained that it applies: 
‘in the event of a mass and spontaneous influx of displaced persons who are 
unable to return to their country of origin, immediate and temporary protection 
to such persons, if there is a risk that the asylum system will be unable to 
process that influx without adverse effects for its efficient operation, in the 
interest of the persons concerned and other persons in need of protection’.  
Secondly, article 11 covered the principle of non-refoulement, however, it is still 
lacking at the legislative level and further amendments are required as it currently 
permits ‘refoulement or exclusion of persons on broader grounds than the 1951 
Convention allows’ (UNHCR 2011:3).  
Thirdly, in regard to minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, the second 
visa free travel progress report found that the new law on asylum is in accordance with 
the Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003. 
At the practical level only partial compliance has taken place. Firstly, asylum seekers 
have been granted access to Refugee Status Determination (RSD) procedures and 
therefore is compliant (UNHCR 2011a). Secondly, respect for the principle of non-
refoulement was suffering because of the quality of RSD interviews and assessment 
limitations, for example, UNHCR found that some assessments lacked structural logic 
and an evaluation of credibility (UNHCR 2011a). There is a lack of translators which 
makes determination difficult.
164
 Therefore, non-refoulement in practice still needs to be 
enforced (UNHCR 2011a). Thirdly, detention centres are working well and most of the 
refugees and asylum seekers live in the accommodation centre outside the city centre 
(UNHCR 2011b). The first one opened in 2005 (ECRE 2006) with the help of UNHCR 
and the EU Tacis programme. The second refugee centre opened in 2007 and according 
to the UNHCR report, since the upgrading of the accommodation centre in 2010, meets 
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the needs of accommodation in Moldova according to international standards and 
therefore can be considered compliant (UNHCR 2011b). However, opportunities for 
integration face challenges at some levels. While access to healthcare and schooling is 
provided,
165
 employment possibilities remain limited because unemployment is also a 
problem for Moldovans
166
 and the language barrier further prevents opportunities to 
find employment (UNHCR 2011b).  
6.4.6 Conditions and Logic for (non)Compliance 
6.4.6.1 Formal Compliance 
Moldova complied with the EU asylum protection standards between 2004 and 2008 
through adding temporary accommodation facilities into legislation in 2004 and 
adopting a new law (270) which recognised subsidiary and temporary protection in 
legislation in 2008. Moldova was then largely in line with the international regulations 
apart from the principle of non-refoulement. 
The favourable conditions for compliance at the formal level were medium/high 
membership perspective and medium identification with the EU, financial support, 
legitimacy, other organisations’ involvement and low costs.  The reform had already 
taken place in regard to the accommodation centre before the EU expressed its concern.  
As the EU did not offer any direct conditionality yet in 2005 and as the assistance was 
focused on implementation and technical cooperation starting just in 2008 (de Wekker 
and Niemann 2009) the only favourable conditions were a macro level condition of 
membership belief, medium identification and external influence by the IOs. The issues 
of asylum protection had already been long on the agenda of UNHCR even before the 
EU had become involved. Moldova asked UNHCR to help it to introduce an asylum 
system in 1997 (UNHCR 2004) and in fact were in the process of assisting in the 
drafting of law, which demonstrates that achieving formal compliance was helped with 
UNHCR support rather than EU influence. 
  
While non-refoulement is not yet complied with, the government promised that it will 
comply with it in conjunction with adopting other EU visa liberalisation issues. It 
demonstrates that the visa liberalisation incentive has been able to trigger compliance 
with a more complex issue which was not previously complied with. Issues that were 
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more technical and where there were international organisations involved were 
successful even without the incentive.  Thus, formal compliance can be explained by 
international assistance and low costs.  
6.4.6.2 Behavioural Compliance 
At the practical level progress took place in regard to travel documentation in 2007 and 
the elevation of the accommodation centre to international standards in 2010.  However, 
non-refoulement and local integration is still lacking.  
Other conditions were the same except that Moldova also benefited from financial and 
technical assistance and in 2010 visa facilitation was expressed for the first time in 
connection with asylum system enhancement. Also, the costs were higher for 
implementation.  
Implementation only took place in cases where there was assistance available and issues 
were less complex. The accommodation centre was to a large extent financed and 
created through international implementation agencies and EU funding. The experiences 
from the centre’s functioning are very positive on the ground.167 Moldova takes asylum 
system reform issues seriously and the areas where it had the needed support prevailed. 
An expert who had visited the accommodation centre told that ‘It is in a perfect 
condition, the staff are very proud of it and everything works successfully’. 168  
The implementation of the non-refoulement clause fell short due to lack of capacity. 
There was not enough expertise to carry out determination procedures and also due to 
language difficulties they were not always addressed adequately.
169 
In addition, local 
integration and employment were difficult to organise when the country itself suffers 
from unemployment and housing issues due to lack of resources.
170
  
While behavioural compliance was lacking overall the achievements demonstrate 
Moldova’s willingness to address the issues.  Moldova demonstrated commitment for 
reform and as an interviewee argued the attitude in Moldova was that ‘if we do this we 
will get benefits from the EU’ 171. In comparison, interviewee suggested that Ukraine 
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was expecting to have the benefits even without compliance.
172
 However, due to lack of 
capacity the international organisations and the EU still end up doing the things for 
Moldova which it should do for itself
173
. The accommodation centre was funded by the 
EU and UNHCR has been addressing the non-refoulement issue by organising study 
trips to help to develop protection sensitive entry system in regard to reception of 
asylum seekers (European Commission 2012). In sum the EU’s influence in the asylum 
sector was low before the visa liberation incentive. However, at the behavioral level it 
has contributed to capacity building.The case however demonstrated that there was a  
domestic drive for change as Moldova had committed to pursuing EU membership in 
the future and tried to achieve compliance at all levels where there was enough 
capability to do so.  
Table 6.3 Conditions for (non)Compliance: Protection of Asylum Seekers and 
Refugees in Moldova 
*Low cost marked + (referring to a favourable element for compliance and vv). 
6.5 Criminalisation, Prosecution and Punishment of Human Trafficking 
Moldova is a major country of origin and transit in trafficking of human beings 
(Busceanu et al. 2009). It has been propelled by its poor economic situation, geographic 
location and corruption, particularly related to the Transnistrian border area.  
International organisations observed, before the EU-Moldova action plan was launched, 
that the Moldovan fight against trafficking was inadequate due to a lack of resources, 
border guard corruption and legislation which did not prohibit trafficking (TIP 2001). 
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At that time the criminal code the law was only in a draft form and it was also reported 
that there were no traffickers sent to jail by 2001 and therefore implementation was 
lacking even if there were cases in the court (TIP 2001).  
 
When the EU action plan was launched, it addressed human trafficking as part of the 
organised crime issues section and drew attention to the ratification of international 
instruments i.e. UN Palermo Protocol; to enhance Moldovan law enforcement 
authorities and implement recommendations in the OSCE action plan to combat 
trafficking, focusing on chapters III, IV and V and national human rights action plan 
provision on trafficking (European Commission 2005).  It also required cooperation 
with law enforcement bodies and support for victims.  Similarly to the Georgian action 
plan it referred to the international legislation of OSCE chapters and also to UN 
convention rather than making reference to the EU standards. 
This section will analyse compliance in regard to convicting and punishing the crime of 
trafficking of human beings. The action plan objective of punishing trafficking is 
considered compliant when criminalisation of trafficking of human beings is set into 
national law and at the implementation level when sentences are carried out.   
6.5.1 EU Conditionality, Assistance and Capacity and Technical Support 
The EU did not mention in its action plan or in any of its EU-Moldova related official 
documents conditional incentives for enhancing the fight against human trafficking. 
When the visa liberalisation plan was initiated in 2010, it included trafficking of human 
beings as one of the issue areas which needed to comply with EU and international 
standards in order to benefit from visa liberalisation and therefore EU incentives can be 
considered high since 2010 and low before then. 
 
EU financial assistance in the sector of trafficking against human beings has been based 
on projects which are implemented by international implementation partners. The first 
form of financial assistance for Moldova was funding in 2002 focusing on the fight 
against human trafficking in women. It donated a grant of €750,000 from August 2002 
until February 2004. It was part of the sector focusing on human rights to raise 
awareness and enhance effectiveness to criminalise and prosecute the trafficking in 
women and encouraging the authorities to provide protection and reintegration 
assistance for the victims (Project number 1923). From August 2005 until December 
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2007 the EU donated €288,880 in the form of technical assistance for the fight against 
human trafficking. From the beginning of 2006 until the end of 2007 the EU also 
focused on the Iasi area of supporting the fight against trafficking with €59,000.  
After the ENPI, Aeneas allocated from the end of 2006 until the end of 2008 to 
Moldova and Ukraine €748,492 with the ILO as an implementation partner in a project 
focusing on the ‘Elimination of Human Trafficking through Labour Market based 
Measures’ (European Commission 2007a). Furthermore, it also, from the end of 2006 
until the end of 2008, donated through Aeneas to Ukraine and Moldova just over €1.7 
million with the IOM as an implementation partner in a project ‘Combating Trafficking 
in Human Beings in Ukraine and Moldova’ (European Commission 2007a). 
Before the ENPI funding had been approximately €1,097,880, after the ENPI funding 
increased and totals approximately €2.4 million. The total allocation of approximately 
€3.4 million in comparison to other issues areas is the lowest amount of financial 
assistance by the EU.   
 
The EU’s direct contribution and involvement in fighting against human trafficking 
started taking place in Moldova just in late 2000 and has been focusing on aspects of 
stopping trafficking at the border rather than the core causes of trafficking and 
prevention of people falling victims
174
. This contribution is through agencies and 
programmes such as FRONTEX and Europol. The role of FRONTEX since 2008 has 
been providing training to border guard authorities, particularly focusing on 
strengthening their capabilities to identify victims of trafficking (FRONTEX News 
27/02/2009). Europol and Moldova signed a cooperation agreement in The Hague, on 
12 February 2007. Cooperation aimed to facilitate information exchange and to create 
for Moldova an opportunity to participate in seminars, training and expert visits of law 
enforcement authorities (European Commission 2011b).  
 
Outside of this the EU’s involvement has been limited.  TAIEX has delivered only two 
seminars and one study visit, focusing on combating human trafficking involving the 
participation of Minister of Internal Affairs since 2008.
175
 The EU has also, just since 
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2011, focused on protection of victims of human trafficking when the mobility 
partnership initiated new projects (European Commission 2011c). 
 
In sum, the EU approach to the fight against human trafficking is more project-based 
and limited to influence through implementation organisations which it has provided 
funding for rather than its own effort going beyond the actions taking place on the 
border. 
6.5.2 Macro and Micro Level External Pressures  
No conditional incentives were given by any other organisations or countries to address 
Moldova’s trafficking issues. Whereas the EU engaged in the human trafficking issues 
just from 2002, international organisations have been supporting the area already before 
then. The US state department has organised projects and financial assistance since 
2000 (USAID 2002), the IOM has provided legal framework recommendations since 
2000 and victim assistance and capacity building,
176
 and the OSCE has provided legal 
expertise on trafficking issues since 2005.
 177
 In addition, international NGOs, especially 
la Strada and also the Swedish Development Agency (SIDA) have had an important role 
in Moldova in the area of trafficking. All main international organisations and NGOs 
that are promoting anti-trafficking in Moldova are focusing on the main three aspects of 
trafficking: prevention, prosecuting and criminalisation, and protection (USAID 
2002:12).  
6.5.3 Domestic Conditions and Costs 
The costs at the legislative level for criminalisation of human trafficking were low as it 
does not require institutional changes but only amendments to existing criminal codes 
which already included human trafficking as an offence since July 2003. At the 
implementation level criminalisation incurs economic costs. The numbers of crimes has 
previously been high in Moldova in comparison to other countries and as per capita it is 
one of the highest trafficking countries in the world (Kontula and Saaristo 2009) costs 
of prosecuting and punishing were high.  
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6.5.4 Process and Current Status of Formal and Behavioural Compliance 
The main developments in the anti-trafficking law took place as a consequence of a 
joint effort by international organisations, Moldova and NGOs from 2001 onwards 
(IOM 2008b).  Moldova did not have any legislation capable of dealing with trafficking 
crimes either for perpetrators or victims still in 2000. At the formal level the two most 
important steps taken in Moldova have been in 2002 when trafficking of human beings 
became criminally punishable by adding it into its criminal code (in article 165) and 
amending it in 2006 (Fomina and Rusu 2006) and when the Law on Preventing and 
Combating Human Trafficking was passed in 2005.
178
 The criminal code imposes 
imprisonment from seven to 15 years and if trafficking leads to ‘serious bodily injury, 
psychological damage or a death punishment is increased to imprisonment for 15 to 25 
years or to life imprisonment’.179 On the basis of the progress reports it can be 
concluded that the legal aspects are in place already since 2005-2006. 
Despite success at approximation levels, both EU progress reports and TIP reports have 
expressed concern over some aspects of punishment in practice. Even if in overall terms 
there are convictions, especially increasingly since 2003 (see table 6.4), the Moldovan 
government made little effort investigating or prosecuting government officials linked 
to trafficking crimes (TIP reports 2004-2010). They also found corrupt judges 
downgrading trafficking charges for lesser penalties (TIP 2005, 2009) and Moldovan 
authorities lagged in the follow-up on cases of alleged complicity of government 
officials in trafficking (TIP Report 2007, 2010). Furthermore, the government has not 
prosecuted or criminally punished any government official allegedly complicit in 
trafficking and it is also failing to give data on convictions (TIP 2010). 
Only on a few occasions have elements of implementation of criminalisation and 
punishment been seen on the ground. In 2006 several officials were dismissed from 
their jobs for assisting a trafficker and his syndicate but they were not convicted (TIP 
2009). During 2008, the government prosecuted one trial court judge and investigated 
another suspected of downgrading the charges in two trafficking cases and imposing on 
the defendants less severe penalties than prescribed by the law (TIP 2007, 2009). The 
TIP reports that their data demonstrate still in 2011 that the government did not take 
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significant efforts to punish government officials complicit in human trafficking and the 
EU progress report also pointed out that Moldova should have made more of an effort in 
tackling organised trafficking networks and activities and substantial capacity-building 
is still needed in all relevant stakeholders including law-enforcement agencies 
(European Commission 2011b) 
Table 6.4 Human Trafficking Convictions and Sentences in Moldova 
 
Source: Author’s constellation of available data from TIP Reports 
6.5.5 Conditions and Logic for (non)Compliance 
6.5.5.1 Formal Compliance 
Compliance at the legislative level took place from 2005 to 2006 under conditions of 
medium levels of membership expectations and identification, low political costs and 
high legitimacy and high attention from International Organisations and NGO. Low EU 
incentives and low EU assistance and involvement from the EU agencies until 2008 did 
not halt compliance.  
While the EU had low potential to directly influence this area and legitimacy was not 
able to explain compliance on its own as it had been present already earlier, the 
explanatory factors for compliance are the many international organisations that since 
2000 had already been involved in assisting Moldovan approximation with the 
international standards in regard to anti-trafficking issues and the fact that it was also a 
legitimate issue. As an interviewee argued, Moldova, at the time, had a bad reputation 
as a country of trafficking
180
 and wanted to demonstrate that it belongs to the 
international community by respecting international human rights through adopting 
legitimate requests.
 181
 However, despite following the EU standards, interviewees also 
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argued that Moldova’s focus was according to international regulations at that time.182 
Moldova has longer established relations with many international organisations working 
in human trafficking related issues whose standards it refers to.
 183
 Therefore, while the 
environment in Moldova of wanting to approximate to international standards in regard 
to trafficking was emerging in 2005 and motivating changes in law, facilitation was due 
to international agencies assistance and their standards, as the perception that authorities 
get from Moldova is that officials doubt whether the EU is even interested in seriously 
promoting the fight against trafficking in Moldova, as it does not itself benefit from 
it.
184
 Therefore, the EU had no influence in promoting legal change in the 
criminalisation of trafficking. 
6.5.5.2 Behavioural Compliance 
Behavioural compliance did not fully take place under the same conditions as at the 
formal level conditions except for higher political and economic costs.  It did not 
improve in 2008 when there was a higher membership belief, identification and when 
the European Alliance coalition pushed out the Communist government and when in 
2010 the visa liberalisation incentive included human trafficking as one of the issues to 
be adhered to.   
Many reasons, which are in essence related to the complexity of the crime, explain the 
lack of implementation i.e. difficulties in interpreting the law, lack of knowledge of 
dealing with trafficking crimes, difficulties in gathering evidence especially if a foreign 
country is involved and establishing what is trafficking from crimes of labour because 
in almost all cases the victims were paid but they received less than promised which 
initially brought up the crime (Fomina 2011).  There were two main reasons for the lack 
of prosecutions: corruption and long sentences for trafficking crimes. First the 
interviewees found system wide corruption as the main problem for completing 
prosecutions and also the fact that after the new government has been replaced it takes 
long time to fight patterns of corruption at the state level.
185
 Secondly, the high 
minimum threshold for trafficking punishments may make prosecutors and criminal 
judges reluctant to prosecute and punish cases of trafficking under article no. 165. For 
example, OSCE demonstrated that one single act of recruiting into prostitution would be 
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punishable with at least seven years of imprisonment, whereas an act of slavery would 
only start from minimum of 3 years of imprisonment up to 10 years (Kartuch et al. 
2003). These harsh minimum sentences for trafficking meant as a consequence that 
judges found it difficult to impose and often ended up giving sentences under other 
terms than trafficking which often were not more severe than fines (Kartusch et al. 
2003).  
 
Thus, the influence of the EU in Moldova in the area of fight against human trafficking 
is minimal also at a practical level. The EU did not refer to its own standards or use 
direct incentives before 2010, the financial assistance was low and forms only part of 
the international organisations run projects. Its own agencies are only focused on 
stopping the crime on the border whereas the approach really to tackle the crime is 
prevention of becoming a victim within the country.
186
 Furthermore, the TAIEX events 
were previously found to be only beneficial when an expert from the government 
participates but more often than not the case is that anyone with no prior knowledge 
takes part instead and little benefit is taken from it.
187
 The lack of compliance is 
therefore to do with the lack of capacity at the domestic level and the EU’s lack of 
influence is due to its own lack of interest in the issues apart from providing assistance 
to internationally implemented projects.  
Despite this it is demonstrated that Moldova is taking steps both to address legal 
approximation and implementation with the EU standards as demonstrated when the 
Ministry of Interior approved the visa liberalisation action plan for the period of 2011 -
2012. It approached OSCE in Moldova to request assistance in establishing experts in 
the review of Moldova’s anti-trafficking legislation and its compliance both with 
binding and non-binding European and international standards (OSCE 2011).  
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Table 6.5 Conditions for (non)Compliance: Fight against Human Trafficking in 
Moldova 
*Low cost marked + (referring to a favourable element for compliance and vv). 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the EU approaches and domestic conditions and responses for 
approximation with the EU action plan recommendations in four selected issues of the 
action plan: border guard reform, readmission agreement, asylum protection and 
punishment for the crime of human trafficking in Moldova. In the case of Moldova, like 
in Georgia and Ukraine, the EU only used direct conditionality and high amounts of 
financial assistance in the border management and readmission sectors before 2010. 
However, when the visa liberalisation plan was initiated in 2010 it also expanded 
conditional benefits to all four sections.   
In Moldova the EU’s capacity to promote compliance levels188 were higher overall at 
legislative and behavioural levels than in either Georgia or Ukraine. All requests in 
regard to legislative changes complied with the EU standards except non-refoulement, 
which the government confirmed it would address during the implementation of the 
other visa liberalisation plan issues. At the behavioural level all of the issues except for 
having border guard training and carrying out sentences for human trafficking were also 
complaint with the EU standards. The human trafficking deficiencies were also further 
addressed since the visa liberalisation plan was launched when the Ministry of Interior 
has requested the OSCE to assess all the laws which Moldova should adhere to in order 
to make it complaint with the European and international standards. The main reasons 
for the non-compliance levels were related to lack of capacity and expertise rather than 
political will.  
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In general the cases demonstrated that most of the legal amendments and 
implementation toward the EU standards took place after 2007. The new government 
and the new enthusiasm in committing to EU integration together with the incentive 
worked in all cases as a motivator for compliance. The cases that were complied with 
before EU attention were mostly involving international organisations as the main 
actors. In all of the cases compliance had seemed to follow the rationalist logic of 
explaining influence.  
Overall, cases of Moldova’s non-compliance were to do with lack of capacity and 
knowledge rather than political will.   Issues which were not yet compliant had however 
started to be acknowledged by Moldova. Thus in comparison to Georgia and Ukraine 
the fact that Moldova’s had increasing expectations of EU membership may have given 
it the impetus also to comply at the behavioural level.  It was demonstrated in that 
Moldova did not treat the ENP as a substitute but as a stepping stone for EU 
membership once they converge enough.  
The most successful combination of tools for the EU to promote convergence was the 
membership expectation and direct incentives it provided in regard to increased 
mobility reflecting that rationalist logic was able to explain compliance with the EU 
standards. Therefore if the EU wants to retain this momentum where it can have 
influence in Moldova through incentives, it should acknowledge that keeping the 
membership incentive open is important.  
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7. The EU’s Influence in the Area of JHA in Ukraine 
7.1 Introduction 
Ukraine is mainly a transit country and to a lesser degree a country of origin for illegal 
migration. Its large size with a long border, geographical position and previously having 
allowed visa free access from the CIS countries has made it a major transit country of  
irregular migrants after its independence (Düvell 2006). According to UN statistics the 
absolute number of illegal transitory migrants places Ukraine in the 4
th
 position in the 
world (Luptakova 2009). Apprehended transit migrants were mostly from the CIS 
(around 50-56 per cent) and specifically from Moldova, Georgia and Russia (Luptakova 
2009). Unlike in Georgia and Moldova, there are also many seeking asylum in Ukraine. 
On average 1,000 applications are received in Ukraine every year (Luptakova 2009). In 
addition, even if the amounts are difficult to estimate, as many as 22,000 – 36,000 
persons per year are also believed to have fallen victims of human trafficking in the last 
few years in Ukraine (Ball and Hampton et al 2009). 
 
While official EU-Ukraine relations began soon after independence through the PCA in 
1994, there was a limited focus on JHA issues in the 1990s apart from police 
cooperation. EU-Ukraine cooperation was mainly focusing on issues related to energy, 
environment and nuclear safety.
189
  Nevertheless, attention toward Ukraine’s migration 
management questions started earlier than in Georgia and Moldova. The JHA related 
questions were addressed specifically as part of a separate JHA action plan already 
before the launch of the ENP and is the only one of its kind in the ENP countries 
(Knelangen 2007). It preceded the enlargement of 2004, which undoubtedly increased 
the EU’s interest towards Ukraine. Consequently, a JHA action plan already launched in 
2001 was later in 2007 replaced by the Justice, Freedom and Security (JFS) action plan.   
This chapter examines compliance with the EU’s action plan objectives and domestic 
responses in Ukraine in the area of border guard reform, readmission agreement, asylum 
protection and criminalisation and punishment of human trafficking: from 2001 until the 
end of 2011.  
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It argues that the EU’s influence was limited to offering issue-specific incentives and 
that the EU working as a framework for change when it was the best option to choose 
from. The EU membership considered as a potential was only influential to motivate 
change in early 2000. The EU influence was more efficient at formal level and the EU 
was limited in promoting compliance at the behavioural level and in most cases 
international organisations and civil society organisations carried out the jobs that the 
government did not have capacity or commitment to undertake.  
 
The first part starts with an analysis of the border management sector. The second 
section discusses readmission, the third asylum protection and the last section focuses 
on trafficking of human beings before summarising findings in the conclusion.  
7.2 Border Guard Reform 
The porous border and backward structures in border control, as a legacy of the Soviet 
system, prompted the initial EU engagement in Ukraine. In 2000 when the EU turned 
its attention toward the JHA sector, the Ukrainian border was still not properly 
controlled and the Border Guards were a military body prepared for defence rather than 
law enforcement.
190
 The issue of border management became one of the key priorities 
for the EU for the first time in EU-Ukraine cooperation in the 2001 JHA action plan as a 
consequence of the upcoming enlargement to its neighbouring countries. The EU 
wanted to be prepared by enhancing border management because ‘Ukraine’s territory is 
increasingly used for illegal immigration and transit of illegal migrants into the territory 
of the European Union’ (European Commission 2007d).   
 
The border management demands in the 2001 JHA action plan envisioned efficient and 
comprehensive border management on all Ukrainian borders and included issues such 
as implementation of the action programme, reform of the border troops and cross-
border cooperation. The action plan was initially signed for five years before the JFS 
action plan replaced it in 2007. This upgrade included further recommendations on 
adoption and implementation of an integrated border management system; to enhance 
interagency cooperation; improve the existing legal framework; set up a mobile border 
guard unit and develop specialised training for border guards. Furthermore, it 
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requested demarcation and delimitation of the border; to develop working 
arrangements with FRONTEX; and enhanced cooperation with Moldova.  
 
As in the two previous chapters, border guard reform will be analysed against the border 
guard service being transferred to a rule enforcement agency vested with investigatory 
power and utilising professional staff instead of conscripts. It is evaluated on whether it 
has been enshrined into national law and complied with also at the behavioural level. 
7.2.1 EU Conditionality, Assistance and Capacity and Technical Support 
The EU used conditionality to incentivise border management reform over a number of 
years and in different ways. Initially, financial assistance for border management reform 
was clearly conditional on Ukraine’s commitment to reform. The first country strategy 
paper and indicative programme reiterated that the authorities had to commit themselves 
to the reform and appoint key personnel and if not ‘the Commission may suspend or 
cancel all or part of the programme’ (European Commission 2001: 21).   In addition, 
since 2005, consideration about the visa facilitation negotiations became indirectly 
conditional on border management reform as mentioned in the ‘common approach on 
visa facilitation’ document from December 2005.191 
 
On 9 September 2008, visa liberalisation dialogue was launched between Ukraine and 
the EU ‘with the long-term perspective of establishing a visa free regime’.192 The EU 
visa-free travel was used as a further incentive for border reforms from 2010 onwards 
when the EU and Ukraine agreed to enter into a fully operational phase during the 9 
June 2010 meeting and created an action plan including all technical conditions that 
needed to be met before a visa-free travel regime could be established (Council of the 
European Union 2010a).  
 
The visa dialogue document stated: 
‘Visa-free regime for Ukrainian citizens can only be established once the 
relevant conditions are put in place. In particular, visa liberalisation is 
conditional upon: significant improvements in the level of document security, 
including biometrics; strengthening of border and migration management and 
asylum policy; reforms and cooperation in the area of public order and security; 
addressing external relations issues (including human rights and fundamental 
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freedoms) linked to the movement of persons’ (Council of the European Union, 
2010a:2). 
 
In regard to border management the national indicative programme (NIP) 2000-2003 in 
Ukraine allocated funding for border management for the first time under institutional, 
legal and administrative reform as a separate budget instead of being included in the 
administrative reform sector as it was in Moldova and Georgia (European Commission 
2001:13). The total amount allocated for border management in 2002 was €15 million 
and €7 million in 2003. In 2005 all JHA related issue areas, one of which was border 
management, received in total €10 million. Since the ENPI’s launch in 2007 funding 
has increased. During 2007 much of the funding - €35 million193 was given toward the 
EUBAM programme in the sector of border management. EUBAM flanking measures 
under the ENPI in 2007 for Ukraine was worth €5 million. In 2008 there was no funding 
allocated but in 2009 EUBAM received a further €12 million.  In 2010 the IBM 
programme received €10 million from the EU covering both Ukraine and Moldova. 
Also in 2010 a further €66 million was allocated to a sector policy support programme 
covering border management through the development of an integrated border 
management strategy.
 194
 This meant that the EU allocated in total for Ukraine from 
2007 to 2011 approximately €128 million and overall €160 million.195 
 
Ukraine has also benefited from EU capacity building agencies’ assistance and 
programmes specialised in border guard reform since 2003 such as Bommoluk and 
Huremas, Twinning, TAIEX and FRONTEX. Bommoluk and Huremas projects were 
implemented by international partners. Border management measures through 
Bommoluk under the regional action programme in 2003 and 2005 were supported with 
€9.9 million and implemented by the UNDP. Also, the Commission together with the 
US state Department funded the Huremas project in 2003 with €4.3 million focusing on 
border management legislation and training (European Commission 2006). Huremas II 
was run from 2006 to 2009 with a budget of €5.5 million together from the EU and the 
US State Department (IOM News Report 23/01/2009). IOM as an implementation 
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partner has assisted with legislative reform by drafting guidelines for achieving 
standards with the acquis and the Schengen Border Code (Söderköping Process News 
21/9/2009). In addition, it also helped through creating guidelines on EU level practices 
on border management. The Polish Border Guard and Hungarian Police have been 
cooperating with Ukraine from 2006 onwards in a Twinning framework. They 
facilitated 40 training operations in Ukraine for approximately 1,000 Ministry of 
Interior and SBGS employees (IOM News Report 23/01/2009). Furthermore, 235 
Ministry of Interior and SBGS personnel have participated in 35 study visits to Poland 
and Hungary.  TAIEX has facilitated information exchange and training through 
seminars since 2006, for instance focusing on document safety.  The FRONTEX-
developed Common Core Curriculum was also applied to training in Ukraine. The 
application of this means a harmonisation of training content that is applied to all EU 
member states (Laitinen 2007). 
In sum, the EU has aimed to influence through financial conditionality since 2000, 
technical workshops since 2003 and financial assistance which has been allocated since 
2001. Since 2005 the EU has also used visa facilitation and from 2008 visa 
liberalisation as incentives for border management reform. In total the funding allocated 
to the border management sector has been the highest amount out of the four sectors and 
three countries of the research. 
7.2.2 Domestic Conditions and Costs 
When the EU voiced a request for border guard reform toward a law enforcement 
agency in 2001, the Ukrainian system was still a militarised border guard system.  
The political costs that Ukraine faced with legal change were high as it required a 
separation of the border unit to become an independent body as it was initially formed 
as a part of the defence system. Consensus did not take place among the political 
authorities as not everyone saw that security sector reform, which border guards were 
part of, was necessary (Krivosheev et al. 2009). Border guard reform was contested by 
the Ministry of Interior because its transformation to a law enforcement agency limited 
its power due to a split of tasks and consequently loss of financial budget (Wunderlich 
2009). 
The practical application of the legislation also had high costs as it involved phasing out 
the conscript service and consequently required a large amount of border guard training. 
168 
 
The numbers of border guards to be trained was as high as 50,000.
196
 While training 
itself generated costs, the high turnover of the staff generated more costs as lots of 
training was not passed on to others.
197
 An interviewee maintained that after 3 or 4 
months they have to train a whole new group of people because when some are still 
conscripts the information is not passed on when they finish their term of service.
198
  
7.2.3 Macro and Micro Level External Pressure and Support 
Apart from the EU, no other organisations were able to use conditionality in Ukraine to 
promote border guard reform. As in the case of Georgia, Ukraine had created relations 
already since independence with NATO by joining the North Atlantic cooperation 
council in 1991, then the PfP in 1994, and in 1997 the NATO- Ukraine charter was 
finalised which aimed for cooperation in the defence and security sector (Simmons 
2011:169). In the Ukrainian case the desire for NATO membership has never been fully 
shared with all of the political actors. Even if a consensus was expressed between 
Yuschenko, Tymoshenko and Yanukovych on using a nationwide referendum on 
accession in 2008,  soon after Yanukovych came to power Ukraine pledged to break the 
ambition to aim for  NATO membership (Simons 2011:172).  In fact, on 3 June 2010 
the Ukrainian parliament voted against future NATO membership (BBC News 
03/06/2010). 
Other organisations have nevertheless been important in the reform process.
199
 
Especially the IOM, the OSCE, the ‘Centre for Security, Development and a Rule of 
Law’ (DCAF), EU member states and the EU permanent representative have been 
influential in assisting with the preparation of new laws and reform.
200
 Therefore, even 
if the main incentive came from the EU to potentially influence decision making, many 
other actors have supported approximation and practical application. 
7.2.4 Process and Current Status for Formal and Behavioural Compliance 
A presidential decree initiated the reform of the Ukrainian border guards in 2000 from a 
Soviet-style border system into a law enforcement agency (Chumak 2007; Wunderlich 
2009). Since 2001 the Ukrainian border guard announced that it would start reform 
according to European standards (Quo Vadis-Report 2007). It was followed by 
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legislative change through the law on ‘Border Guard Service on Ukraine’, which was 
passed on 3 April in 2003. The law meant that the border troops were to be 
demilitarised and be made an autonomous unit called the State Border Guard Service 
which made the transformation toward European standards possible (Bruun et al. 2006; 
Chumak 2007). Compliance at the formal level in regard to the agency took place 
already in 2003.  
 
In regard to the training of border guards and phasing out of conscripts, the progress has 
started but is still ongoing.  Transferring the agency to a fully professional agency was 
set in the ‘State Programme of Development of the Armed Forces 2006 –2011’ (White 
Book 2009). After this Ukraine started using professionally trained border guards and 
recruited personnel through an entry examination based on contracts starting from 2007. 
Training followed the EU standards and therefore can be considered as partially 
compliant from 2007 onwards.
201
  It was initially aimed to phase out conscripts and 
have a fully professional service by 2010.
202
 Soon however it was realised that it will 
take more time and the new deadline was set to 2015.
203
  
In sum, besides successful legislative compliance with the EU standards, overall the 
EU’s first progress report of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation found very good 
progress within the border management sector even if training is still an on-going 
process.
204
 Border guard reform is therefore consided to be partially compliant at the 
behavioural level.  
7.2.5 Conditions for (non)Compliance and Logic of Compliance  
7.2.5.1 Formal Compliance 
Compliance in border guard reform took place when the law on ‘Border Guard Service 
on Ukraine’ was adopted in 2003. This created the border guard service as an 
independent body separate from the defence department and set the regulation into the 
law in regard to demilitarisation of the service. 
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Compliance occurred under conditions of high expectations of EU membership, 
medium identification, and high financial assistance and incentives. Low technical 
cooperation (before 2005) low external support, high political and economic costs and 
low legitimacy did not halt compliance at the formal level. 
Thus under these conditions Ukrainian border guard reform at the legislative level was 
motivated by financial incentives and large amount of financial assistance. It was also 
motivated to match western counterparts’ standards in border management in realisation 
of its own deficiencies (Wunderlich 2009).  
7.2.5.2 Behavioural Compliance 
Behavioural compliance has partially taken place since 2007. Conditions were the same 
as under formal compliance except for costs which were economically high. With the 
help of large amount of financial assistance and technical support, most importantly 
from EUBAM the border guard transformation progress has been successful but it is 
still ongoing.
205
 Success has been made possible due to two issues at the domestic level. 
First, the border guard service is an independent body and therefore has not been 
affected by the restructurings in the migration service but rather has been able to make 
its own decisions.
206
 The second reason it that the leadership of the border guard service 
has been the same since 2002 and this has given continuity to its reform process 
(Wunderlich 2009). 
This case demonstrates Ukraine’s self-driven convergence toward the EU standards 
however with assistance from the EU. It is evident as Ukraine first initiated the reform 
before EU involvement and EUBAM was also launched due to Ukraine’s and 
Moldova’s joint request to the EU and later exemplified by Ukraine’s commitment to 
reforming according to the European IBM system practices. While EU incentives for 
visa facilitation and visa liberalisation emerged later the commitment for transformation 
was already established. This case suggests that Ukraine is aiming to comply with the 
EU standards as it considers it as a reference point in its own reform process because it 
had no other model to refer to after separating itself from old Soviet based system. This 
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suggests a combination of rationalist and constructivist logic explaining compliance in 
this case.  
Table 7.1 Conditions for (non)Compliance - Border Guard Reform in Ukraine 
*Low cost marked + (referring to a favourable element for compliance and vv). 
7.3 Readmission Agreement  
With regard to irregular migration, Ukraine is both a country of transit and origin of 
illegal migrants. The transit migrants come from Asia, the Middle East and Africa and 
attempt to travel towards the EU (Düvell 2008). It is estimated that over the last ten 
years there have been between 800,000-1.6 million illegal migrants trying to enter the 
EU (Luptakova 2009). The need for a readmission agreement with Ukraine with the 
intention of controlling the amount of irregular immigrants coming to Europe had been 
on the EU’s agenda already since the PCA. This section analyses readmission 
agreement in terms of (non)compliance both at formal and behavioural levels.  
7.3.1 EU Conditionality, Assistance and Capacity and Technical Support 
The ambition to complete readmission with Ukraine was mentioned in the PCA as ‘the 
opportunity to examine the joint efforts in regard to controlling illegal immigration 
taking into account the principle and practice of readmission’ (European Commission 
1994). However, there were no direct incentives set against the completion of a 
readmission agreement before 2005.  When the EU action plan announced that ‘a 
constructive dialogue on visa facilitation between the EU and Ukraine would be 
established, with a view to preparing for future negotiations on a visa facilitation 
agreement, taking account of the need for progress on the ongoing negotiations for an 
EC-Ukraine readmission agreement’, it was clear that visa facilitation was conditional 
Ukraine 
 
 
 
EU 
Memb
er 
ship 
Prospe
ct 
Identi
ficatio
n with 
the 
EU 
Clarity 
and 
Size of 
Issue-
Specifi
c 
Incenti
ves 
Finan 
cial 
Assista
nce 
Techni 
cal 
Cooper
ation 
Legiti
macy 
Politi 
cal 
Costs 
Econo
mic 
Costs 
Exter 
nal 
Pressu
res 
Formal 
Compli
ance 
Behavi
oural 
Compli
ance 
Border 
Guard 
Reform 
+/- 
until 
2002 
+ 
until 
2007 
+/- 
until 
2011 
+/- 
until 
2002 
+ 
until 
2007 
+/- 
until 
2011 
-  
until 
2000 
 
+/- 
until 
2005 
+ 
since 
2010 
+  
since 
2000 
 
On the 
ground 
IOM, 
OSCE, 
DCAF, 
the EU 
membe
r states. 
US 
- - - No 
NATO 
pressur
e,  IOs 
at the 
implem
entatio
n level 
+ 
2003 
+/- 
since 
2007  
172 
 
on a readmission agreement (2005:4). Furthermore, in 2008 the implementation of the 
readmission agreement became tied to future cooperation and visa free travel. It was 
decided, when the EU-Ukraine Summit took place on 9 September 2008, that a dialogue 
on visa–free travel of Ukrainians to the EU would also be launched and, in addition to 
readmission, included provision for biometrics, public order and security, external 
relations and fundamental rights before Ukraine could benefit from visa liberalisation 
(Council of the European Union 2010a). On 22 November 2010, during the EU-Ukraine 
summit, the action plan towards visa liberalisation for Ukraine was agreed. Thus, direct 
incentives have been high since 2005, first tied to visa facilitation and since 2008 to visa 
liberalisation.  
 
Besides strong direct incentives the EU also supported the readmission request through 
financial assistance in Ukraine since 2007. The main form of assistance was €35 
million, granted in 2007 to support infrastructure and capacity to deal with irregular 
migrants to reduce the flow through Ukraine (European Commission 2007c). In 
addition, Gumira project has provided humanitarian aid, social and interpretation 
assistance to third country citizens (Commission Newsletter 18/09/2009). Other direct 
financial sources were not available according to programming documents. 
 
The EU has mainly operated through implementation agencies in assisting the potential 
consequences of the readmission agreement besides some limited approaches through 
TAIEX and Twinning tools. The main implementation partner for the readmission 
agreement related consequences is the IOM, which has implemented projects related to 
own nationals’ reintegration, voluntary return and also addressing detention conditions 
on the ground. The IOM supported the readmission agenda by establishing seven 
centres on migrant advice and providing information on migrant’s rights, legal 
opportunities and employment schemes for those residing temporarily or permanently in 
Ukraine during 2005-2009 and in total assisted 74,963 persons.  
The EU TAIEX programme has organised three seminars between 2009 and 2010 on 
readmission related issues.  The Twinning light project ‘ERIT’ was set up to support 
and mentor on the implementation of readmission (European Commission 2010a). In 
sum, the EU’s main tool to exercise influence has been its incentive for visa facilitation 
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and also the financial assistance that it has provided to cover the consequences of the 
implementation of the agreement.  
7.3.2 Macro and Micro Level External Pressure and Support 
Besides the EU’s incentives there have not been other forms of conditionality impacting 
Ukraine’s decision to comply with the EU readmission agreement. However, Ukraine 
has benefitted from international organisations and NGO’s support on the ground. The 
IOM has focused on projects in regard to voluntary return, detention centres and 
reintegration and the local NGOs on the ground have been the Chernihiv Public 
Committee for Human Rights Protection, NGO Volunksi Perspektyvy, NGO NEEKA at 
Mukachevo Dormitory and NGO Caritas which have supported the running of the 
migrant accommodation centres (EuropeAid 2010). Despite this, there have been no 
donors other than the EC investing in readmission-related assistance even if the US 
State Department, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) 
and the Canadian International Development Agency have contributed to asylum 
projects (European Commission 2007e
 
).  
7.3.3 Domestic Conditions and Costs 
Contrary to the Moldovan and Georgian reaction to the readmission agreement, the 
EU’s invite to Ukraine to complete a readmission agreement since 2002, faced both 
domestic opposition and adoption costs at the political level and therefore costs were 
high for rule adoption. The domestic political actors’ opposition was related to the need 
to take responsibility for third country citizens and as Ukraine is mostly a transit 
country the costs are higher than in countries of origin, as they are responsible for 
onward repatriation (Kruse and Trauner 2008). Interviewees maintained that Ukraine 
does not have money to ‘invest on foreigners’ when they have enough of their own 
problems,
 207
 and furthermore there is not the required capacity to cope with them which 
puts Ukraine in a position where it can be endangering human rights standards.
208
 At the 
population level costs also stem from the need to address the lack of acceptance toward 
different groups of people as demonstrated by multiple racially motivated attacks in 
2006.
209
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 Author’s interview with an interviewee no. 48, Kiev, December 2009. 
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 Author’s  interview with an interviewee no. 49,  Kiev, April 2008 and an interviewee no. 44, 
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At the practical application level readmission agreement costs relate to both own 
nationals and third country nationals.  Even if own nationals are included in 
international customary law and every state is responsible for taking back its own 
nationals, signing a readmission agreement which makes it official is likely to raise the 
numbers of returned (Kruse and Trauner 2008).  This has consequences in two different 
ways: firstly, returnees usually settle in cities rather than go back to the countryside 
which they originally left, thus placing further pressure through urbanisation (Kruse and 
Trauner 2008). Secondly, returned nationals result in loss of remittances for Ukraine. 
The remittance loss is quite important in Ukraine as it is estimated that Ukrainians could 
send back between $4-7 billion annually (state budget: $6.9 billion) (Düvall 2009; 
Melnykovska 2006). Moreover, Eurostat statistics demonstrate that since 2004 each 
year there has been over 11,000 Ukrainians removed from the EU
210
, which could also 
increase as a consequence of the readmission agreement (Kruse and Trauner 2008).  
Concerning third country citizens, implementation costs are high because as a 
consequence of the readmission agreement the number of readmitted is expected to 
increase. Because Ukraine’s capability to deal with illegal migrants even before the 
readmission agreement was weak, with overcrowded detention centres and long waiting 
times, the readmission agreement is likely to make the third country citizens even more 
vulnerable to ill-treatment.
 211
 A Ukrainian official argued that Ukraine was not ready to 
implement the agreement as it did not have the required capacity when it was expected 
to start implementation.
212
 In addition it was felt that the readmission agreement would 
put too much pressure on the system as officials were still trying to catch up with 
previous applications due to the standstill of the migration system in mid-2000.
 213
 
7.3.4 Process and Current Status for Formal and Behavioural Compliance 
Even though readmission was mentioned in the PCA, it took until August 2002 before 
the EU invited Ukraine to enter negotiations for a readmission agreement (Coleman 
2009). Four meetings later the issue had not proceeded and Ukraine requested assistance 
to support the consequences of implementing readmission, especially for reception 
conditions (Coleman 2009). As these requests were in line with the EU strategy anyway 
the EU was happy to do so but later Ukraine also expressed a desire for visa facilitation 
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to be tied to the negotiations for the readmission agreement (Coleman 2009). The 
Commission agreed to extend visa facilitation to diplomatic passports and people with 
service status, even if member states expressed fears that due to corruption passports 
could end up in the wrong hands (Coleman 2009). Since the beginning of negotiations a 
total of twelve rounds of readmission negotiations and four rounds of visa facilitation 
negotiations took place before completion of the EU-Ukraine readmission agreement. 
The ratification
214
 was supported by 226 MPs, with 226 votes required for endorsement 
(Söderköping Process News 15/01/2008). Because the visa facilitation and readmission 
agreements between Ukraine and the EU were signed and ratified on 1 January 2008 it 
represents a successful case of compliance.  
Practical application of a readmission agreement obliges procedural requirements on 
how and when a country readmits illegal own citizens, third states and rejected asylum 
seekers. Due to the recent timing of the agreement the analysis of the implementation of 
readmission agreement is analysed here on the basis of whether the readmission 
agreements’ consequences are prepared for rather than analysing how the readmission 
procedure is carried out.  
At the behavioural level Ukraine has complied only partially. Firstly, Ukraine has not 
yet concluded any implementation protocols, however is negotiating with several 
member states (European Commission 2011:6). Secondly, Ukraine has already 
concluded readmission agreements beyond the EU states with Russia, Republic of 
Moldova, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam and is negotiating with 
Belarus and several countries in Central Asia. Thirdly, Ukraine has not been successful 
in regard to preparing for an increased number of third country citizens in detention 
centre facilities.  Detention centre conditions are also heavily criticised by the Council 
of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment (CPT) as well as by a number of human rights organisations (European 
Commission 2011). Fourthly, the question of reintegration of own nationals by 
preparation on the action plan ‘Integration of Migrants in Ukraine and the Reintegration 
of Ukrainian Migrants up to 2015’ has been prepared and is before the government 
pending approval (European Commission 2011). Overall, the implementation level was 
not fully compliant even if progress has been made. 
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7.3.5 Conditions for (non)Compliance and Logic of Compliance  
7.3.5.1 Formal Compliance 
The readmission agreement was signed in 2008. It took place under conditions of 
medium identification and medium strength for membership prospect, strong 
conditionality and financial assistance. The lack of technical assistance groups, 
legitimacy and external pressure, and high political costs did not stop compliance. 
Membership aspiration and expectations, and identification with the EU had been 
present already since the late 1990s and therefore on their own are incapable of 
explaining influence. The visa facilitation incentive on its own was not enough to 
motivate Ukraine to sign the readmission agreement because it was not signed before 
2008 even if the visa facilitation incentive was present already since 2005.  Just when 
the EU agreed on the promised financial assistance did the negotiations proceed to the 
signing of the agreement. Therefore, the case suggests that issue-specific conditionality 
and assistance was together enough to overcome the costs. It is likely that the fact  that 
the membership was still aimed for and that the Ukrainian elite identified with the EU 
may have also had a role. This case is best explained by the rationalist logic.   
7.3.5.2 Behavioural Compliance  
Preparation for the implementation of the readmission agreement was not fully 
complying with the EU recommendations.
215
 Ukraine has not yet signed implementation 
protocols with any EU member states and detention centres were not satisfying human 
rights standards for reception. However, Ukraine had completed readmission 
agreements with numerous other states beyond the EU and also started addressing the 
reintegration of its own nationals. This partial compliance took place under the same 
conditions as at the formal compliance level except for the visa liberalisation incentive 
had now also been made available for Ukraine and high economic costs. Therefore, the 
favourable conditions for compliance were the visa liberalisation incentive, increased 
capacity building assistance from the EU and high involvement of the international 
organisations and NGOs on the ground.  
Ukrainian authorities maintained that a lack of capacity prevented them from complying 
whereas the EU and international experts considered poor performance as a 
consequence of a lack of political commitment.
216
 While comparing the levels of 
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compliance in the readmission sector issue areas it is evident that Ukraine had been 
successful in the areas which were more beneficial for it i.e. facilitating readmission 
agreements with other countries, which would make it easier for it to pass on the illegal 
immigrants that are in Ukraine or are readmitted to Ukraine from the EU. Also it had 
started creating reintegration programmes for its own citizens, while treatment of third 
country citizens has been found to violate the international human rights standards. It 
has not either managed to sign implementation protocols with the EU.  
This suggests that the EU visa liberalisation incentive has not been important enough in 
Ukraine to promote compliance at the practical application level in the detention centre 
area or in the implementation protocols. While the detentioncentre issue is suffering 
from lack of capacity due to already bad starting conditions, the migration service 
restructuring put on hold progress at the national level.
217
 The lack of motivation to 
complete implementation protocols could be explained, as an interviewee commented, 
that Ukrainian authorities ‘expect that because they are an important country to the EU 
the EU will in any case give visa free travel even if all the conditions are not 
fulfilled’.218 As a consequence at the practical level the challenging detention centre 
conditions are coped with through a combination of EU assistance, and support from the 
international and voluntary organisations.
219
 In sum, whereas formal compliance took 
place through a combination of conditionality and financial assistance, behavioural 
compliance has been partially compliant due to EU funded and IO implemented projects 
at scattered level while government contribution has been low apart from addressing its 
own citizens’ reintegration and readmission with countries beyond the EU. The EU was 
able to motivate the signing of the readmission agreement through a combination of visa 
facilitation incentive and financial assistance. However, it had limited leverage in 
promoting implementation on the agreement. Even if the visa liberalisation action plan 
since 2010 included conditions to be complied with, it was found that the EU would not 
be stringent in all conditions at the domestic level.
220
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Table: 7.2 Conditions for (non)Compliance - Readmission in Ukraine 
*Low cost marked + (referring to a favourable element for compliance and vv). 
7.4 Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees 
Ukraine is both a destination and a transit country for asylum seekers. Most asylum 
seekers come from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Russia, even if there 
are as many as 50 countries from where Ukraine receives applications (Düvell 2008). 
Statistics show that there are 25,111 refugees currently residing in Ukraine (UNCHR 
Global Trends 2011) and that there are around 1,000-1,500 applications received every 
year (Zimmer 2008).   
The Ukrainian system of asylum protection began developing after independence and 
the Ukrainian Parliament passed a law in 1993 on refugees reflecting principles of the 
1951 Geneva Convention (Melynovska 2006). The national migration service was 
created in 1994 and the basic principles in the national migration policy were drafted in 
1996 (Melynovska 2006). In 2001 the ‘Law on Refugees’ was adopted and as it met 
basic international standards in 2002 Ukraine was able to join the 1951 refugee 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol (Melynovska 2006). 
Despite the basic principles being in accordance with international law there were 
weaknesses both in legislation and the practical application of asylum law especially in 
regard to recognising other forms of protection besides granting refugee status, 
respecting the principle of non-refoulement and supporting the rights and conditions of 
refugees and asylum seekers. 
Ukraine 
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The 2001 action plan recommended approximation of the legislation according to EU 
norms and standards including assigning responsibility to state authorities. It also called 
for implementation of the UN 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the status 
of refugees. Besides these issues, the JFS action plan in 2007 additionally outlined more 
detailed requests: to ensure appropriate conditions in detention centres for illegal 
migrants; ensure compliance with European standards of administrative legislation in 
respect to persons detained for illegally crossing the Ukrainian border and to ensure 
appropriate judicial control over all decisions on detention in no longer than 72 hours. It 
also requested future legislation to be developed according to European standards and 
cooperation with UNHCR where relevant. The association agenda which was launched 
in 2010 for Ukraine also reiterated the same set of issues to be practically implemented: 
in addition to 1951 UN Convention it also highlighted the need to implement the 2000 
UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime with the aim of ‘combating and 
preventing criminal activities, organised or otherwise’ (United Nations 2004). 
 
Three aspects of asylum protection are examined both at formal and behavioural levels 
as in the previous chapters: access to protection including subsidiary protection, the 
principle of non-refoulement as well as basic standards for reception and protection. 
7.4.1 EU Conditionality, Assistance and Capacity and Technical Support 
Asylum related issues were mentioned for the first time in the JHA action plan in 2001 
and since then have been present in all key EU-Ukraine cooperation documents. There 
were no direct incentives given for the fulfilment of asylum sector recommendations, 
however, the common approach on visa facilitation in general maintained that when 
opening negotiations on visa facilitation the European Commission should also take 
account of migration and asylum issues among all the other JHA issues (Council of the 
European Union 2005). When the visa dialogue was launched in 2008 and the action 
plan came into force in 2010, asylum sector reform was one of the conditions to be 
fulfilled if Ukraine wanted to benefit from visa liberalisation in the future. Therefore, 
the incentives before 2005 were low, until 2010 medium and since then high.  
 
The EU has also intended to influence the asylum system in Ukraine through financial 
assistance. Financial assistance is channelled through Aeneas and thematic migration 
funding which provides assistance with international organisations as implementation 
partners.  Until 2000 asylum issues did not receive separate support but were included 
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among other issues under the cross-border control infrastructure programme section that 
received overall €63 million funding from 1991 until 2000.221 Since the JHA action plan 
the asylum sector has been addressed specifically and funding has been organised under 
thematic branches.  
 
There have been so far seven EU funded projects addressing asylum seeker and refugee 
rights in Ukraine. In 2003 the EC supported asylum protection with a €1.3 million 
project which was implemented by Austrian Caritas from June 2004-June 2008 called 
‘Enhancing Capacities in the Area of Protection and Treatment of Refugees and Asylum 
Seekers in Zakarpattya’ (EuropeAid 2008). In 2005, Aeneas continued the support for 
the same programmes with €699,942 between December 2006 and September 2008 
(European Court of Auditors 2008).  €529,705 was granted to support asylum seekers in 
Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia and implemented by ECRE from October 2005 
until October 2008, thus, on average each country received €132,000 (European Court 
of Auditors 2008).  From 2006 ‘Assistance to the Legal and Administrative Reforms in 
Ukraine in the Sphere of Migration and Refugees’ Protection According to the Norms 
and Standards of the European Union’- project was implemented between July 2006 – 
March 2007 with the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute as implementation partner and 
€500,000 Tacis funding (European Court of Auditors 2008).  Aeneas further supported 
through a project called ‘Strengthening Asylum and Protection Capacity in Ukraine by 
Enhancing the Capacity of Governmental and Civil Society Stakeholders’ (European 
Court of Auditors 2008) in a participatory approach and cross-sector co-operation with 
€534,397 from February 2007 until April 2009, in a project where the Danish Refugee 
Council was the implementation partner.  In 2009, a legal and social protection 
programme on asylum seeking children and refugee children was supported with 
€960,000 (European Court of Auditors 2008). In addition, EIDHR also assisted during 
18 months with a €78,000 EU contribution to support human rights protection of 
refugees and migrants in the areas of Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, Zakarpattya and Lviv 
from 2005 onwards. The total EU allocation through projects in the asylum sector is 
approximately €4.5 million (European Court of Auditors 2008). 
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Ukraine is also included in the RPP and it also partakes in TAIEX and Twinning 
programmes in asylum protection in Ukraine. The RPP covered from 2009 until of the 
end of 2010 at a cost of €1 million. It was implemented by the UNHCR in cooperation 
with SBGS, MIA, international organisations and NGOs and is currently being 
evaluated
222
. Ukraine also benefitted from TAIEX in the area of asylum since 2006. It 
has facilitated experience exchanges to learn about asylum seeker reception systems and 
working methods with vulnerable groups and integration of refugees with other EU 
members states. In addition, Twinning projects were taking place from 2009. The first 
one, for a three year period from 2009-2012 was addressing the ‘Establishment of 
custody centres and temporary holding facilities for irregular migrants in Ukraine’.223 
The second Twinning project, launched in 2010, focused on ‘Enhancing the Public 
Authorities’ Efficiency in the area of Migration Processes Management’, in particular in 
the context of the implementation of the EU-Ukraine readmission agreement.  
 
In sum, EU conditionality was low until 2005, medium since 2005 and high from 2008 
onwards when it was set against visa liberalisation. The EU has provided assistance 
already from 2000 but in comparison to other areas it was limited: totalling only €4.5 
million for the whole time. It is, in comparison to other countries of this research, low 
taking into consideration the volume of asylum seekers and refugees in Ukraine.  
7.4.2 Domestic Conditions and Costs 
The domestic costs incurred by the creation of an asylum system were high because in 
2000 the central system was abolished and there was a need to create a new system and 
relevant legislation (UNHCR Global Report-Ukraine 2000).  Furthermore, legislation 
creation was costly because there was not a consensus on its creation as some political 
actors have an attitude that refugees are not their responsibility.
224
 
 
At the practical application level better possibilities for protection, securing respect for 
non-refoulement and the creation of integration facilities also created high economic 
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costs due to the continuous nature of the tasks and due to a need to train new staff that 
are knowledgeable and capable to deal with new challenges.
225
  
7.4.3 Macro and Micro Level External Pressure and Support 
There have been no conditional demands presented from other organisations besides 
fulfilling the basic conditions to be able to become an IOM member in 1996 and the 
Geneva Convention (Zimmer 2008). However, Ukraine is benefitting from technical 
and financial assistance from a large number of international organisations and NGOs.  
 
The main contributors in the asylum sector are the IOM, UNHCR, the US State 
Department, the SIDA and the Canadian International Development Agency (Zimmer 
2008).  The IOM has been working in Ukraine since 1996 and it has in its central 
mandate to support the authorities in developing harmonisation of national law with EU 
law in the asylum sector. The UNHCR has been supporting the government with 
drafting legislation, monitoring the implementation of the Geneva Refugee Convention 
and construction of accommodation centres and the development of the asylum system 
since 1999. Financial contributions have mainly been coming from the UNHCR which 
had a budget of €5 million since its initiation but it is as high as €11 million in 2011 
(UNHCR Global Appeal 2011).  
In addition, 14 NGOs, focusing on legal and social rights of refugees and asylum 
seekers are formed under a civil society platform called the Ukrainian refugee council 
which has been functioning since 2008 with its own strategic plan. 
7.4.4 Process and Current Status for Formal and Behavioural Compliance 
The first asylum law was created in 1993 and its implementation started three years 
after. It established a basic framework for an asylum system (Zimmer 2008).  However, 
international organisations and the EU raised concerns in 2000 over a lack of access to 
asylum and other forms of protection including respect to the principle of non-
refoulement and minimum reception standards. In 2001 ‘Law on Refugees’ was created 
to address the previous deficiencies in the asylum system. It has become the principal 
legislation for refugee matters (UNHCR 2008) up until today and only since 2005 and 
2011 have amendments been made. The law provides for non-refoulement (Article 3) 
and for the issuance of refugee travel documents (Article 1) and the granting of social 
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and economic rights for refugees (Article 20) (UNHCR 2008), but it can only be 
considered partially compliant with the EU and international standards as within this 
legislation there are instances when the law’s efficiency is circumvented by other laws 
or as it does not cover all the aspects of protection.  
 
Firstly, the 2001 ‘Law on Refugees’ created the principal legislation for refugee matters 
by including a definition of the term ‘refugee’ according to the 1951 Convention 
(Article 15). However, even if it had defined refugee according to 1951 standards the 
law from 2001 did not include other forms of protection besides refugee status. In 
addition, it did not either have ‘provisions on non-discrimination of refugees on grounds 
of their race, religion or country of origin’ (UNHCR 2008a:15). When Ukraine adopted 
the ‘Law of Ukraine on Refugees and Persons in need of Subsidiary or Temporary 
Protection’ on 8 July 2011 (European Commission 2012) it just, for the first time, 
recognised forms of protection other than on the basis of refugee status, thus, becoming 
also compliant with the EU standards in 2011.  
 
Secondly, the law from 2001 included non-refoulement, however, because non-
refoulement is not part of the 1994 ‘Law of Ukraine on the Legal Status of Foreigners 
and Stateless People’, which allows the deportation of aliens who commit crimes or 
offences, therefore, if the foreigners and stateless persons who stayed in Ukraine 
without Ministry of Interior's registration, ‘commit a crime’, they face a serious risk of 
deportation (UNHCR 2008:7).  
 
Thirdly, the asylum standards of reception and refugee treatment were addressed in the 
law from 2001 and approved that refugees have the same standards as Ukrainians in 
article 20 and therefore complies with the basic principles.
226
 In sum, at the legal level 
Ukrainian refugee law has been compliant partially since 2001 by providing a basic 
framework but falling short in respect of non-refoulement. It also fulfilled the EU 
standards in regard to subsidiary protection since 2011.
227
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The practical application of the law fails to provide protection at most levels and 
therefore is not compliant with the EU or international standards in most areas.  Firstly, 
access to asylum and other forms of protection is difficult to achieve and therefore does 
not comply with the access to asylum requirements. It was reported that some of the 
applications received by the detention authorities did not reach the migration authorities 
(Human Rights Watch Report 2011). Moreover, an accelerated procedure is used to 
reject claims frequently even before considering their substance (UNHCR 2008). 
Furthermore, the law does not provide for non-discrimination on the basis of race, 
religion or origin. For example, Chechen and Tamil asylum seekers had received a 
negative response and were not even having an opportunity to be considered as asylum 
seekers but were out rightly denied due to their origin (Amnesty News 07/03/2008). 
These difficulties for access to asylum are demonstrated with a decrease in recognition 
rate (Zimmer 2008). As a consequence even if there were 1,200 applications only 80 
were subsequently recognised as refugees in 2005 (Melynovska 2006). Overall 
recognition rate has changed from year 2001 from about 50 per cent as low as to 2.5 – 3 
per cent in 2008 (Zimmer 2008). 
 
Secondly, the principle of non-refoulement is also violated at the practical level. Lack of 
proper investigation of each case due to having no access to legal specialists or 
translators during the determination procedure is adding to vulnerability to refoulement 
(UNHCR Global Appeal 2011). Amnesty reported that there were cases of forcibly 
removed people without proper investigation. One such case is when Tamil refugees 
were sent back even if they were in danger of inhumane conditions (Amnesty Report 
2010a).   
 
Thirdly, asylum seeker treatment on the ground is seriously violated.  For instance, 
asylum seekers during the decision making process are often not informed of how long 
it will take and even though a decision should be reached within 6 months according to 
the law, it usually is reached just after 2-3 years. During this time international 
organisations have criticised the seriousness of conditions in the detention centres. 
Asylum seekers are deprived of clothing, food, fresh air and other basic needs (Border 
Monitoring Project Ukraine 2010) and ‘suffer from determination procedures and police 
harassment’ (Human Rights Watch 2012). Refugees were deprived from having 
adequate access to state-sponsored accommodation, material assistance or employment 
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(UNHCR 2008). In addition, the centres are overcrowded and even if the EU funded a 
new centre which is under state responsibility, it is kept empty as the staff are not able 
to get it functioning.
228
 The only issue that was complied with in regard to fulfilling 
minimum conditions for refugees was the issuance of ID cards in 2004. 
7.4.5 Conditions for (non)Compliance and Logic of Compliance  
7.4.5.1 Formal Compliance 
Compliance at the formal level took place in regard to subsidiary protection in 2011
229
 
and in regard to basic conditions in 2001. Non-refoulement, which was set in 
legislation, did not comply with either the EU or international rules. 
Formal compliance took place under medium membership prospect, medium 
identification, high incentives, low EU assistance, medium EU cooperation, high 
international cooperation and high legitimacy. Because identification and the EU 
membership prospect had in fact reduced from the time of the Orange Revolution it is 
evident that the incentive for visa liberalisation was able to trigger compliance as 
legitimacy on its own had not had an impact. As an interviewee commented, ‘it is the 
only way to put pressure on Ukraine’230 and it was successful as it was to do with a 
legal approximation which is not economically costly even if in general refugee and 
asylum protection matters are not considered to be Ukraine’s responsibility.  
While visa liberalisation dialogue had been on-going since 2008, in April 2011 the 
national action plan for visa liberalisation was approved by the decree from the 
president which set subsidiary protection as one of the priorities that needed to be 
fulfilled by the end of 2011. Having created a concrete plan and the political situation 
allowing again decision making after turbulent years of political fighting the new law 
was adopted. Thus, this case demonstrates the effect of the EU’s influence to use 
conditionality but it was only effective because it was not economically expensive and 
because Ukraine had the capacity to adopt it after having overcome the worst standstill 
in the refugee protection sector and its own political situation.  
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7.4.5.2 Behavioural Compliance 
Behavioural compliance had been lacking at all levels in regard to access to asylum or 
protection, respect to non-refoulement and offering minimum reception standards and 
ID document issuance only started in 2004. The conditions for practical application of 
the law were the same as for formal compliance but compliance did not take place even 
if since 2008 conditional benefits increased. Four main reasons were found to be crucial 
for the lack of compliance: 
Firstly, the on-going reconstruction of the migration system halted decision making 
from 2002 to 2006
231
. This was a consequence of the state committee, responsible for 
migration and refugee questions,  being reorganised 8 times since 1996 until 2008 
(Zimmer 2008). As a result since then Ukraine has needed to catch up with the previous 
applications on top of the new ones when the system started functioning again in 
2010.
232
  
Secondly, asylum protection has not been considered as one of the priorities in Ukraine. 
Interviewees maintained that refugees are not considered Ukraine’s responsibility when 
the limited resources should be used to take care of its own citizens.
233
 It was 
demonstrated in dissatisfaction of using Ukrainian finances. The dissatisfaction   was 
also publicly expressed when  Mr. Zlenko Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2002 
commended that ‘the reception points are overfilled with thousands of illegal migrants 
from Asia and Africa, who are sent home at the cost of the scanty Ukrainian budget’ 
(Simons 2011:117). While maintaining the rhetoric that they will soon start 
implementation, little changes have taken place on the ground over the years.
234
 
In addition, the government’s lack of political will was further demonstrated through 
lack of staff allocated to tackle the problem. For example, in 2008 there were only 3 
people working in the whole of the Kiev area to deal with asylum applications and the 
limited time given to each case is affecting the quality and speed of asylum decisions 
(Zimmer 2008).  
Thirdly, corruption was also complicating carrying out tasks. An interviewee 
exemplified the situation by highlighting that the staff who are supposed to help 
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refugees in the centre and provide food that was donated to support the refugees instead 
were trying to sell the food to refugees
235
 but it is difficult to do anything to it, as it is 
not possible to monitor on an everyday basis.
236
  
Fourthly, the official also maintained that besides Ukraine’s uncommitted response to 
the asylum related issues the EU has not either taken a strong role. The EU Home Affair 
representative maintained that assistance has been low in the asylum sector and that 
they also do not have too many staff members dedicated to it, thus, it makes it difficult 
to keep up with all the issues.
237
 The EU feels it cannot do more than encourage Ukraine 
as earlier incentives were not either taken seriously as Ukrainian officials felt that they 
were too important a country not to be able to receive visa facilitation and that they 
would anyway receive it eventually.
238
 In addition, the EU was also hesitant to take a 
stronger role due to a variety of reasons. It was expected that it would be difficult for the 
EU to be strict with one of the issues of its list if other areas would be complied with.
239
 
It was also seen that Ukraine did not want a stronger involvement as it can be 
considered as foreign imposition on Ukraine's internal issues.
240
 Therefore, as an 
interviewee maintained ‘the only thing that the EU can do is to remind the 
authorities’.241  
 
In sum, the case of asylum protection reflects a lack of both Ukrainian and the EU’s 
commitment to the issue. Poor convergence was to do with the standstill as a 
consequence of multiple reforms and reconstructions that the migration service had 
gone through and the lack of political will. However, the EU’s contribution with limited 
incentives and assistance did not support the compliance either and hence the EU had 
little influence in the situation when it only could keep reminding about the reforms 
Ukraine who kept saying they are working on it.
242
 As a consequence, the international 
organisations and NGOs in reality end up carrying out the tasks at the moment. 
However, it was found that there is a good NGO framework and things get done, even if 
the tasks should be  undertaken by the government
243
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Table 7.3 Conditions for (non)Compliance - Protection of Asylum Seekers and 
Refugees in Ukraine 
*Low cost marked + (referring to a favourable element for compliance and vv). 
7.5 Criminalisation, Prosecution and Punishment of Human Trafficking 
Trafficking of human beings is and has been for the last decade a very salient problem 
in Ukraine. Ukraine has become one of the main countries of origin for human 
trafficking. To a lesser degree it is also a country of transit but only rarely a destination 
(TIP 2001-2011).  The victims are most often trafficked to Turkey, Russia and Poland 
and since 1991 approximately 117,000 Ukrainians have been forced into exploitative 
situations in Europe, the Middle East, and Russia (TIP 2009).  As a transit country 
Ukraine is often used for trafficking Moldovan victims to Russia (IOM 2008c). 
The government’s inability to meet minimum standards of preventing trafficking due to 
a lack of financial resources and low level corruption have been the main causes of 
concern by the international organisations since 2000 (TIP 2001). Even if in 1998 the 
Parliament amended the criminal code to make trafficking punishable, in practice, most 
cases ended in acquittals and small fines (TIP 2001).   
The EU acknowledged human trafficking issues in regard to Ukraine for the first time in 
the Common Strategy Paper in 1999. Since then it has been addressed in the JHA plan 
2001 and in most of the key EU-Ukraine documents. The EU action plan set the 
recommendations for the fight against human trafficking in the section of organised 
crime (section 3) and requested Ukraine to combat cross-border organised crime, to 
ratify and fully implement international instruments such as the 2000 UN Convention 
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against Transnational Organised Crime and the additional protocols, one of which is 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children.  
When the revised action plan was launched in 2007 it had a separate and much more 
detailed section devoted to trafficking issues. It recommended promoting cooperation 
and exchange of data between Europol and interested member states; to implement the 
State Anti-Trafficking Programme; support the creation of a permanent secretariat 
ensuring regular inter-agency coordination and to promote the child sensitivity approach 
and finally to implement the UN Convention of the Rights of Children. In addition, it 
requested the provision of necessary professional skills through training, to promote 
preventive campaigns and implementation of the UN Convention against ‘Transnational 
Organised Crime and its protocols on Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking in 
Persons’. The association agenda, which was launched in 2010, further reiterated the 
development of an appropriate legislative and institutional framework related to 
migration management with the aim of fighting illegal migration, smuggling and 
trafficking in human beings with the support of the EU (European Commission 2010a). 
 
As in the previous country chapters this section analyses compliance in regard to 
convicting and punishing the crime of trafficking of human beings, which are included 
both in the international and the EU law. It is considered compliant when 
criminalisation of trafficking of human beings is set into national law and when actions 
toward punishment are carried out in practice through prosecution and punishment.  
7.5.1 EU Conditionality, Assistance and Capacity and Technical Expert Groups  
In the action plans of 2001 and 2007 the EU committed to the provision of assistance to 
Ukraine’s efforts to combat trafficking in human beings, however, it was not 
specifically set as a condition for progress. The fight against human trafficking was 
requested as part of visa free travel negotiations since 2008, like other JHA related 
issues, before Ukraine could benefit from visa liberalisation, however criminalisation 
was not particularly mentioned. It instead referred to prevention of trafficking and the 
need to support victims (European Commission 2010a). Therefore, incentives were low 
before 2008 and medium thereafter. 
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The fight against trafficking did not receive any EU assistance before 2006.
244
 In the 
indicative papers 2002-2004, 2005-2007, 2007-2010 and 2010-2013 trafficking was 
only mentioned as a part of the border management section whose actions would 
indirectly support the fight against trafficking, thus, treating trafficking from the 
perspective of organised crime. This approach aimed to stop trafficking happening at 
the border rather than prevent people becoming victims on the ground.  In 2009, 2010, 
2011 no funding was allocated according to Ukrainian country fiche or thematic fiches. 
Thus, the Aeneas programme has been the only source of funding. It has funded several 
programmes which have been implemented either by the IOM, ILO or local NGOs.
245
  
The first project called ‘Combating Trafficking in Human Beings was implemented by 
the IOM in Ukraine and Moldova with financial support of €1.7 million between 
December 2006-2008. The second programme called ‘Elimination of Human 
Trafficking through Labour Market based Measures in Ukraine and Republic of 
Moldova’ donated again for the two countries €748.492 in a project implemented by the 
ILO from November 2006 to November 2008. Thirdly, Aeneas funded a ‘Safebridges 
for Migrant Workers Initiative’ covering again the two countries with €701,214 
assistance between February 2008-2011. The initiative was implemented by a group of 
third level sector partners.
246
  The total allocation was under 4 million.
247
 
In addition to this limited financial funding, there have been no TAIEX or Twinning 
programmes orientated toward trafficking in Ukraine.
248
  EU agencies which are 
responsible for other issues such as border management have only contributed indirectly 
with enhancing border controls, such as FRONTEX and EUBAM. The Europol also has 
a mandate for counter trafficking and with whom Ukraine had talks about strategic 
cooperation on 13 October 2008. The Söderköping process has been facilitating 
cooperation and workshops to counter trafficking in Ukraine since 2004.  
In sum, the EU’s effort to influence the fight against trafficking of human beings in 
Ukraine was low at all levels until 2006 when the EU supported through some projects 
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the fight against trafficking. Since 2008 the EU offered the direct conditionality of visa 
liberalisation with the fight against trafficking being one of the requirements. Financial 
assistance has been low in comparison to other issue areas.  
7.5.2 Domestic Conditions and Costs 
Costs of criminalising trafficking at the legislative level were low as structural changes 
were not required and an amendment to existing legislation was sufficient because the 
punishment of trafficking was already set in the criminal code in 1998. The criminal 
code was then amended in 2001 and again in 2006.  The general human trafficking draft 
law in comparison was costly as it was focused on all aspects of the fight against human 
trafficking and adoption would have meant a commitment for increasing the budget for 
each oblast responsible for their own contra-trafficking work which under the current 
budget was only around $500 per year.
249
 
Practical implementation faced high costs as it added stringent conditions for 
imprisonment and a large amount of punishable offences which involved higher 
economic costs for the government to imprison and prosecute criminals. Previously 
only a very few cases had actually been punished and instead of imprisonment 
traffickers had only been required to pay small fines (TIP 2001). Training of police 
forces and courts were also necessary, thus, generating costs as previously they were 
hesitant to approach potential criminals and also the courts were uncertain in giving 
sentences.  
7.5.3 Macro and Micro Level External Pressure and Support 
There are multiple organisations involved in Ukraine supporting the formal and 
implementation aspects of the fight against trafficking. The main cooperation partners 
with the Ukrainian government’s effort are OSCE, IOM, and the International Women 
Rights Centre ‘La Strada – Ukraine’ (Ukraine Scorecard 2010). The IOM and OSCE 
have been providing advice and assistance on law drafting e.g. in 2009 in regard to the 
new draft law on trafficking.
250
 
The IOM has provided monitoring on the situation and the information is very valuable, 
taking into consideration that the government is not fully aware of the situation because 
victims’ low trust in officials prevents them from reporting to state authorities 
(Gerasymenko 2011). Statistics demonstrate very different scales of the problem. When 
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the IOM assisted in its first nine months 539 victims the MoI reported that there were 
only 359 victims in the whole year. When the MoI, in 2010, demonstrated positive 
dynamics of victims dropping to 277 the IOM at the same time provided assistance to 
1,085 people (Gerasymenko 2011).  
In the preventive sector La Strada and the ILO have been the main organisations 
assisting Ukraine since 1997. Prevention of trafficking has focused on the promotion of 
human rights, gender equality and education on labour migration. The IOM has also 
been cooperating with many local NGOs in each oblast. The IOM’s goal to train the 
local sectors to help themselves since early 2000 has been successful.
251
   Furthermore, 
on a practical level assistance for victims is facilitated by the IOM including legal 
assistance, consultation and representation for victims in criminal cases and availing of 
psychological counselling.   
7.5.4 Process and Current Status for Formal and Behavioural Compliance 
The act of trafficking was criminalised in Ukraine already in 1998 before the EU had 
got involved in Ukrainian trafficking issues. Article 124-1 set legally binding sanctions 
for the crime of trafficking (Pyshchulina 2003). However, it lacked clear definitions of 
the crime and often a term such as ‘exploitation of work’ was interpreted in different 
ways and therefore aspects of the crime of trafficking were sometimes overlooked 
(Pyshchulina 2003). In addition, law enforcement was not always aware of the new 
procedures that this law would entail, consequently police and responsible officials 
were hesitant to investigate allegations of trafficking and prosecutors to initiate new 
cases (Pyshchulina 2003).  
 
The new criminal code came into force in September 2001. It established a penalty of 3 
to 8 years imprisonment and ‘in the presence of other aggravating circumstances, the 
sentence is increased up to 15 years imprisonment. However, as it defined trafficking as 
something taking place across international borders it ignored that there were many 
cases where victims were only moved from one region to another and therefore the law 
did not apply to those traffickers (Pyshchulina 2003). Another issue that was not noted 
in the law was that often trafficking took place though employment agencies, thus, 
legalising this activity and the law did not require agencies which were involved in 
practicing this type of activity to discontinue (Denisova and Hughes 2007).    
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In 2006, the criminal code was amended to address the full range of trafficking crimes 
and satisfied the requirements of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (TIP 2009) and it was 
recognised that it prescribed sufficiently stringent penalties.
252
 Therefore, it is 
considered that criminalisation of human trafficking was compliant with the EU and 
international standards in 2006.  
The practical application of prosecution nevertheless has not taken place between 2001 
and 2011 according to international or European standards. For the whole time period 
TIP reports and the EU progress reports demonstrate that even if the law had 
criminalised trafficking since 2006 on the practical level the law enforcement system 
has failed to act according to the law. Where imprisonment should be given, depending 
on the situation, from 3-8 years and in aggravated circumstances up to 15 years, in 
practice the local police and judges who carry out prosecutions and convictions give 
more often probation and small fines than actual prison sentences (TIP 2008-2011).  
Table 7.4 Human Trafficking Convictions and Sentences in Ukraine 
 
Source: Author’s constellation of available data from TIP Reports 
7.5.5 Conditions for (non)Compliance and Logic of Compliance  
7.5.5.1 Formal Compliance 
Compliance has taken place in 2006 under conditions of high expectations for receiving 
EU membership and high identification, without incentives, high legitimacy, low EU 
support or agencies, high amounts of international support and low costs. As there were 
no incentives from the EU and little EU programmes suggests that Ukraine was 
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following the more established international organisation’s best practice.253 Therefore, 
the EU’s direct influence at the formal level was not present but rather compliance took 
place because of international organisation support and due to low political costs of 
adoption.  
7.5.5.2 Behavioural Compliance 
The practical application has not taken place according to international or EU standards 
as only a few of the crimes are actually sentenced, even if it has been lately increasing, 
and often they are receiving probation instead. The main reason, according to 
international experts is corruption. For instance, it has been reported that police and 
border guards take bribes to overlook trafficking and also judges take bribes to give 
lighter sentences (TIP 2012) Even if there is little international influence to curb the 
lack of punishments, international organisations are assisting Ukraine in fighting 
corruption.  
The EU has not had a role in enhancing the criminalisation system as while the EU 
incentives were also covering the fight against human trafficking it did not specifically 
address other aspects except for prevention and supporting victims in regard to the visa 
liberalisation plan. The financial assistance in the sector is also minimal.  A trafficking 
expert commented EU funding only helping to carry out some administrative tasks but 
overall as insufficient.
254
 Thus, the EU’s only asset is indirectly as a side product of 
other more security driven goals for the EU such as illegal immigration and border 
management. For instance, the efficiency on the EU borders since the Schengen 
regulation has contributed to stopping traffickers.
255
   
In general, implementation has been weak due to corruption at the domestic level and 
the EU’s role in supporting it has also been low as the EU has not had much influence 
on either decision making or practical implementation of the law due to its non- 
committed nature to the issue demonstrated by its governance techniques. This has also 
been noticed at the Ukrainian level, describing the EU action as being miniscule when 
first of all the international organisations have set the standards they follow and as their 
perception is that the EU in general is not interested if it ‘does not benefit from it’.256  
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Thus, the lack of commitment at the domestic level and the EU’s interest to have more 
influence still reminds of the situation that was the case already in 2001: NGO’s and 
locally trained groups are supporting efficiently the victims in each oblast
257
 and NGOs 
and specially trained units are relied upon by the government to investigate crimes (TIP 
2001). 
Table 7.5 Conditions for (non)Compliance - Fight against Human Trafficking in 
Ukraine 
*Low cost marked + (referring to a favourable element for compliance and vv). 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the EU approaches and domestic conditions and responses for 
approximation with the EU action plan recommendations in four selected issues of the 
action plan: border guard reform, readmission agreement, asylum protection and 
punishment for the crime of human trafficking in Ukraine.
258
 The assessment 
considered compliance both at the formal and behavioural level. Promoting compliance 
with its standards in the JHA sector in Ukraine, similarly to Georgia and Moldova, the 
EU only used direct conditionality and high amounts of financial assistance in the 
border management and readmission sectors.  
Compliance took place at the legislative level in the border guard reform sector, in 
regard to the readmission agreement, and in criminalisation of human trafficking, but 
only partially in regard to the asylum protection sector. Behavioural level compliance 
overall had a lower success rate and took place partially in the  border guard reform 
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sector with functioning as a law enforcement agency but not fully using professional 
staff instead of conscripts. Preparation for implementation of readmission agreement 
was also only partially compliant. Ukraine formed readmission agreements with 
countries beyond the EU and facilitated reintegration for own citizens but did not fully 
address human rights standards of detainees or made the readmission facilitation easier 
with the EU states by signing implementation protocols. In the asylum protection sector 
behavioural compliance was not successful at any level except for providing ID cards to 
refugees since 2004. Punishment for human trafficking was also lacking at the 
implementation level. 
The overall membership perspective in principle still being available and identification 
with the EU did not promote compliance except for the years before and around the 
Orange Revolution when expectations of EU membership were supporting its formal 
compliance. However after the Orange Revolution when the standstill in political 
decision making standstill became evident, Ukraine has not been so interested in 
committing itself to expensive reform before it sees ‘the end goal’ while Moldova has 
taken the route to commit to change as long as it will be enough for the EU to accept it. 
Overall, the EU’s leverage influencing convergence toward its standards has been 
possible through offering strong clear incentives, but only at the formal level, or when 
Ukraine itself has chosen the EU as a framework for its own reforms and if it has seen it 
to be the most beneficial. At the implementation level not even the visa liberalisation 
incentive was initially enough to support convergence. At the implementation level the 
EU only had leverage when it was supporting capacity building through financial and 
technical assistance in the areas which Ukraine itself did not consider pivotal or have 
capacity for. When in other areas except for border guard reform, the EU’s contribution 
was small, the local civil society actors and international organisations have been 
contributing to convergence toward EU and international standards.  
Therefore, in the future it can be expected that the EU can promote compliance through 
issue-specific incentives and financial assistance. In some issue areas it also can be 
important as a framework to refer to when Ukraine aim converge towards the EU 
standards.  
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8. Conclusion 
8.1 Overview of the Thesis 
The early Europeanisation literature assumed that the EU’s influence is low in the 
neighbourhood as the EU was not able to use EU membership as an incentive to 
encourage compliance with the EU standards. Nevertheless, since the first EU progress 
reports were evaluated the countries’ progress toward the EU standards demonstrated 
some convergence. This research aimed to solve the puzzle of why countries comply 
and what is the leverage and limitations of the EU’s influence.  
The research framework and hypotheses were built on the basis of the previous findings 
in the Europeanisation and external governance literature while theoretically drawing on 
new institutionalist rational choice and constructivism. Acknowledging that the 
Europeanisation literature had concluded the EU’s influence to be limited without being 
able to use an EU membership incentive, and external governance literature expects that 
compliance is related to issue-specific conditions, the thesis constructed a framework to 
answer the research questions of the EU’s influence. Instead of treating the EU 
incentives as a starting point for the analysis or contrasting the variables depending on 
whether they were drawn from rationalist or constructivist origins, this research laid out 
a variety of independent variables which varied both at the domestic and issue level, 
their logic of origin and also took into consideration potential external factors which 
could impose cross-conditionality or cross-socialisation. In doing so the analysis of the 
EU’s influence first considered under what conditions compliance takes place and why 
do countries comply before coming to conclusions on whether this compliance or non-
compliance was related to the EU. This approach was aiming to eliminate bias and 
overestimation of the EU’s influence which has been identified in some Europeanisation 
research (Schimmelfennig and Scholz 2007:4).  
The research examined the EU’s influence through the ENP in its Eastern 
neighbourhood by studying levels of compliance with the EU’s JHA standards in 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Compliance was analysed both at the formal and 
behavioural levels within four JHA issues: border guard reform, readmission agreement, 
asylum and refugee protection, and criminalisation of human trafficking from the year 
2000, when the EU began to increase its attention toward the neighbourhood, until the 
end of 2011 when discussions on the association agreements with the states had started.  
198 
 
The first three chapters of the thesis explained the puzzle, previous literature and the 
methods for research. From chapter four onwards the empirical data were presented. 
Chapter four focused on the macro conditions: the strength of the EU membership 
prospect and identification with the EU. Chapters five, six and seven were country 
specific chapters focusing on the evaluation of the micro level conditions: incentives, 
financial assistance, technical cooperation, costs and also the external factors which 
varied across countries, issues and logic of action before the coded data were collected 
on a raw data table which functioned as the basis of the analysis.   
This final chapter presents the summary of what leverage and limitations the EU has in 
the neighbourhood to promote convergence towards its standards. The second part of 
the chapter summarises the findings and presents the main arguments on the EU’s 
leverage and the conditions under which it can have influence. The third part discusses 
the main challenges to the EU’s influence. The fourth part elaborates on the 
contributions and limitations of the research and potential for their generalisation. The 
concluding part presents further avenues for research.  
8.2 Summary of Research Findings 
This section presents findings and demonstrates the patterns of conditions which were 
found to be conducive for compliance. By doing so it is able to illustrate that the 
findings confirm, but also to some extent challenge, the previous Europeanisation 
literature and external governance literature.  
Through analysis of compliance at the formal and behavioural level this research makes 
the following conclusions: 1. When the country had expectations of potential EU 
membership there were signs of convergence even before an issue-specific incentive 
was set. Under the expectations for EU membership countries also demonstrated 
willingness to comply with all sectors if they had capacity to do so rather than selecting 
between the sub-issues of the sector;  2. The EU was able to have influence without a 
membership incentive through issue-specific incentives but only if the costs were 
covered and if there was no cross-conditionality at the same time; 3.  Legitimacy and 
identification did not make a difference for the EU’s capacity to promote compliance 
because if the EU did not also offer incentives, countries chose to follow international 
organisations as a framework for converging their laws; 4. If no cross-conditionality or 
socialisation was present and the country found the EU standards as an example for 
domestic reform the EU was able to have influence without incentives.   
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8.2.1 Formal Compliance with the EU Recommendations 
At the formal level all of the issues which showed compliance and were traced back to 
the EU demonstrated that compliance was only possible under conditions of clear issue-
specific incentives, if economic costs had been overcome through financial assistance, 
and when countries still had at least some expectation of the potential for EU 
membership in the future. Under the same favourable cost-benefit issue-specific 
conditions, but under high identification with the EU, and without EU membership 
expectations, compliance was not EU related, except in limited cases where an external 
trigger (Russia) created additional pressure for adoption of the rule. More often the issue 
was complied with because it was already part of the domestic plan, or because cross-
conditionality or cross-socialisation was triggering compliance.  
The cases following the described pattern, where the EU was able to trigger compliance 
through the combination of rationalist factors, took place in Moldova and Ukraine both 
with border management and readmission agreement issues and also in the asylum 
sector for subsidiary protection approximation in Ukraine in 2011. All the cases 
demonstrated that they complied with the EU recommendation due to favourable cost-
benefit calculations and thus at the formal compliance level the EU’s influence was best 
explained by the rationalist logic.  
The argument that issue-specific conditions on their own were not enough for the EU to 
trigger compliance was further strengthened by two other findings drawing from 
Georgia’s experience and in regard to the motivations for compliance of Moldova and 
Ukraine expressed in the interviews. Firstly, while Georgia had the same conditions as 
Moldova and Ukraine in border management and in the readmission agreement area, the 
border management compliance was traced back to the NATO incentive and in the 
readmission case to Georgia’s own relations with Russia. Even if the EU requested 
border management reform in fact the reform had already started as part of the NATO 
incentive plan. In addition, the readmission agreement was just being negotiated when 
the completion of the Russian visa facilitation agreement with the EU prompted 
Georgia to also aim for visa facilitation.  
Secondly, indications of the membership expectation were found in the case of Moldova 
and Ukraine which supported convergence toward EU standards even before the clear 
incentive was set. For example, Ukraine at the highest moment of Europeanisation 
expectation during the Orange Revolution started to approximate some of the laws 
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toward EU standards even before the action plan was launched. Moldova also made 
efforts to converge toward laws in the readmission agreement even before negotiations 
had started and also interviews confirmed that Moldova in the asylum sector took 
initiative to comply with laws and their practical application even before EU 
suggestions, especially after the new government’s aim for European integration.     
Despite these issues, the EU’s influence as a triggering power was not present in other 
cases at the formal level. In other areas in Moldova and Ukraine the compliance levels 
were traced back to other organisations promoting the same standards as the EU. For 
instance, in Moldova and Ukraine the asylum sector’s partial compliance was related to 
the UNHCR cooperation and countries following the UN regulations as guidelines. In 
the human trafficking sector cooperation with the IOM, and similarly drawing on UN 
regulations, triggered compliance. Therefore, influence in these sectors is best explained 
through socialisation and capacity building assistance. In Georgia the lack of the EU’s 
influence was evident across all the issues at the formal level as Georgia was influenced 
by other organisations’ conditionality or socialisation rather than the EU’s approaches.  
In sum, at the formal level the EU had the most influence in Ukraine and Moldova in 
the issues of border management and readmission through incentives and assistance to 
cover economic costs and due to a lack of political costs, thus demonstrating the EU's 
influence was most efficient through the rationalist logic. The EU was least efficient in 
Georgia even if in general Georgia was the frontrunner in the formal level reforms. The 
sectors where the EU was least efficient  in promoting convergence with its standards 
was in the asylum and human trafficking sectors where the EU did not offer incentives 
and only provided low levels of assistance and where countries followed the regulations 
set up by other international organisations rather than referring to the EU standards. The 
only example of the selection of EU rule complementing UN standards was in Ukraine 
when after the visa liberalisation action plan it complied with subsidiary protection 
regulation. Thus, it suggests EU rationalist variables were able to explain compliance 
whereas legitimacy, technical cooperation, and specialist agencies were not able to 
explain the ability of the EU to promote convergence at the formal level.  
8.2.2 Behavioural Compliance with the EU Recommendations 
Behavioural compliance levels indicated a more varied pattern across countries and 
issues than the formal level. The results demonstrated that the EU was able to promote 
compliance on its own or in cooperation with other international actors. The results 
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indicated that EU leverage to have influence at the behavioural level was both triggered 
by the logic of cost-benefit calculations and also was evident through capacity building 
and the EU system working as a framework to refer to. Membership expectation seemed 
to be less important to encourage compliance at the behavioural level.  
The EU on its own was able to promote convergence under two different patterns of 
variables. Firstly, at the behavioural level it was able to have influence under high 
incentives, high financial assistance covering high economic costs and political costs 
being low indicating that rationalist factors were explaining compliance. Secondly, it 
was also able to have a direct influence through capacity building and as a framework 
which resembled the sociological institutionalist/constructivist explanation model.   
First, the rationalist conditions that were able to explain compliance at the behavioural 
level were present in two cases. Moldova and Georgia were complying with all of the 
four readmission agreement related factors at the behavioural level whereas Ukraine 
was complying with just two of the four issues. The lower economic costs of 
compliance were explaining the overall higher compliance in Moldova and Georgia.  
Second, the EU was able to have direct influence only through capacity tools in the case 
of justice sector reform in Georgia, being the main implementer and assistance provider 
in the sector, which facilitated the criminalisation of human trafficking. In addition, the 
EU was able to attract convergence through EUBAM and being selected as a framework 
due to the lack of other models in the case of border guard reform and training in 
Moldova and Ukraine, also demonstrating constructivist factors explaining compliance. 
Thus, the logic when compliance took place at the behavioural level was both explained 
by rationalist choice and capacity building but also by socialisation factors.  
Apart from readmission agreement compliance and justice sector reform there were no 
other issue areas with full compliance which were triggered by direct EU influence. 
Neither were there other issues where full compliance would have been triggered by 
other international actors. There was however some issues where partial compliance had 
taken place. The EU had a partial role in cases of border guard system reform and 
training in all three countries, especially demonstrating the role of EUBAM and its 
capacity building programmes and in the sector of asylum in an ad-hoc manner through 
initiating the creation of accommodation centres according to the asylum sector request 
in Moldova and Ukraine.  
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Thus, at the behavioural level the EU’s influence was evident to some extent across all 
issue areas and was most evident in Georgia and Moldova and least in Ukraine. The 
EU’s influence was traced back to its capability to use incentives and assistance, and 
cooperation capacity programmes.  
8.3 The Main Challenges to the EU’s Influence 
Despite evident influence of the EU in some issue areas, there were also many cases 
where the EU was not able to have influence. The lack of the EU’s ability to promote 
compliance was especially present at the behavioural level and was overall found to be 
related to three main reasons. 
Firstly, if the economic and political costs were higher than expected benefits, 
especially when no membership expectations were present, this stopped or slowed down 
compliance. Secondly, if cross-conditionality or cross-socialisation were present when 
the EU had limited involvement countries chose other international organisations as a 
framework. Thirdly, the EU’s own different intensity of engagement correlated with the 
levels of EU induced compliance. Overall, countries with less EU membership 
expectations, issues with low EU incentives, low assistance and low amounts of 
technical cooperation, and high costs and strong involvement of other organisations in 
the issue area resulted in low EU ability to promote compliance. This section will 
elaborate on these conditions to further explore the limitations of the EU’s influence 
related to domestic conditions, cross-influences and its own approaches. 
8.3.1 Domestic Conditions Restricting the EU’s Influence  
The domestic conditions which limited EU influence were related to economic costs, 
rising from the lack of capacity and corruption, Soviet-inherited state structures, and the 
political costs which occurred due to different perceptions of the priorities.  
Firstly, the lack of capacity and the state structures which were a consequence of the 
previous Soviet system were impacting all of the countries’ border guard systems. Poor 
working conditions and low wages were complicating reform at the behavioural level 
because these conditions made border guards vulnerable to bribery and they were eager 
to move to new and better jobs after only a short time in service. This frequent change 
in the posts meant that those who were trained according to new reformed standards did 
not pass over the learned information.  
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Second, corruption was found as one of the reasons, especially in Moldova and Ukraine, 
contributing to the lack of progress in complying with the EU recommendations in the 
area of the fight against human trafficking. Prosecutions of the high level officials 
involved in trafficking were overlooked or given small fines instead of prison sentences.  
Thirdly, the lack of political will also complicated the EU’s capability to promote 
influence. Some of the EU promoted issues were not considered as either priorities or as 
responsibilities of the country and therefore the EU could not attract compliance.  
Especially in regard to the asylum sector in Ukraine and to a somewhat lesser extent in 
Georgia it was found that decision makers did not consider asylum seekers as the 
country’s responsibility. It was felt that when there were so many other priorities 
considering their own nationals, taking care of foreign nationals came secondary within 
the limited budgets they had.  
8.3.2 Cross-Conditionality and Socialisation reducing the EU’s Capacity to 
promote Compliance 
In addition to costs, cross-conditionality and cross-socialisation seemed to distract 
compliance with the EU especially when there were no expectations for EU 
membership and in cases where the EU used limited conditional incentives, assistance 
or technical cooperation. Firstly, in Georgia the lack of membership expectations and 
attraction of NATO membership made it choose border guard reform according to 
NATO’s model rather than the EU being able to have influence at the formal level. 
Secondly, across the countries where the EU did not use clear incentives, and only 
provided limited amounts of assistance and technical cooperation, the countries were 
referring to the UN regulations rather as their model for convergence. This was evident 
in both the asylum and human trafficking sectors across countries until the EU initiated 
the visa liberalisation plan in Moldova and Ukraine which just in 2010 onwards 
prompted and demonstrated the EU’s capacity to promote convergence through 
incentives. For instance, Moldova requested a review of the current laws to determine 
whether they adhered also to EU standards with the help of international organisations 
after the 2010 incentive. Since the visa liberalisation incentive Ukraine adopted 
subsidiary protection regulations because they did not incur high costs.  
8.3.3 The EU’s own Limitations contributing to the Lack of the EU’s Leverage   
Despite the ENP’s normative outlook, the EU approach in the neighbourhood was also 
evidently geared toward enhancing its own security. The EU was giving less attention, 
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financial assistance or incentives in the areas of asylum system reform and fight against 
trafficking in comparison to border guard reform and readmission. Across the countries 
border guard reform and readmission agreement were linked directly to the EU 
incentive of visa facilitation and later to visa liberalisation and was assisted through 
EUBAM, EUMM and also received a large majority of the EU assistance (see figure 
10). In the asylum and fight against trafficking sector the countries’ incentives were not 
present before the visa liberalisation plan since 2010, assistance was limited and only 
small technical projects took place rather than the EU contributing to the system 
development as a whole. As a consequence this approach in the asylum area was not 
well received, especially in Georgia and Ukraine who saw little point in spending their 
own money for other countries’ citizens if it was not paid for them. In the trafficking 
against human beings sector interviewees confirmed in Moldova and in Ukraine that 
financial assistance from the EU was found to be inadequate. 
Thus, the EU’s influence in regard to the four issue areas demonstrated a clear pattern in 
that the EU’s influence was limited in the asylum or trafficking against human beings 
sector because of the high costs, having other actors offering more attractive models for 
socialisation and also due to its own limited contribution.  
8.4 Research Contribution, Limitations and Generalisation 
8.4.1 Research Contribution 
These findings make three important contributions. Firstly, this research contributed to 
Europeanisation and external governance literature by clarifying the role of the EU’s 
influence without the EU membership incentive. Secondly, it created new empirical 
knowledge on the current migration related issues and in general on the domestic 
conditions of the three states. The third contribution was the constructed framework for 
the research which did not contrast variables but utilised a selection of variables, 
reflecting both rational choice and sociological institutionalist origins crossing country 
and issue levels, and thus was able to come to reliable results on the EU’s influence. In 
addition, it introduced new variables which are important to pay attention to in the 
future research in the countries without a certain EU membership incentive. 
Firstly, there were two starting points for this research. The first was Europeanisation 
literature which suggested that without a credible EU membership incentive the EU’s 
influence will be limited in the neighbourhood (i.e. Kelley 2004; Sedelmeier and 
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Schimmelfennig 2005) and therefore socialisation tools may be more conducive for 
compliance in the neighbourhood (Kelley 2005; Sasse 2006; Schimmelfennig and 
Scholz 2007). The second starting point was that the external governance literature 
suggested issue-specific conditions would be determining the EU’s influence in the 
absence of a credible EU membership incentive (see i.e. Sedelmeier and Epstein 2008).  
The findings of this research partly challenged the above but also partly produced 
similar results. While the research results agreed with the Europeanisation literature in 
that the EU's influence is decreasing from the countries where the EU is able to offer an 
EU membership incentive in comparison to the countries of post-accession and then the 
ENP states, it also confirmed that a credible EU membership incentive is not a 
necessary condition for compliance with the EU standards. It however also 
demonstrated that when countries still saw the EU membership as a distant potential 
they were more uniformly willing to comply. When no expectations of EU membership 
existed the issue was only complied with if the costs were covered and if no other 
conditionality was introduced by other actors. Countries chose international 
organisations’ standards over EU standards if there were no incentives, low assistance 
and cooperation with the EU on the topic. 
The research results also agreed with the external governance literature in that research 
should be focusing on studying issue-specific conditions instead of determining low 
convergence due to lack of the EU membership prospect. However, in comparison to 
some recent research (i.e. Freyburg et al 2011) this research did not find as strong 
evidence towards the EU’s influence in the issues where there were also other 
international organisations either offering incentives or which were more established in 
the area of the promotion of human rights. In the codified cases where there was high 
legitimacy it was not possible to find the link between compliance and the EU trigger 
but rather that the convergence toward the EU (and international) regulations was 
related to the countries willingness to follow international organisations’ standards. 
Overall, this research, through the in-depth study of three countries and three issue 
areas, gave a nuanced understanding of the EU’s influence without a membership 
incentive and contributed to the Europeanisation and external governance literature 
through the finding that issue-specific decisions are made both on the domestic and 
external setting.   
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Secondly, this research produced new empirical knowledge on the three countries’ 
relationship with the EU, giving an overview of the status of the state in regard to 
expectations of membership and also the levels of identification which have previously 
had little in-depth attention. It also produced in-depth information on the policy 
development and reform levels in migration related issues in the three countries. 
Understanding the country and external context is useful for the creation of assumptions 
of the potential reactions in regard to other sector areas where international influence is 
present. Thus, this new empirical information is beneficial for informing the logic of the 
countries’ responses to international influence which help to create assumptions of the 
best possible policy tools and strategies for the international actors to gain responses to 
their recommendations.  
This issue-specific empirical information, which took a close account of the migration 
related law adoption and practical application, is contributing to previous data which 
has been scarce especially in Georgia and Moldova when most previous research on the 
ENP countries has been interested in conflict resolution and the energy or trade sectors. 
In addition, the previous research on the JHA sector was not considering the variety of 
issue areas within the JHA separately but only treated the JHA sector as one issue. The 
overview of the status of where countries are now is important especially with regard to 
currently topical visa liberalisation talks.  
Thirdly, this research also contributed with its analytical framework to the current 
studies which aim to understand international institution’s transformative power. The 
framework intended to address some of the previous weaknesses which were identified 
in the literature. The previous literature identified that the EU’s influence was 
potentially overestimated in promoting convergence, having focused only on studying 
the CEECs, where the EU membership was credible and not adding more variance by 
also studying countries with no membership incentives (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 
2007). In addition, previous literature has also been challenged in terms of how to 
separate external influences from the EU’s influence (Keohane and Millner 1996) or 
from the other domestic influences (Hurrell and Menon 2003). These issues were 
addressed in this research through the framework which studied macro and micro 
related conditions which had origins both in rationalist and constructive explanations 
and also accounted for external influences in terms of cross-conditionality and 
socialisation in order to account for all possible explanations for compliance. In 
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addition, the benefit of this framework was that it placed the EU’s influence in the wider 
context in regard to other international actors.  
8.4.2 Limitations and Generalisation of the Research 
While this research and its methodological choices made possible a detailed view of the 
conditions which mattered for compliance at the domestic and issue level and allowed 
recognition of new explanatory factors for compliance beyond the EU’s influence, there 
are also some limitations in this research.  
Firstly, identification with the EU was a complex issue to operationalise and measure. It 
was challenging first of all in regard to being able to separate whether the orientation of 
the countries toward the EU was truly reflecting identification with the EU’s values, 
identity and belonging rather than just orientating toward the EU to gain expected 
benefits. The second challenge with the identification was in terms of differentiating 
between the identification with the EU values and western values which were often 
overlapping. Despite these challenges the operationalisation of identification, after 
finding reliable data sources for measuring separately identity, preferred values and 
feeling of belonging through Manifesto Group data based on political party 
representative surveys, allowed the measurement of identification with the EU. 
Manifesto Group provided information on different values between the countries’ 
motivations to get closer to the EU in terms of benefits and identity and also allowed the 
assessment of the countries’ views of the West and the EU. While acknowledging the 
difficulty to achieve totally accurate results, these findings, which allowed variation 
between the countries, were sufficient for the purpose of this research in detecting the 
role of macro and micro variables.  
The second limitation of the research was the selection of the most likely cases for 
research as it has some limits in regard to generalisation of the results. The research 
design was selected to represent three countries, which were most likely for the EU to 
have influence on, in order to be able to bring in-depth understanding of the causal links 
which would have been difficult to produce if the research would have focused on the 
countries where little cooperation was taking place such as Belarus or Azerbaijan. The 
selected countries was also quite similar to each other in comparison to contrasting them 
for instance with Mediterranean neighbours. However, as the focus was specifically to 
understand the causal links in the situation where there was no certain membership 
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incentive but also in a situation where countries had some hopes for it, these three 
countries served the purpose of this study.  
Under these limitations, how far can the research results travel from this research? 
While evidently the most likely cases are less suitable for generalisation, this research 
can however generalise results at least in two aspects. On the basis of the findings, that 
the EU’s influence is dependent on the issue, external and domestic contexts, the 
information can create future expectations of the leverage and limits of the EU in other 
countries, in other issue areas and to create future expectations in the three countries 
having understood the domestic motivations and external environment in the countries.   
Firstly, it is possible to expect that the influence reduces from the candidate states to EU 
neighbourhood countries. However, the EU can still have influence if the cost-benefit 
calculations are favourable and no better cross-conditionality is presented. It is possible 
to expect that without countries aiming for membership the EU can have better 
influence in the countries which are smaller in size as the costs will often be higher in a 
large country like Ukraine.  
Secondly, the research results also allow generalisation and further hypotheses in regard 
to issue areas. The research demonstrated that the EU was using only incentives in the 
areas which had more security importance to the EU and less in the areas where issues 
were referring to international organisations’ standards. Accordingly it can also be 
expected that the EU’s influence in the other issue areas, such as environment or 
education can be stronger than for instance in other human rights related factors (where 
other organisations pose cross-conditionality or cross-socialisation) or in energy or trade 
(which are highly sensitive issues especially in the East in regard to Russia’s role). 
Thirdly, learning about the country conditions and external setting in the three countries 
it is also possible to make future assumptions on the countries further compliance in 
regard to different issue areas. As it was found that countries were responsive not only 
to issue-specific conditions but also that the domestic perceptions and external context 
was determining whether to comply or not, it can be expected overall that Georgia will 
make its decisions on the basis of whether the EU issue suits their domestic plan and 
whether there are other sources of cross-conditionality or socialisation. Moldova will 
comply with the issues where it has enough capacity as it still expects EU membership. 
Ukraine is expected to consider each issue specifically on a cost-benefit basis.  In this 
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light the research results demonstrated that it is important to keep the membership 
perspective aspect open to those countries which still can be motivated by it such as in 
the case of Moldova in order not to break the momentum which Ukraine previously had 
during the Orange Revolution. In addition, it was demonstrated that if the EU wants to 
influence it needs to be willing to support assistance for the economic costs, as without 
it, it is unlikely to have influence. Overall, the lessons from the research results show 
different responses to EU triggers and emphasise that the EU approach should be 
differential to each country. 
8.5 Future Research Avenues on the EU’s Influence 
Empirical analysis showed that the EU had influence in the neighbourhood and the 
conditions under which it took place. These results suggested some generalisations for 
the research of what could be expected in regard to country conditions, issue areas and 
also in the three countries where the domestic and external setting of the countries 
through the research became familiar. 
While these three areas of generalisation provide some further expectations of the 
potential EU influence, further research would be beneficial to test new hypotheses. 
Firstly, in regard to the findings about costs being apparently higher in larger countries, 
a variety of large and small countries could be tested in order to clarify whether it was 
the costs which were responsible for the lack of compliance and to assess whether some 
domestic characteristics such as identification with the EU could still hold some 
importance in the EU’s capability to promote convergence.  
Secondly, in order to clarify the EU’s influence in the neighbourhood and to test the 
importance of the suspected difference that the domestic situation and external setting 
makes, it would be beneficial to test how similar issue-specific settings would be 
responded to differently in the context of strong cross-conditionality and socialisation 
and in areas where other actors’ influence is not present. This would allow further 
understanding about the EU’s influence as an international transformative power and 
also how it rates in regard to other pressures. 
Thirdly, research could also take place to test whether the hypothesised future 
compliance patterns hold in regard to three countries and thus draw expectations of the 
EU’s influence in the three countries also in other issue areas. The research results 
suggest that Georgia is complying with the EU recommendations if the issue conforms 
210 
 
to its own plan and if there are no other cross-influences, Moldova is complying across 
all sectors with the EU recommendations where it has capacity and Ukraine is 
complying only if the costs of compliance are covered. 
While there are many research questions in the future to be explored in order to further 
advance the knowledge on the EU’s domestic influence, this research contributed to the 
current literature with some empirical knowledge showing that influence has taken 
place through the EU’s governance tools by focusing on four JHA issues and Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine, even if it was more limited than through enlargement, as Prodi 
envisaged in 2002.  This research also importantly recognised the EU’s influence is 
differential according to country, issue and external context and provided a framework 
for further research for exploring the EU’s leverage and limitations.  
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Appendix 
List of Interviews 
 
Interviewee no. 1, EUBAM,Odessa, 27/03/2009, (group interview). 
 
Interviewee no. 2, EUBAM, Odessa, 27/03/2009, (group interview). 
 
Interviewee no. 3, Razumkov Centre, Kiev, 03/04/2009 (group interview). 
 
Interviewee no. 4, The Institute for Development and  Social Initiatives ‘Idis Viitorul’, 
Chisinau, 26/03/2009 (group interview). 
 
Interviewee no.5, interviewee who preferred to stay anonymous, Kiev, 02/04/2009. 
 
Interviewee no.6, Our Ukraine party representative, Kiev, 03/04/2009 (group interview). 
 
Interviewee no.7, Our Ukraine party representative, Kiev, 03/04/2009 (group interview). 
 
Interviewee no. 8, Razumkov Centre, Kiev, 02/04/2009 (group interview). 
 
Interviewee no. 9, Anti-Trafficking and Gender Officer, OSCE, Chisinau, 25/06/2010. 
 
Interviewee no. 10, EuropeAid, Brussels, 24/06/2011. 
 
Interviewee no. 11, DG Home Affairs, Visa and Readmission, 23/06/2011. 
 
Interviewee no. 12, EU Delegation, Chisinau, 21/06/2010. 
 
Interviewee no. 13, Independent Analyst, Chisinau, 24/06/2010. 
 
Interviewee no. 14, Desk Officer for Ukraine, DG EEAS, Brussels, 21/06/2011. 
 
Interviewee no. 15, MP, Party of Region, Secretary of National Security, Kiev 
01/04/2009. 
 
Interviewee no. 16, Deputy Director, Centre for Adaptation, Kiev, 15/12/2009. 
 
Interviewee no. 17, Head of Economic and Political Section,  European Commission’s 
Delegation to Moldova, Chisinau, 28/03/2009. 
 
Interviewee no. 18, Second Secretary, Ukraine’s Mission for the EU, Brussels, 
22/06/2011. 
 
Interviewee no. 19, DG Home Affairs/Unit A2 Fight against Organised Crime, Brussels, 
17/06/2011. 
 
Interviewee no. 20, Centre for Legal Approximation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Chisinau, 18/06/2010. 
 
Interviewee no. 21, HUREMAS Officer, IOM, Ukraine, Kiev, 11/12/2009. 
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Interviewee no. 22, First Secretary, Ukraine’s Mission for the EU, Brussels, 22/06/2011. 
 
Interviewee no. 23, Director, APE, Chisinau, 11/06/2010. 
 
Interviewee no. 24, Deputy Head of the International Cooperation and  
European Integration Department, Ministry of Interior, Chisinau, 25/06/2010. 
 
Interviewee no. 25, MFA Capacity Building in Support of Rule of Law Unit, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi, 05/10/2010. 
 
Interviewee no. 26, Head of Political Analysis and Security Program, ICPS, Kiev, 
09/12/2009. 
Interviewee no. 27, Desk Officer - Georgia, EEAS, Brussels, 22/06/2011. 
 
Interviewee no. 28, Head of Unit F1 - Geographical Co-ordination  
Neighbourhood East, EuropeAid, 24/06/2011. 
 
Interviewee no. 29, Officer, EUBAM-Ukraine, 02/08/2011. 
 
Interviewee no. 30, Councellor , Moldova’s Mission to the EU, 17/06/2011. 
 
Interviewee no. 31, Team Leader, GEPLAC- Georgia, Tbilisi, 06/10/2011. 
 
Interviewee no. 32, Team Leader, Support to the Implementation of Moldova-EU 
agreements, Chisinau, 22/06/2010. 
 
Interviewee no. 33, Head of Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, Kiev, 01/04/2009 
(group interview). 
 
Interviewee no.34, Programme Officer, IOM, Georgia, 04/10/2010. 
 
Interviewee no. 35, Director, FES, Tbilisi, 07/10/2011. 
 
Interviewee no. 36, Committee on Integration in Europe, Parliament of Georgia,   
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Figures 
Figure 1. Democracy  
 
Freedom 
House/Nations 
in Transit 
Dataset : 
1(+ ) to 7(- ) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 
Georgia 4.33 4.58 4.83 4.83 4.96 4.86 4.68  4.79  4.93 4.93   4.86 4.78 
Moldova 4.29  
 
4.50  4.71  4.88  5.07  4.96  4.96  5.00  5.07  5.14 4.96 4.87 
Ukraine 4.71  4.92 4.71 4.88 4.50 4.21 4.25  4.25 4.39 4.39 4.61 4.53  
Average  New 
Eastern 
Member 
States  
2.01 ( CZ,HU, LA, LI, PL, SK, SL) in 2004 
3.09 (RO, BL) in 2007 
2.55 
Average 
Balkan states 
accepted as 
Candidates 
3.79 (CR 2003, MN 2008, SE 2009)  
4.29 (MC 2004) 
3.09  
Source: Nations in Transit data259 (author’s constellation) 
                                                          
259
 Available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit 
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Figure 2. Rule of Law: Corruption and Independence of Judiciary 
 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index:  
10(+) to 0 (-) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Averag
e 
Georgia Not 
availa
ble 
2.4 1.8 2.0 2.5 2.8 3.4 3.9 4.1 3.8 3.0 
Moldova 3.1 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.9 3.2 2.8 2.9 3.3 2.9 2.8 
Ukraine 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.4 
New EU 
Member states 
 4.7 
(2004) 
3.9 
(2007) 
Eastern 
Candidate 
States 
CR 3.7 (2003), MC 2.7 (2004), MN 3.4 (2008), SR 4.1 (2009) 
 
3.5 
Source: Corruption Perception Index260 (author’s constellation) 
CIRI Dataset 
independence 
of judiciary: 
2(+) to 0(-) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Averag
e 
Georgia 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.6 
Moldova 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0.7 
Ukraine 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 
Average- New 
Member states 
 1.75 
Average -
Balkans 
 1.33 
Source: CIRI Dataset261 (author’s constellation) 
 
Figure 3. Human Rights 
                                                          
260
 Available at: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
261
 Available at: http://ciri.binghamton.edu/. 
physical 
integrity 
rights 
SCALE: 
0 worst 
8 Best 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average 
Georgia-  5 4 5 4 4 6 4 4 5 6 4.7 
Moldova-  5 6 6 5 5 5 5 6 5 4 5.2 
Ukraine  4 6 6 3 4 5 6 4 4 5 4.7 
New Eastern 
member states 
 6.4 (2004) 
5.5 (2007) 
Candidate 
states in the 
Balkans 
 6.7 
New 
Empowerment 
Rights Index  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average 
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Source: CIRI Dataset262 (author’s constellation) 
Figure 4. Economic Freedom 
 
Economic 
freedom 
dataset:  
100 (+) 
to 0 (-) 
2000 2001 2002 20
03 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 20
11 
Average 
Georgia 54 58 56 58. 58 57 64 69 69 69 70 70 63 
Moldova 59 54 57 60 57 57 58 58 57 54 53 55 57 
Ukraine 47 48 48 5. 53 55 54 51 51 48 46 45 50 
Av.  New 
eastern 
member 
states  
 (2004) 
 (2007) 
66 
62 
Av.Balkan 
countries*  
(Macedonia 56.8 and Croatia 53.3 only available ) 55 
Source: Economic Freedom Dataset, Heritage Foundation263 (author’s constellation) 
Figure 5. Party Opinion - Georgia  
 
Georgia  election 1992 : Minority representation of pro-European parties (5/12 ) 
Pro-European Party Name Position  in Parliament Seats 
National Democratic party 3th 14 
The Traditionalists 6th 8 
Greens 7th 11 
National Independence 11th 4 
Social democratic party 14 2 
Total  38/225 
Georgia election 1995:  Minority representation of pro-European parties (2/8) 
Pro-European Party name Position  in Parliament Seats 
National democrats 2nd 108 
 Traditionalists 5th 3 
Total  111/235 
Georgia election 1999: Majority representation of pro-European parties (2/4) 
Pro-European Party name Position  in Parliament Seats 
SMK Citizens' Union 1st 131 
SSAK All-Georgian Revival Union 2nd 58 
Total  189/235 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
262
 Available at: http://ciri.binghamton.edu/. 
263
 Available at: http://www.heritage.org/index/default. 
(no 
government) 
to 14 (full 
government 
respect). 
Georgia 9 9 8 8 7 6 8 7 10 8 8 
Moldova 11 8 9 7 9 7 8 7 5 4 7.5 
Ukraine 7 7 6 6 6 8 8 7 7 8 7 
  New Eastern 
member states 
 12.5 (2004)  
9.5 (2007) 
Candidate 
states in the 
Balkans 
 
 11 
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Georgia election 2003: Majority representation of pro-European parties (4 out of 7) 
Pro-European Party name Position in Parliament Seats 
Democratic Union of Revival 2nd 33 
SLP Labour Party 4th 20 
BD Burjadnaze Democrats 5t 15 
BAS Bloc 'For a New Georgia' 1st 38 
Total  106/ 150 
Georgia election 2008: Majority representation of pro-European parties 
Pro-European Party name Position in Parliament  Seats 
National united movement (no MFG 
data but has clarified its goal for EU 
membership and NATO) 
1st 119 
New rights party had no mention in the 
EU integration in their programme 
(Timuş 2008) 
2nd  
Despite this the first party gaining 
more than majority is supporting EU 
integration and therefore it is 
considered EU orientated 
  
Source: MSG dataset 264(for pro-European parties) and (for seats for the parties popularity ratings) (author’s constellation) 
Figure 6.  Party Opinion - Moldova 
 
Moldova election 1994:  Minority representation of pro-European parties (1/4) 
Party name Position  in Parliament Seats 
All neutral at least   
Pro-European and pro-Russia   
BTI Peasants and Intellectual Bloc (higher Russian ) 3rd 11 
Pro-Russia   
PDAM Agrarian Democratic Party 1st 56 
Anti-Russia   
PPCD Christian Democratic People’s Party 
 
4th 9 
Total pro EU vs Pro Russian  11/104 vs 56/104 
Moldova election 1998: Majority representation of pro-European parties (2/4) 
Party name Position  in Parliament Seats 
All Neutral at least   
Pro-European and pro-Russia (higher eu score)   
CDM Democratic Convention  
 
2nd 26 
PMDP Democratic Prosperous Moldova 
 
3rd 24 
Pro-European and Pro and anti-Russia/CIS   
PFD Democratic Forces 4th 11 
Pro-Russia/CIS 1st 40 
PCM Communists   
Total pro-European and pro-Russian   30 vs. 40 
Moldova election 2001 : minority representation of pro-European parties 
Party name Position  in Parliament Seats 
Pro-European and pro-Russia (higher EU support 
score) 
  
BEAB Braghis Alliance 2nd 19 
Pro-European and Pro and anti-Russia/CIS   
PPCD Christian Democratic Peoples Party 3rd 11 
Pro-Russian   
PCM Communists 1st 71 
Total pro-European and pro-Russian  19/101 vs 71/101 
Moldova election 2005: Majority representation of pro-European parties 
Party name Position  in Parliament Seats 
Pro-European and anti-Russian   
PPCD Christian Democratic Peoples Party 3rd 11 
Pro-European and Pro and anti-Russia/CIS (same 
scores)>pro-European 
  
DMB Democratic Moldova Bloc 2nd 22 
Pro-European and Pro-Russian   
PCM Communists (higher EU score) 1st 56 
Total pro-European  89/101 
   
                                                          
264
 Available at: www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2119_92.htm. 
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Moldova election 2009: Majority representation on Pro-European parties 
Party name Position  in Parliament Seats 
Pro-European and pro-Russia (higher EU support 
score) 
  
PLDM Liberal party  2nd 18 
Pro-European and pro-Russia (same score)   
PCM Communists 1st 48 
Pro-European and pro-Russia (higher Russia/CIS 
support score) 
  
Liberal party 3rd 15 
PDM 4th 13 
PAMN 5th 7 
Source: MFG dataset 265(for pro-European parties) and (for seats for the parties popularity ratings) (author’s constellation) 
Figure 7. Party Opinion - Ukraine 
 
Ukraine election 1994: Minority representation on Pro-European parties 
Party name Popularity Position Seats 
Pro-EU and Anti Russia   
Rukh Popular Movement 
 
2nd 20 
Neutral EU and anti-Russia   
UKRP Conservative Republican Party 
 
11th 2 
Pro-EU and pro and anti-Russia (anti higher 
score) 
  
UNA National Assembly 13th 1 
Pro EU and Pro and anti-Russia (same score)   
KhDPU Christian-Democratic Party 
 
14th 1 
Pro-EU and Pro-Russian same score   
DemPU Democratic Party 9th 2 
URP Republican Party 5th 8 
Pro EU and Pro Russian (lower EU score)   
RC Renaissance of Crimea   
Kuchma Bloc for Reforms   
Neutral both direction    
SDPU Social Democracy Party 
 
10th 2 
PVDU Party of the Democratic Rebirth 
 
7th  4 
SelPU Peasant Party 
 
3rd 19 
Only Russia positive (EU neutral)   
KPU Communist Party 
 
1st 86 
SPU Socialist Party 
 
4th  14 
PPU Labour Party 
 
8th  4 
HKU Civic Congress 
 
12th 2 
KUN Congress of Nationalists 
 
6th 5 
Ukraine election 1998 : Majority representation of pro-European parties 
Party Name Popularity Position Seats 
Pro EU and Neutral Russia 
 
  
Vpered Go Ahead, Ukraine 
 
15th 1 
Pro EU and pro and anti Russia (lower both 
and same 
  
KhDPU Christian-Democratic Party 
 
14th 2 
Pro eu and neutral Russia 
 
  
Rukh Popular Movement 2nd 46 
PZU Green Party 4th 19 
Pro EU and Russia  (same score) 
 
  
NDPU People's Democratic Party   
                                                          
265
Available at:  http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2119_92.htm. 
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Neutral EU and Russia   
KPU Communist Party 1st 121 
SDPU-o Social Democratic Party-associated 8th 14 
NF National Front 12th 6 
APU Agrarian Party   
Neutral EU and Pro Russia/CIS   
PSPU Progressive Socialist Party 7th 16 
BSP-SP Socialist Party-Peasant Party 3rd 34 
Ukraine election 2002 :Minority representation on Pro-European parties 
Party name Popularity Position Seats 
Neutral EU and Russia/CIS   
SPU Socialist Party 6th 22 
NU Victor Yushenko Bloc Our Ukraine 2nd 119 
JT Juliya Tymoshenko Election Bloc 5th 23 
Neutral EU and positive Russia/CIS   
KPU Communist Party 3rd 64 
SDPU- Social Democratic Party-associated 4th 31 
ZyU For United Ukraine 1st 175 
Ukraine election 2006: Majority representation on Pro-European parties 
Party name Popularity Position Seats 
Pro EU and Neutral Russia/CIS   
Our Ukraine   3rd 81 
SPU Socialist Party 4th  33 
Neutral EU and Russia/CIS   
Juliya Tymoshenko Election Bloc (BYUT) 
 
2nd 129 
Pro EU and Russia/CIS    
Party of Regions (higher eastern score) 1st 186 
Pro Russia/CIS and neutral EU   
KPU Communist Party  21 
Ukrainian election 2007 : Majority representation on Pro-European parties 
 
Pro EU and Neutral Russia/CIS   
Juliya Tymoshenko Election Bloc (BYUT) 2nd 156 
Our Ukraine   3rd 72 
Same scored support for both  or Neutral EU 
and CIS/Russia 
  
PRU Party of Regions 1st 175 
SPU Socialist Party   
LB Lytvyn Bloc 4th 20 
Pro Russia/CIS   
KPU Communist Party 5th 27 
Source: MFG dataset 266(for pro-European parties) and (for seats for the parties popularity ratings) (authors constellation) 
Figure 8.Perceptions on European Values and Nationalist Tendencies 
 Amount of parties being 
pro democracy,freedom 
and human rights,fight 
against corruption and 
supporting market 
enterprise 
In comparison to the three countries Nationalist Tendencies 
Georgia  
1992 3/18 At best mixed in 1999 
Position 2. 
5/18 
1995 2/8 0/8 
1999 2/4 2/4 
2004 3/7 1/7 
Moldova  
1994 3/4 Marjority 1994,1999,2009 
Position 1. 
0 
1999 3/4 1/4 
2001 1/3 0 
2005 1/3 0 
2009 3/5 0 
Ukraine   
1994 3/16 Minority all the time 
Position 3. 
6/16 
1998 5/12 4/12 
2002 1/6 3/6 
2006 1/5 2/5 
2007 1/6 2/6 
Source: MFG Datase267t (author’s constellation) 
                                                          
266
 Available at: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2119_92.htm 
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Figure 9.  Identification with the EU Data: Population Poll Results  
Amounts in the table represent percentages; cells were left empty in case data was not available in the three population poll sources 
which were utilised for this research. 
IDEN
TI- 
FICA
TION 
19 
92 
19 
93 
* 
19
94 
* 
19
95
*  
19
96
* 
19
97
* 
20
02 
20
03 
# 
20
04
# 
20
05 
# 
20
06
# 
2007
# 
2008# 2009# 2010# 2011
# 
Georgia – Public Opinion 
Wher
e does 
future 
lie? 
Partne
r/threa
t?  
EU 21  13 15   13/
1 
23/
1 
21/
1 
28/
1 
20/0 40/2 29/3 22/ 0.1 20/  
1 
US 26   13 
 
14   59/
15 
63/
8 
66/
9 
53/
12 
48/1
2 
63/3 60/3 56 4 58/  
3 
RU 14  27 34   42/
60 
32/
77 
27/
78 
32/
74 
20/7
0 
6/90 10/8 18/ 83 10/ 
83 
Image 
of the 
EU 
Posi
tive 
39  25 16 37  71
268 
83 86 83 85 94 85 86 91 
Neu
tral 
33  35 
 
8 21  4 2 1 6 4 1 5 6 3 
Neg
ativ
e 
24  13 5 10  10 6 4 2 2 2 3 1 1 
Who 
benefit
s most 
Cou
ntry 
itsel
f 
  23 
 
26            
Bot
h 
  33 30            
EU   16 10            
Suppot  
for  
EU 
memb
ership 
Yes  82     70 72 74    72 79 73** 
 
 
Moldova – Public Opinion 
Where 
does 
future 
lie? 
 
EU 23               
US 30                 
RU 15               
Image 
of the 
EU269 
Posi
tive 
48          48 61  67 69 
Neu
tral 
23          18 17  16 11 
Neg
ativ
e 
3          13 10  8 14 
Suppo
rt 
/Vote
270 for 
memb
ership 
Yes 85     ++
61 
  
66 
  
70 
     
64 
Ukraine – Public Opinion 
Where 
does 
future 
lie? 
 
EU 12 24 12 
 
14  29 
+ 
27 26 27 30 33 28    
US 14  9 13 10  4 2.9 2.2 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.6    
RU 30 46 48 54  32 29 40 43 46 44 51    
Image 
of the 
EU 
Posi
tive 
46 44 30 23 21           
Neu
tral 
27 27 25 
 
14 14           
Neg
ativ
e 
2 2 2 3 3           
                                                                                                                                                                          
267
Available at:  http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2119_92.htm. 
268
 *source IRI: www.iri.org (how do you rate the relations ship with the EU). 
269
 *source IRI: www.iri.org (how do you rate the relations ship with the EU). 
270
 ++Source : IPP Public Barometer. Available at: http://ipp.md/libview.php?l=en&id=565&idc=156 
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Who 
benefit
s most 
Cou
ntry 
itsel
f 
  19  16            
Bot
h 
  4 32            
EU   8 14            
Suppo
rt for 
EU 
memb
ership 
/ need 
to join 
the 
EU? 271 
Yes 82     65 53 45 40 49 54 45 44 58 51 
No 3      13 26 29 36 32 30 35 25 30 
 
* indicates to CEEB public data poll data results. Available: http://www.gesis.org/?id=1359&tx_eurobaromater_pi1[vol]=1359&tx_ 
eurobaromater_pi1[pos1]=0 
# refers to IRI population poll results. Available at:http://www.iri.org/explore-our-resources/public-opinion-research/public-opinion-
polls 
+ refers to Razumkov population poll results. Available at: http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/socpolls.php 
++ refers to IPP Public Barometer. Available at: http://ipp.md/libview.php?l=en&id=565&idc=156 
 
 
Figure 10. Financial Assistance 
Amount (referring to 
millions of Euros) 
Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
Border Management 37 37 160 
Readmission Agreement 20 4.4 35 
Protection of Asylum and 
Refugees 
7.3 8.2 4.5 
Fight against Trafficking of 
Human Beings 
5 3.4 4 
 
Source: Author has collected and calculated these average values on the basis of the EU’s project fiches and National indicative 
plans available in the EuropeAid Website. The amounts are averages as some of the assistance allocated to certain fields were part 
of a multicounty projects and in those cases amounts were equally divided between the countries, if no information was available in 
detail. 
  
                                                          
271
 Answers to a question by Razumkov population poll ‘Does Ukraine need to join the EU? 
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Figure 11. Summary of Results 
 
Table presents values of the variables when compliance took place in regard to the four sectors. Coding: 
+= high level/high compliance, +/- = medium level/partial compliance, -= low level/low compliance. 
 
 
 
EU 
Membe
rship 
Prospec
t 
Identifi
cation 
with the 
EU 
Issue-
Specific 
Incentiv
es 
Financi
al 
Assista
nce 
Technic
al 
Cooper
ation 
Legitim
acy 
Politica
l Costs 
Econo
mic 
Costs 
Cross-
conditio
nality 
and 
socialis
ation 
Formal 
Compli
ance 
Behavi
oural 
Compli
ance 
Georgia 
Border 
Guard 
Reform 
- + 
 
+/- 
 
+   +/-  - + - +  
NATO 
+ 
2006 
+/-  
2006, 
2007 
Readmi
ssion 
- + 
 
+  +  +/-  - + +/- +  
Russia 
visa 
facilitat
ion 
+ 
2010 
+ 
2010, 
2011 
Asylum  - + 
 
+/-  +/-   - + +/- + + 
IOs 
+/- 
2007, 
2009 
+/-
2009, 
2010 
Human 
Traffick
ing 
- + 
 
- +/- - + + + +  
 IOs 
+  
2006 
+ 
2007 
Moldova 
Border 
Guard 
Reform 
+/- 
+ 
+/- - 
+/-  
+  + - +/- +/- - + 
2007, 
1011 
+/- 
2007 
Readmi
ssion 
+/- +/- +  +  - - + - + 
 Russia 
visa 
facilitat
ion 
+ 
2007 
+ 
2009 
Asylum  +/- +/- -  
+/- 
- 
+/- 
+/- + + +/- + 
 IOs 
+/- 
2004-
2008 
+/-
2007-
2010 
Human 
Traffick
ing 
+/- 
+ 
 
+/- -  
+  
(2011)  
- -   
+/- 
(2011) 
+ + - + 
 IOs   
+ 
2005-
2006 
+ 
2011 
+/- 
Ukraine 
Border 
Guard 
Reform 
+ 
 
+/- 
+ 
-   
+/-   
+   + - + - - + 
2003 
+/- 
2007 
Readmi
ssion 
+/- 
 
+/- 
 
+ +  +/- - +/- - -  + 
2008 
+/- 
Asylum  +/- 
 
+/- -  - 
+/-   
(2011) 
+/-   + - - + 
IOs 
+/- 
2001, 
2011 
- 
Human 
Traffick
ing 
+/- 
 
+/- -   -  - + + - + 
 IOs 
+ 
2006 
- 
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